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1.1 THE AIMS OF THE THESIS 
To a political scientist the challenge.is irresistible of 
trying to explain and understand a conflict society which 
is generally characterised in the world as historically 
anachronistic, politically untenable, economically wasteful 
and morally unacceptable. It is common cause that South 
Africa will change. What are the likely ways in which the 
conflict will be resolved, and which is most likely? 
These are the questions to which this thesis will attempt 
to provide answers : it is an effort to determine, as far 
as possible, the nature, direction and pace of change in 
South Africa, as seen by a selected group of recent studies 
of South African politics. 
The method will be to test the validity of the respective 
positions on this and related issues embedded in the 
selected studies of South African politics. Part II, the 
major part of the work, therefore, is an examination of the 
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explicit or implicit assumptions and values, the conceptual 
and theoretical frameworks, the use of evidence, the 
existence of counter evidence, the omissions, inconsistencies 
and conclusions of various studies of South.Africa, in order 
to assess the strengths and weaknesses of each as 
explanations of the political, social and economic process. 
In the course of the examination, an alternative analysis 
of the issues will be presented and defended. 
A synopsis of the analysis will be given in Part III. This 
will be used as a means for testing the analyses of the 
selected studies, before selecting what is valid in all of 
them in terms of providing possible answers to the questions 
posed about the resolution of conflict. 
1.2 THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
The immediate difficulty encountered with this subject is 
the meaning of the concept 'change',_ and it is worth 
elaborating on what is meant by change at the outset of 
the thesis. 
The South African system has certain core characteristics. 
These are White control of the power structures, 
institutionalised racial stratification, differential 
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incorporation into the political and economic system, a 
largely capitalist economy, economic interdependence 
between racial groups, and an unusual degree of cultural 
heterogeneity. These factors partially determine the 
patterned political, social and economic interactions of 
people in the system. 
There are two possible ways in which the South African 
system can change. The first is marginal change, which 
does not affect the salient features of the system, and 
the sec9nd is fundamental change, which does affect the 
core characteristics: These correspond to Talcott Parsons' 
distinction between change within and change of systems. 
As Coser points out, 
~"even though it may be difficult to pinpoint the 
exact time at which one social system has been 
transformed into another, we, can talk of changes 
of social systems when all major structural 
relations, basic institutions, and prevailing 
value systems have been transformed" (Coser, 
1967, p.18). 
For example, it could be argued that the creation of a 
Cabinet Council which excludes Africans, and in which Indians 
and Coloureds have a consultative rather than an executive 
role, is marginal change which does not alter the basic 
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characteristics of the system. . Fundamental change, if it 
were also equitable change, would result in a system in 
which no South African would be at a disadvantage because 
of skin colour or ethnic affiliation. 
The distinction between 'marginal' and 'fundamental' change, 
and between change 'within' a system or 'of' a system, is 
natur,ally a relative one, since there is always some sort of 
~R c_s>_l),t.-i-nui_t_y_pe_tween--the past, present and future .of a sociaJ.. 
\~ 
; system. Societies do not experience birth and death, except :y ,.----· 
metaphorically, in the saro.e way as biological organisms. 
Relevant to this is a further distinction between 
'purposive' change, which is brought about by overtly 
political action (the establishment of independent homelands, 
say, or three parliaments for White, Brown and Indian), and 
'non-purposive' change, brought about as a result of, for 
example,.new technology, or an increase in African birth 
rates, which are not planned political moves but may 
nevertheless have a clearly political impact on the system. 
Since change, even revolutionary change, is a process, it 
is necessary to define what is meant by the term social or 
political 'process'. The term is used descriptively by 
political scientists of various ideological positions. A 
Marxist would see the historical process as being formed 
.. 
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through the tensions generated by the differential access 
of individuals and groups to scarce resources and power in 
society. It is an essentially conflict view of society, 
and according to Marx conflict leads not only to ever 
changing relations within the existing social structure, 
but the total social system undergoes transformation through 
conflict. 
Easton suggests that 
"the political process ... is a continuing flux 
of activity among social elements that seek to 
influence policy. The process conception views 
social elements as in constant tension or power 
struggle over policy, and the task of the political 
scientist is to extricate the various elements for 
independent study in order to examine the exact 
role of each. But for most political scientists, 
the political process is not only a complex network 
of human interactions; it is also specifically the 
interaction of groups" (Easton, 1953, p.175). 
The concept is useful for South Africa specifically because 
the country is clearly divided into differentially 
incorporated groups within the social and political systems, 
and generally because it emphasises that politics is the 
dynamic product of interacting groups. 
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The problem, however, goes deeper than definitions of change, 
to the analysts' fundamental perception of society. One 
possible way of looking at society is as a system in which 
stability is the norm and change is pathological, a.system 
which tends towards equilibrium. 
Moore has pointed out that 
For example, Barrington 
"as the expressions 'immune' and 'vulnerable' show, 
English usage imposes a conservative bias on the 
analysis of revolutions the implicit assumption 
is that a 'healthy' society is immune to revolution" 
(Moore, 1966, p.457). 
Since each word in a language is a shared symbol, we under-
stand the implicit images common to most members of society 
by examining the words used to describe certain phenomena. ,, 
Another way of viewing society is as a collection of 
conflicting interests in which continuous change is the 
norm. In other words, coercion, conflict and change are 
seen as more basic societal attributes than consensus and 
equilibrium. Marx's basic premise was that collective 
interests and concomitant confrontations of power are the 
central determinants of the social process. 
These two views of society are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive actual societies are held together by a mixture 
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of factors, including consensus, coercion and interdependence. 
Coser affirms that a mature political theory is aware that 
consent and coercion are at the basis of the political 
order, analogously to mature psychology being aware of the 
intricate interplay of nature and nurture in the determin-
ation of psychological phenomena. 
social conflict he notes that 
Later in his study of 
"to Marx, societal equilibrium was a special case 
of disequilibrium, whereas to current normative 
functionalism, disequilibrium is a special case 
of equilibrium" (Coser, 1967, p.141). 
Are South African conditions such that social conflicts will 
lead to inner adjustments, or to the disintegration of the 
existing social order? This problem is the central concern 
of this thesis. 
In any discussion of change, the time factor is of critical 
importance if this were not so, there would be no 
difference between a theory which argued for the end of 
White domination in fifteen years and one which suggested 
that ultimately, perhaps in a century or more, the Africans 
would become dominant. 
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1.3 METHODS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This thesis accepts the assumption that continuous change 
is the norm where there is a (temporary) equilibrium, 
there must have been conflicting forces which led to its 
establishment in th~ first place; and conflicting forces 
will lead towards the establishment of a new (temporary) 
equilibrium, and so on throughout history. Clea_rly, 
social life always involves change, sometimes fast, sometimes 
slow, sometimes peacefully and at others violently, which 
in the end results in the formation of a new social system 
and the disappearance of the old order. The model used 
in this thesis, therefore, will be a combination conflict 
and equilibrium model. 
The concept of power is a useful one for organising the 
study of politics, and it is one which influences the 
analysis in this work. The insights gained from systems 
theory, gaine theory, communication theory and other approaches 
to political science are also useful in analysis, depending 
on the topic under examination. 
Some sort of explanatory framework is required, since it is 
insufficient to simply describe the facts and let them speak 
for themselves; on the other hand it is unlikely that any 
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one model or paradigm of politics can bear the weight of 
interpretative burden placed upon it. One cannot assume 
that a syncretic approach is prima f acie better than any 
other, but it is often helpful in the study of South Africa 
in avoiding the pitfalls of compartmentalisation, one-
sidedness and excessive reliance on a particular theory. 
Different theoretical perspectives all contribute to the 
explanation and understanding of South African society. 
Lever (1978, pp.100-101), for example, gives several 
suggestions of features from different theories which are 
valuable for the formation of a more all-embracing "theory. 
A few of these are : from the race cycle theory, the notion 
that relations between groups develop, although such 
development is not necessarily progressive or unilinear; 
from the functionalist theory, the notion that value 
dissensus may be disruptive of society; from the Marxist 
theory, the importance of position in the economic hierarchy 
as relevant in shaping the beliefs of actors; and from the 
theory of the plural society, the diversity of groups 
serving to limit or define communication and contact. 
An interdisciplinary approach is also valuable : 
~!'Given a problem or a problem area, then it is 
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rarely that one approach alone would be sufficient. 
We need a de~ailed knowledge of all the relevant 
aspects of the problem, not only purely economic 
but also institutional, political and social. 
We must be prepared to go beyond the conventional 
boundaries of economics " (Knight, 1977, p. 40). 
The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to the study of political 
events. 
A major simplifying assumption of this th{:?.sj_s is that 
individuals and groups in South Africa attempt to pursue 
their perceived self-interest, which is compatible with a 
wide range of prescriptions and actions, but not always 
rationally or morally. The pursuit of self-interest is 
also assumed to apply to groups and countries outside the 
Republic. 
1.4 THE SELECTED STUDIES 
Pierre van den Berghe's work was chosen because it sugg~?~S --- .. 
that developments in South Africa would take the form of '0- --- ---- - - . -·-- -- -· - ---· 
increasing conflict, which in turn would lead to the break-
if - - . -
. down of the system. Heribert Adam, on the other hand, 
~ ---- -
suggests that the ruling elite is not so intransigent as to 
preclude all adjustments to the system, but is attempting 
to secure survival at the minimum cost. O'Dowd is included 
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because his is an explicit theory of change, and was a 
seminal work in the South African context of the argument 
that industriali_s_ati.on __ cy}d~g~ener_a_J,._modernisat.i.Gn lead. -to~ 
--=-=-:.~~____...-~--- - -- ', ~· . 
liberalisation. 
The works of writers such as Giovanni Arrighi, F.A. Johnstone, 
Shula Marks, Harold Wolpe, Martin Legassick, Stanley Trapido 
and others are included because their studies have applied 
different perspectives and added a new dimension to research 
on South Africa. These studies suggest, inter alia, that 
racial discrimination was useful for the development of 
South African mining, industry and agriculture, and that 
change is unlikely to result from the forces for change 
identified by O'Dowd and similar thinkers. 
Although these are the major writers whose works are examined, 
there are many others who make useful contributions towards 
understanding South Africa, some directly, such as Diana 
Russell on revolution, and others such as Barrington Moore 
and Walt Rostow indirectly, by influencing writers on 
South Africa. 
Indeed, this work developed as a result of concern with the 
profusion of analyses and theories on the subject of South 
African politics, particularly when the focus is on change. 
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It represents an effort to put some of these academic findings 
into perspective, to explain the interrelated political, 
social' and economic process, and finally, to suggest the 
ways in which conflict might be resolved,. and what the 
consequent range of outcomes might be for South African 
society. 
P A R T I I 
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PART II 
THE SELECTED STUDIES 
2.1 PIERRE L. VANDENBERGHE 
2.1.1 Aims, Analytical Concepts and Assumptions 
Professor van den Berghe is a social scientist who analysed 
South Africa ('South Africa: A Study in Conflict', Wesleyan 
University, 1965), in a work which Heribert Adam later 
described as the 
"most thorough overall study of South Africa 
published in the sixties and an analysis relying 
less than others on a single social science" 
(Adam, 1971, p.120). 
This section will begin with a brief discussion of his aims, 
analytical concepts and assumptions. Van den Berghe affirms 
that his work is an attempt to analyse South African society 
in its entirety, from a broad sociological perspective. The 
difficulties in achieving this aimar:-ise from the complexities 
of South African society. He continues to outline the broad 
characteristics of the society, the compartmentalised groups 
which nevertheless interact, the rapid change in industrial-
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isation and the relatively static ascriptive system of 
stratification, and summarises the outcome as a high level 
of. internal conflict, contradiction and dysfunction. 
Indeed the key analytical concept of his study is conflict, 
which results from conflict over the distribution of social 
rewards, from the lack of value consensus in South African 
society, and from the role ascription in terms of race. Van 
den Berghe stresses early his belief that the meritocratic ---- ~ ~ ~- - --- ~ ---- . - - -
~~--~~---
demands of an industrialised state are inc~~patible with role 
ascription by race, so that conflict and contradictions have 
beco:rne-increasingly acute over the years. 
Van del"l_B_erg_he' s __ a!?_sumption of the incompatibility of ----. - ·-- - -
apartheid (understood as role ascription by race) and 
industrial development is a recurring theme in studies of 
South Africa, with some observers arguing for and others 
against the assumption. 
As an explicit assumption in his analysis of South Africa, 
Van den Berghe accepts the Talcott Par~o~~~functio~~~~s~. 
postulate that value consensus is a nece~sary condition for 
~---- ---- -· - - -- -- -- --- - - - - ~- _____ .. 
the existence of a society, and that, should this be lacking, 
- --
the society faces disrup~i~~· He also uses Hegelian 
dialectical concepts, arguing that both functionalism and 
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Hegelian-Marxian dialectic present one-sided but complementary 
and reconcilable views of society. 
Coser quotes Van den Berghe as seeing his theoretical effort 
leading towards the establishment of a theory of society 
"that achieves an adequate balance between stability 
and the various sources of endogenous and exogenous 
change, between consensus and conflict, and between 
equilibrium and disequilibrium" (Coser, 1967, p.5). 
2.1.2 The Central Theme 
There is a clear connection between Van den Berghe's 
theoretical assumptions and his prognosis of instability 
and possibly revolution in South Africa. Societies with, ---- --------
low value consensus are unstable societies; South Africa ------·--- ----- - -
has a low value consensus and is therefore unstable. 
Interdependence defuses conflict, but in South Africa th~ 
. - .. - ~------ ---
absence of value -~~I}sus--overcomes interdependence. 
------
Therefore, South Africa will progressively destabilise to 
a revolutionary situation : 
"Under these circun1stances violence and revolution 
seem inevitable .•. " (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.182), 
and "although the exact course of events is impossible 
to foresee in any detail, the likelihood of 
revolution seems high. Mounting internal strains and 
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external pressures doom White supremacy and racial 
~--·---- - ----··- ---
segregation wi thin_the_ne_ar_fu_ture • • • " (Van den 
~ 
Berghe, 1965, p.262). 
Thus the central theme of his work is that developments in 
South Africa will take the form of increasing contradictions, 
---·-~ - ~ --- -·---------· . ~ - ----- ---
~dysfunctions and conflict within the system, which will lead 
--- -- --- - -- -· ---~-- - . 
to the breakdown of the system itself. 
2.1.3 The Study of South Africa 
Within the terms of his perspective, therefore, the South 
African political order presents to Van den Berghe the 
anomaly of a system which does not appear to rest on value 
consensus. In his study, Van den Berghe does not appear 
to resolve this point in an entireli satisfactory manner, 
except to suggest that perhaps the conventional functionalist 
approach is inadequate (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.4). At 
other points in his study he says that 
"the functionalist model of society as characterised 
by a high degree of integration, normative con-
sensus, and equilibrium must be regarded as one-
sided, and revised to incorporate the concepts of 
conflict, malintegration, and disequilibrium" (Van 
den Berghe, 1965, p.216); and "the postulate that 
value consensus is a functional pr~requtsi-t:_e_of_ 
~ -- ~ - - . -
any society~is patently contradicted by the existence 
- -
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of numerous culturally pluralistic societies 
wherein several groups have radically different 
values" (Van den Berghe, 1965, pp.217-218). 
However, his predictions of revolution, quoted above, do 
flow logically from his perspective. If he argued that 
South Africa could possibly or probably have a revolution, 
he would not falsify his assumptions. However, as has 
been seen, Van den Berghe was categorical, not only about 
revolution, but about revolution in the near future. 
The revolution has not occurred, so two conclusions are 
possible : 
(i) that Van den Berghe's prediction of revolution 
might still be correct, but it will take much 
longer to materialise than he thought; and 
(ii) that his theoretical assumptions are of debatable 
validity when applied to the South African 
situation and need to be modified. 
In the long term, it may be that his conclusions and the 
sorts of theoretical assumptions that they rest on will be 
validated. However, it is interesting to consider why his 
conclusions of revolution in the short term has not been 
validated. Over any given time span, whether the forces 
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leading towards disintegration of South African society will 
prevail depends not only on their own momentum, but on the 
strength of the countervailing forces within the society. A 
weakness of Van den Berghe's' sttidy is that he does not 
sufficiently stress these countervailing forces, as, for 
example, does Kuper 
"There is too much interdependence to sustain the 
threat of severance or divisive conflict. In 
fact, apartheid restructures the society by an 
elaboration of intercalary institutions and 
structures, which bind together, as with hoops 
of steel, the units-in-separation" (Kuper, 1971, 
p.182). 
Van den Berghe is aware that plural societies have "often 
been held together by a mixture of political coercion and 
economic interdependence" (Van den Berghe, 1965, pp.138-
139), but appears to have judged that the forces leading to 
malintegration were stronger. In the short run, at least, 
his judgement does not appear to have been borne out by 
events : as will be pointed out later in this section on 
Van den Berghe, revolution still seems to be a remote 
possibility in the foreseeable future. 
Van den Berghe says that 
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"I have introduced on occasions a Hegelian dialectic 
in my argument, and indicated the usefulness of 
such an approach to analyse the conflicts and contra-
dictions in South Africa" (Van den Berghe, 1965, 
pp.265-266). 
It is worth giving an illustration of this use of dialectics, 
so that the way he applies both functionalism and Hegelian 
dialectics to his analysis of South Africa will be clear 
before going on to summarise and interpret his main ideas. 
The following analysis is a good illustration : 
"Because the missionaires all but monopolised African 
education until the 1950's, and insofar as they have 
emphasised (in theory, if seldom in practice) the 
egalitarian and universalistic aspects of the Western 
ethic, they have been the first and most effective 
agents to spread the values with which Africans were 
later to challenge the legitimacy of White supremacy. 
In South Africa, as in many other parts of the 
continent, Christianity, which preceded or accompanied 
European conquest, has spread the seeds of the 
destruction of colonialism. But whereas elsewhere 
this Hegelian dialectical process was recognised only 
quite late, in South Africa, the Afrikaners have, 
from the seventeenth until the nineteenth century, 
combated the spread of the Gospel as conducive to the 
'corruption of the Natives'. The Boers opposed the 
baptism of slaves quite early in the history of the 
Cape settlement, and later they consistently and 
bitterly opposed the activities of the London Missionary 
Society" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.230). 
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2.1.4 The Main Ideas 
Van den Berghe points out that the modernisation process 
politicised the Africans, but that their demands were met by 
increasing repression rather than reform, so that South 
Africa's history has been one of emerging polarisation 
between the races. This polarisation, he suggests, 
greatly increases the chances of upheaval. 
Continuing White intransigence, moreover, contributes to 
the polarisation 
"If White racialism has powerfully contributed to 
the creation and continuation of South African 
society in its present form, it will just as surely 
help to bring about the total collapse of White 
domination. Such is the basic dialectical process 
of change in South Africa" (Van den Berghe, 1965, 
p. 246). 
The study essentially concludes that White intransigence 
plus polarisation plus external pressure add up to a high 
likelihood of revolution. The situation is such that 
"any retreat would precipitate the crisis, but 
every new repressive measure, while postponing 
the explosion, also increases its potential 
violence" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.262). 
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These are the central thrusts of Van den Berghe's arguments 
and the conclusions he draws from his study of South Africa. 
As has already been noted, Van den Berghe believed that the 
forces leading towards malintegration were stronger than 
those leading towards, at least, an uneasy maintenance of 
the core characteristics of the South African polity, or 
perhaps even greater interdependence and integration between 
the various groups which he identified as playing a political 
role. The reasons for this are probably to be found in his 
theoretical assumptions, and also in that he does not consider 
the possible counter-arguments to his own in sufficient 
detail and depth; the latter is probably the critical 
weakness in his study of South Africa. 
For example, Van den Berghe saw what he regarded as the 
incompatibility of apartheid __ a!1d in~~51_J_:!,sat,ion as an ____ . 
-· . ~-~- -- - - -- -
important dysfunction in the system. Other academic 
observers, whose work will be considered later in this 
thesis, question the assumption by Van den Berghe and 
others that economic gro':"_!-h_ is inc_o~patible with apartheid. 
On the contrary, it is argued, apartheid was highly 
functional for the development of South African mining, 
farming and industry. Van den Berghe does not adequately 
consider this possibility, although he is aware that there 
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is no rigid application of what he terms macro-apartheid for 
economic reasons. The industrialisation debate developed 
into a wider range of perspectives on the problem than were 
examined by Van den Berghe, whose conclusion is that 
"the fact that the economy has expanded does not 
mean that it is not inefficient, ridden with 
dysfunctions, and generative of mounting conflicts" 
(Van den Berghe, 1965, p.215). 
These economic strains, therefore, are seen by him as one of 
---~~----
------ ---
the forces leading to the disintegration of the South African 
system. 
Van den Berghe stresses the role of Afrikaner values on 
policy, and suggests that the Afrikaner people, and the 
National Party, are reactionary in the sense of trying to 
recreate some idyllic situation of the agrarian past. 
Against the evidence of a "pragmatic race oligarchy" as 
described later by Adam {though Adam probably overstressed 
the rational, pragmatic aspect of the Afrikaner leadership), 
Van den Berghe argues that 
"every attempt was made /by the Whites/ to 
resist social /in contrast to strictly techno-
logical/ change,· or even to revert to a 
paternalistic, master-and-servant model of 
- - - f 
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society. Lack of change /or reactionary change/ 
can thus result in ever increasing malintegration, 
and one may describe the political deadlock as 
one of static disequilibrium" (Van den Berghe, 
1965, p.273). 
Van den Berghe labours the notion that Whites and particularly 
Afrikaners wish to go back to "old-style colonial paternalism" 
(p.111) and the "good old days of the Boer Republics" (p.105), 
and does not widen his conceptual horizons to consider, for 
example, the possibility of a modernising oligarchy with an 
evolving system of domination. 
He does not note the differences in Afrikanerdom, but this 
may be for understandable reasons, since it seems there are 
no serious differences in the fundamental aims and methods 
of Nationalist social policy. There are Afrikaners with 
different perspectives like Kowie Marais, Nie Olivier, or 
Johannes Degenaar, who questioned whether Nationalists like 
Dr Treurnicht asked themselves how much the apartheid policy 
and maintenance of Afrikaner identity has cost South Africa 
in terms of social injustice and human suffering. Professor 
Degenaar suggested that some young Afrikaners rejected the 
possibility of a "pure Afrikaner hea:ven in favour of a just 
South African earth", and affirmed that "I agree with 
Voltaire :rfa ~l __ c.onti-n-ue-to-cornmi-t-at:roci:ties_as_).9n_g 
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as they believe in absurdities" (Degenaar, 'The Cape Times', 
5th September 1977, p.7). 
However, these are intellectuals who do not have direct 
influence on the power elite, so their views do not constitute 
a politically significant difference in Afrikanerdom. The 
Government decides and implements policy, and the Afrikaner 
intellectuals are either left out or drawn into the fold, 
depending on their own perceptions of Government policies 
at any point in time. 
Although Van den Berghe was writing and researching in a more 
ideologically hide-bound era, his portrayal of the Afrikaners 
as a backward-looking monolithic bloc shows some lack of 
sensitive analysis. 
He ought also to have made it clearer that although the 
South African Government has enormous powers to impose its 
values in the form of policies, it interacts with its 
environment to a certain extent, and this environment imposes 
conBtraints as well as provides possibilities. The con-
straints imposed by the environment (for example, African 
and White interdependence in the economic sphere) have 
effectively prevented the ideological blueprint of separate 
development from solving_ South Africa's problems in the way 
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the Nationalist Government had thought it might. 
2.1.5 Acquiescence in the System 
Van den Berghe is aware that there are factors militating 
against his prediction of disintegration in South Africa, 
but he does not actually follow through this understanding, 
thereby leaving his analysis incomplete. As Petryszak has 
pointed out : 
"A more complete understanding of the reasons for 
the continued passivity of the South African 
minority(l) population requires a careful evalu-
ation of the characteristics and objectives of 
the White power structure, as well as the ways 
by which the minority groups themselves contribute 
to the perpetuation of the social, political and 
economic system as it exists in South Africa 
today" (Petryszak, 1976, p.445). 
In this analysis, the same writer suggests that the seeming 
differences between the Whites themselves, particularly in 
their attitudes to non-Whites, confuse the latter about the 
(1) The author writes that "the term minority is used here in 
the sociological sense in reference to the degree of power 
• which the Africans, Asians and Coloureds hold in 
South Africa, rather in terms of their absolute numbers as 
percentages of the population." 
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real source of their subordination. Other factors which 
contribute to at least a minimum acquiescence in the system 
(enough to prevent its disintegration) include the minimal 
success of the ideology of Black consciousness, partly 
because it stresses fictitious links between Africans, 
Indians and Coloureds; an increasing amount of value con-
sensus as regards orientation towards a modern consumer 
society; and a hesitancy on the part of non-Whites to destroy 
the socioeconomic system on which they are dependent for 
livelihood and satisfaction of the material benefits idealised 
in western culture. 
Other observers have also emphasised the factors leading 
towards the maintenance of the status quo : 
11 0ne further point is often overlooked. People 
involved in a social system often closely 
reflect that system in their values and attitudes. 
Despite obvious reasons for conflict and 
resistance, and despite evidence of discontent, 
a considerable degree of consensus or compliance 
can still exist. Thus to assume that Africans 
in South Africa are in a constant ferment over 
the injustices perpetrated upon them is to 
underestimate the effectiveness of the very 
oppression and conditioning to which they are 
subjected" (Lemon, 19 76, p. 221) • 
This psychological dimension of domination can be further 
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articulated 
"Get some notions of what a person's system of 
channels is like and you have a rough sketch 
of the network within which he is prepared to 
exercise his human right to freedom. Observe 
the shrinkage of a man's system, and you find 
yourself a witness to a gradual human enslavement, 
enslavement without barbed wire or coercion. 
When a person can apply a construct to his own 
behaviour, consciously or unconsciously, it 
opens for him a channel of choice along which 
he is more or less free to move. But without 
such a channel his freedom has no dimension, 
no extent; he cannot even strive towards 
objectives, nor ca~ he hope for things to 
come, nor long for something out of reach, 
for he has no idea of what he is missing, nor 
even any sense of missing at all. He can no 
more move about in lines he has not construed 
than he can.use the fourth dimension to side-
step a locked door. This is why, throughout 
the history of the world, men seeking what 
they supposed to be freedom have struggled 
heroically to change their masters, but have 
made only feeble efforts to lose their chains" 
(G.A. Kelly, 1962, p.87). 
Perhaps the demonstration effect of Angola and Mozambique, 
and possibly Zimbabwe in the future, together with the 
growth in communications since Van den Berghe wrote, has 
heightened awareness of their position among the Africans. 
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The Soweto generation, though brought up entirely under apart-
heid, or perhaps because of it, are likely to be politicised 
and to 'have an idea of what they are missing'. Ironically, 
and as Van den Berghe has written, "the government's policy 
of creating uniracial Bantustans might backfire and be 
seized upon by African leaders to adopt an ideology of Black 
racialism" (Van den Berghe, 196S, p.149). Van den Berghe 
does not expand on the Black consciousness movement or Black 
leadership, probably because the 1960's, during which period 
he researched and wrote, were years of relative quiescence in 
which opposition to apartheid was being eliminated. 
Thus f?r it appears that Van den Berghe underplays the 
cohesiveness of South African society (which is owing to 
cross-cutting economic interests and values) and overplays 
the polarisation of the races. 
There is a tendency in Van den Berghe's study to examine only 
the aspect of a given phenomenon which interests him in any 
depth, and to neglect other factors. Naturally, the future 
consequences of present actions are often unpredictable; 
there are too many variables whose implications are not clear, 
and new factors may enter the equation, all of which make it 
difficult to relate the independent and dependent variables 
to one another in a systematic way, to assign weights to each, 
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and to make prediction less dangerous : Van den Berghe, 
however, does not take as much care in considering why his 
predictions might be invalidated, as he does to show that 
they will be validated by events in South Africa. 
2.1.6 Revolution 
Nowhere .is this tendency clearer than in his consideration 
of revolution, .and for this reason the notion of 'revolution' 
will be examined in detail in the following pages. Another 
reason for so doing is that the possibility of system break-
down must be examined in order to reach some conclusions on 
the nature, direction and pace of change in South Africa. 
Whether academic observers like Van den Berghe envisage 
systemic pathology leading to dissolution, or whether they 
advocate revolution as the only remedy for the Africans, 
Coloureds and Indians to improve their relative position, 
they have rarely attempted to analyse in depth the meaning 
and possibility of revolution in South Africa. 
Van den Berghe, for example, does not define what he means 
by revolution. In order to clarify what is meant by 
revolution, reference will be made to the definitions 
suggested by Diana Russell and Chalmers Johnson. Russell 
says that : 
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11 Rebellion is defined as a form of violent power 
struggle in which the overthrow of the regime 
is threatened by means that include violence. 
In a successful rebellion, overthrow is achieved 
whereas it is not achieved in an unsuccessful 
rebellion. A successful revolution may be said 
to have occurred when substantial social change 
follows a rebellion; and a revolution is 
regarded as unsuccessful when little social change 
results therefrom 11 (Russell, 1974, p.6). 
The Chalmers Johnson view of revolution is change effected 
by the use of violence in government, and/or regime, and/or 
society. By society is meant the consciousness and the 
mechanics of communal solidarity, which may be tribal, 
peasant, kinship, national and so on; by regime is meant 
the constitutional structure-d_emocracy, oligarchy, monarchy; 
and by government is meant specific political and administra-
tive institutions. Violence is not the same as force; it 
is force used with unnecessary intensity, unpredictably, 
and usually destructively. 
A possible point of departure for examining revolutionary 
potential in South Africa is to ask 
11 Why should the present system not continue 
indefinitely? Most people in the world would 
give the same answer to that question : because 
the system is morally evil, and humanity has 
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ceased to tolerate that kind of evil" (Keppel-Jones, 
1974, p.38). 
However, Keppel-Jones confesses a little cynicism in the 
matter of moral forces in human affairs; on the other hand, 
and this is probably one of the points of observers .who 
predict revolution in South Africa, if most of the people 
within a given society find it reprehensible, then there is 
a theoretical likelihood of revolution. This is a factor, 
but there are other, less intangible factors to be con-
sidered, those of the ruling elite and the role of the 
armed forces being the most important in South Africa. 
Following Van den Berghe's assertion "that South Africa has 
survived so long in such an acute state of disequilibrium 
is indeed highly problematic for sociological theory" (Van 
den Berghe, 1965, p.213), Russell continues: 
"In my analysis, too, the case of South Africa seems 
to challenge the validity and usefulness of most 
theories( 2 ) of causation of rebellion and revolution. 
Most of the theories focus on conditions that affect 
the rebels and do not consider the conditions that 
(2) E.g. the 'misery-theories', the relative-deprivation 
theories, the Davies J-curve theory, Tilly's 'uprooting' 
thesis~ Johnson's 'multiple dysfunctions plus elite 
intransigence plus an accelerator equals revolution' 
theory, Marx's polarisation of the haves and have-nots, 
as well as the central role of organisation, and so forth. 
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affect the regime and its agents, or the wider 
structural context of rebellion. That is why 
they are useless in understanding the South 
African situation where it is probably not that 
the push for rebellion is weak, but that the 
obstacles are so enormous" (Russell, 1974, pp. 
53-54). 
The elitist thesis, "that a rebellion or revolution can 
succeed only if the regime or elite is disintegrating or 
disunited, or loses confidence in itself, or stops believing 
that it has the right to keep the power" (Russell, 1974, 
p.53), is critical for South Africa. Neither the Nationalist 
Party nor the Afrikaner people show signs of serious dis-
integration : on the contrary, they appear to be both 
united· and resolute on the core issue of White survival 
(i.e. White domination), if not on more peripheral issues. 
·_The other critical factor is the role of the armed forces. 
In a systematic study of seven successful and seven un-
succes·sful rebellions, Russell established that armed force 
disloyalty is a necessary condition for successful rebellion 
(rebellions may still erupt, but they cannot win unless a 
significant part of the armed forces is either neutralised 
or changes sides). It may be superfluous to add that it 
seems highly unlikely that there will be disloyalty on the 
part 0£ the South African armed forces. The current small-
.. 
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scale recruitment of non-Whites may or may not result in 
the long-term creation of a portion of the armed forces 
which will be willing to turn against the White regime. 
Eckstein makes a distinction between the preconditions for 
internal war( 3 ) and obstacles to it (Eckstein, 1965, p.159). 
He conceives of preconditions as the positive forces that 
make for internal war, and obstacles as the negative forces 
that work against it. Applied to South Africa, the 
probability of a successful rebellion occurring depends on 
the relative strengths of these positive and negative forces 
it is perfectly possible that the preconditions might be 
present, but the obstacles are too considerable for 
rebellion to occur, much less succeed. 
Since predictions of revolution are commonly found in works 
on South Africa, it is worth analysing the phenomenon in 
more detail. This will not only clarify the internal pre-
conditioni for revolution, but bring into prominence another 
factor of vital importance, that of external intervention on 
the side of those working for revolutionary change. 
(3) 'Internal war' is a much broader concept than 'revolution' 
as defined above. All that the various forms of internal 
war-strikes, terrorism, civil war etc. have in common is 
.the use of violence. 
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In his discussion of external pressures, Van den Berghe 
suggests that 
"revolutionary change will thus probably result 
from a combination of several of the following 
actions : strong international sanctions, strikes 
and passive resistance in the urban centres, 
peasant revolts in the rural areas, and well-
organised sabotage from a foreign-based underground 
receiving outside military assistance and training" 
(Van den Berghe, 1965, p.263). 
Statements such as "a South Africa divided against itself 
awaits the impending and inexorable catastrophe" (Van den 
Berghe, 1965, p.263), given without explanation of the 
mechanisms for revolution, can be contrasted with more 
sophisticated analyses. 
For example, Greene points out that "lacking regime access 
and weak in organisational structure, no revolutionary 
movement should expect to succeed - regardless of the 
personal talents or ideological resolve of its leaders" 
{Greene, 1974, p.32). He goes on to say that 
"it may be true that revolution, peculiar to the 
early stages of modernisation and to the intense 
nationalism of anticolonial movements, is more a 
relic of the past than a promise for the future. 
Contemporary revolutionaries must consequently 
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place all the more emphasis on a frequent 
characteristic of the revolutionary process : the 
external support that foreign states can provide 
for revolutionary movements abroad" (Greene, 1974, 
p.93). 
Internally, South Africa provides a good paradigm for the 
supposition that 
11 the relationship between government violence 
and most types of political violence ••• 
appears to.be curvilinear : political violence 
increases along with government violence,· until 
a threshold is reached where increased government 
violence coincides with a rapid decline in the 
collective violence of citizens 11 (Greene, 1974, 
p. 113) • 
The weight, domain and scope of the power that is concentrated 
in Government hands in South Africa is overwhelming, and the 
country has obviously crossed the 'threshold' mentioned above. 
Thus future revolutionary potential in South Africa, as well 
as the regime's capacity for counterrevolutionary violence, 
appears to be partially a function of the cohesion and 
determination of the political elite. 
Elite fragmentation may be accelerated by attempts on the 
part of elites to initiate reform, especially where socio-
economic development has not been accompanied by changes in 
political institutions and representation, but it seems 
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unlikely that the Nationalist Government would commit the 
'error' of reform in the foreseeable future : otherwise 
improved conditions, political and economic, might make the 
remaining grievances more intolerable, the resentments more 
bitter, and the consequent repression more severe still. 
In an illuminating survey of theories of revolution Lawrence 
Stone points out that 
"fundamental to all analyses, whether by historians 
like Brinton and Gottschalk or by political 
scientists ·like Johnson and Eckstein, is the 
recognition of a lack of harmony between the 
social system on the one hand and the political 
system on the other. This situation Johnson calls 
dysfunction, a word derived from the structural-
functional equilibrium model of the sociologists" 
(Stone, 1972, p.9). 
The analysis goes on to suggest that dysfunction may have 
many causes, but perhaps the most important one is a new 
and developing process (e.g. industrialisation), as a 
result of which certain social groups find themselves in 
a condition of relative deprivation. 
Much depends on the rate of change and the adjustment ------ ~-"-----
potential of the ruling elite; if the change is rapid and 
profound, it may cause the sense of deprivation and alien-
' .
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ation to spread in!q_ ma!}y_se~c_tpr~ of society at once, causing -- ----·· --- ·- ·- - . . . 
what Johnson calls multiple dysfunction, which may not be 
. -- -curable-within the existing political system. 
- ___ __,_ __ --
-----A critical variable is the attitude of the entrenched elite, 
since a revolution becomes possible when a condition of 
multiple dysfunction meets an intransigent elite. This 
description fits the South African situation. 
However, revolution only becomes probable if certain special 
factors intervene: the 'precipitants' or 'accelerators'. 
Of these, continues Stone, the three most common are the 
emergence of an inspired leader or prophet (in South Africa 
he would be banned, imprisoned or exiled); the formation of 
a secret, military, revolutionary organisation (in South 
Africa it would probably go the way of Poqo and Umkonto we 
Sizwe); and the crushing defeat of the armed forces in 
foreign war (there is no indigenous sub-Saharan force, or 
even concert of African countries' armed forces, which could 
tackle South Africa successfully without outside intervention 
to balance and ttp the scales). 
2.1.7 External Intervention 
Therefore it seems clear that revolutionary change of major 
( 
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structural relations, basic institutions and prevailing 
value systems in South Africa can only be implemented at 
this juncture by powerful outside intervention, which is 
a perspective insufficiently emphasised by Van den Berghe. 
This is a view supported by Russell, Greene and Potholm, 
who all agree that while the preconditions for revolution 
exist, the critical factor for revolutionary success is 
outside military intervention. 
Despite the fact that the socialist governments in Angola 
and Mozambique achieved power with Cuban and Soviet support, 
it is likely that Potholm's conclusion remains a valid one 
that the great powers will not intervene to overthrow the 
South African system; and without overt action by medium 
to large pqwers there is little. in __ the .past and less in the 
"---present to suggest that the Whites ~n South Africa are about 
to give up the core characteristics of the system, or that 
any endogenous forces could make them do so in the foresee-
able future. 
A possible linkage between internal unrest and external 
intervention might exist if the internal upheaval were such 
that the South African Government lost control of the 
country : in this situation, the great powers would be 
likely to intervene to pick up the pieces and remake the 
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puzzle to their own liking. However, this intervention 
would take place after full-scale rebellion had succeeded 
in breaking down White control of the country. Once again 
in African history, then, it would be the violent 
revolutionary praxis of the indigenous people which would 
eventually bring in outside intervention and force con-
cessions from the ruling European-descended elite. 
As Grundy and others have pointed out, there are built-in 
rewards for violent behaviour. Black Africa's leaders 
progressively abandoned a Ghandian approach in favour of a 
Fanonesque one as it became clear that nonviolent methods 
made no impression on the rulers, nor, for that matter, on 
the outside world. Tom Mboya noted that the world only 
helps African nationalists when they have become active, 
but not before; and outside moral, material and ultimately 
active support is essential to revolutionary success. 
Thus it was that Nelson Mandela and other Black leaders in 
Africa adopted the Von Clausewitz doctrine of continuing 
the political struggle-by other means. Using Van den 
Berghe's dialectical approach, it becomes clear that the 
use of violence by one side in a polarised situation will 
evoke a violent response from the other. 
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The fate of a particular revolutionary movement, it has been 
argued, is in part a function of its external support, in 
neighbouring countries and the outside world. However, 
against this must be weighed the external support available 
to the target government. The extent of support for the 
South African system is difficult to judge. On the one 
hand, the considerable economic interests of Britain, 
Germany, the U.S. and others in South Africa probably makes 
their policy towards the country more conservative than it 
might otherwise be. Yet on the other hand, the strategic 
importance of the Cape sea route to the West appears to be 
marginal in terms of global nuclear warfare (and con-
ventional warfare along World War II lines between the 
superpowers is an unlikely possibility). The Carter 
Administration has placed a higher priority on ethical con-
siderations than is usual in international relations 
operating within the framework of standard 'realpolitik' 
it regards the South African system as fundamentally 
unjust; it does not consider South Africa's mineral 
resources to be of critical importance (they would be sold 
on the international market by whatever government was in 
power locally); and it must consider the trade-offs between 
support for South Africa or the Third World. The policy 
implications of this are that the U.S. cannot support 
South Africa unless substantial changes in the relationship 
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structure between the races takes place, and this is a 
pressure for change in South Africa (although it is hard 
to assess its impact on internal policies). 
However, it is possible to suggest that the tentative move-
ments away from discrimination that have taken place in 
South Africa are the result of outside pressure, and that 
the Government response to, for example, the Soweto unrest, 
was more restrained because of awareness of external 
opposition to harsh measures. 
Potholm contends that 
"the development of viable revolutionary organis-
ations within South Africa is considerably 
hampered because large segments of the population 
simply do not believe that the system can be over-
thrown. It seems safe to say that this attitude 
would be dramatically changed with outside 
intervention; with such a change in attitude, 
the quiescence of the South African domestic 
situation could no longer be assured" (Potholm, 
1972, p.631). 
There is certainly a dynamic dialectical process between 
external pressure for change and the internal situation. 
This cause-and-effect relationship takes the form of a 
ratchet effect : 
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(i} ~ncreased pressure from abroad - arms embargo and 
threats of economic boycott, UN and OAU condemnations 
and moral opprobrium, support by governments, 
churches and neighbouring countries for guerillas, 
sports isolation, diplomatic and press pressure, 
worsening relations with the countries that would 
like to support South Africa but cannot be seen to 
be dealing too openly with institutionalised racial 
discrimination and so forth - encourages the 
Africans to believe that their situation is not 
hopeless, and therefore diminishes their apathy 
and increases their demands for a better political, 
social and economic role in South Africa; 
(ii} Black demands or Black unrest in turn lead to 
increasing authoritarianism on the part of the 
Government, which is noted by the outside world and 
increases pressures from abroad; 
(iii} The~e pressures for equitable change again affect 
the internal dynamics in the way described, and so 
on up the ratchet. There can be no return to the 
status quo after each input. 
Yet this is a slow process. It may produce changes in the 
long run, but, as Potholm concludes, "for those Africans, 
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Coloureds and Indians presently under its jurisdiction, this 
seems at best a scant and distant hope" (Potholm, 1972, 
p.638). 
While the Western powers are finding it more difficult to 
support the South African system for a number of reasons, 
and are in fact advocating reform in clearer terms, this 
does not mean that the Communist powers, specifically the 
U.S.S.R., will automatically assume that an opportunity 
has been granted them to make gains in southern Africa : 
in terms of the global 'balance sheet', the cost of inter-
vention in South Africa is probably too high. The Soviet 
Union has not only become a global power since about 1970, 
but also a status quo power. The world is no longer made 
up of two international actors the global system is a 
loose bipolar one moving towards multipolarity, which 
complicates international issues. With the emergence of 
deterrence and a stable balance of terror, the Soviet 
Union recognises, at least implicitly, the limits of its 
power. 
', B~ America and Russia know that the other is a permanent 
feature on the globe, and that their own best long-term 
interests lie in a limited adversary relationship. Factors 
such as trade with the U.S., technical aid from the U.S., 
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and the success of the SALT talks probably weigh more heavily 
than domination in South Africa. Concrete issues and great 
power politics are stronger than ideological considerations 
in the modern Soviet Union. Though it is not necessary to 
do so here, a case can be made that Angola was a unique 
opportunity for some benefit at little cost, and that such 
circumstances are unlikely to be repeated. The essential 
point of this brief analysis of the global situation is that 
direct external intervention on the side of the Africans in 
South Africa is improbable unless (a) there is internal 
destabilisation, and (b) the world situation changes 
significantly in a way which is unforeseeable now. 
These are the sorts of considerations which Van den Berghe 
does not examine in sufficient depth. What he does say, 
moreover, is not very useful. Adam points out that Van 
den Berghe "bases a single chapter on 'External Pressures' 
on no fewer than eight fallacious predictions and 
assumptions that cannot all be dismissed as historical 
accidents" (Adam, 1971, p.120). 
These include statements such as "Basutoland and Bechuanaland 
will most probably adopt a hostile policy towards White South 
Africa" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.248); after the independence 
of the British Protectorates "the collapse of White supremacy 
45 
will be imminent" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.262); and South 
Africa "will be highly vulnerable to foreign based terrorist 
organisations" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.255). 
In the euphoria following independence throughout much of 
Africa, there was an almost universal belief that White 
domination could not last, and something of that spirit shows 
early in Van den Berghe's study of South Africa. In his 
Pref ace he maintains that 
"the liberation of South Africa remains contingent 
on-two main external factors. First, the terri-
tories north of the Limpopo must come under majority 
rule. Second there must be effective outside 
support for the South African underground and an 
escalation of sanctions." 
Yet nowhere in his work does he analyse the interpenetrating 
and interdependent relationships of the countries that make 
up southern Africa in the way that Ken Grundy and Timothy 
Shaw have done. Shaw, for example, says that 
"continued UN-OAU harrassment has encouraged White 
unity and intransigence; yet the prospects for 
reform are not all exhausted. This analysis of 
regional politics, focusing on the variety of 
actors, strategies, coalitions and structures in 
and around the subsystem, suggests the need to 
take into account the impact of bargaining within 
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and between the two multinational coalitions. 
The established modes of analysis which concentrate 
on national or global relations to the exclusion 
of regional interactions have not explained or 
predicted the politics of southern Africa very 
satisfactorily. The balance of dependence and 
interdependence, change and control in southern 
Africa depend not only on national or global 
attributes and interests, but also on the impact 
of two diverse multinational coalitions and on 
bargaining within these groups of actors" (Shaw, 
1976, p.19). 
Van den Berghe does not consider the point made by Shaw, 
applicable even when all the remaining territories in Africa 
are under Black rule, that "because of South Africa's 
regional hegemony, southern Africa may be a case of 
involuntary integration" (Shaw, 1976, p.4). 
There is no exposition of the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for turning internal Black dissatisfaction, or White 
disaffection for that matter, into more than a South African 
underground of token opposition, but into rebellion and 
successful revolution. 
Finally, there is no clear consideration of what is required 
in order to make sanctions effective, and the obstacles to 
action by the relevant actors. 
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Whereas Van den Berghe is clear in establishing that con-
ditions for revolution exist in South Africa, he is weak in 
consideration of factors which suggest that the South African 
system may not break down (at least not in the imminent 
future, which is what he suggests). 
2~1.8 Instruments of Change 
Consideration should be given to some of the specific 
mechanisms for coercing concessions within the existing 
system,_or bringing about a change of system, and a resultant 
revolution in the Russellian sense of the word. 
These instruments of change include internal rebellion, 
external military intervention, nonviolent methods such as 
boycotts, strikes and civil disobedience, and violent methods 
such as assassination,-sabotage, terrorism and guerilla 
warfare. 
On the basis of the ~nalysis already made in this study, it 
appears unlikely that change will come through rebellion and/or 
military intervention in the short term, and possibly not in 
the medium term either. Of course, new factors, as yet 
undiscernible or seemingly unimportant, may enter the 
equation at a later stage, in which case a reassessment may 
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lead one to suggest that rebellion and military intervention 
are either more or less likely than they are at present. 
In the meantime, that leaves open the theoretical possibility 
that reforms may be wrested or coerced from the ruling elite 
through the use of the other instruments mentioned above. 
A brief study will be made of each in the following pages, 
since this was not done systematically in Van den Berghe or 
the other works selected for analysis. 
Of the nonviolent instruments for change, boycott is the most 
significant in terms of both power and probability. The 
potential force is concerted international sanctions, 
applied under Section 39 of the United Nations Charter, if 
South Africa is deemed to constitute a threat to peace. To 
actualise this force requires Security Council approval, 
and although Britain, France and the U.S. are likely to 
veto sanctions proposals at present, it is not inconceivable 
that their policies might change. A Socialist-Communist 
government in France, a Britain that becomes more involved 
in the E.E.C. and relatively less financially interested in 
South Africa, an American administration more dependent than 
Carter's on the Black electorate and made up of committed 
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anti-apartheid members, are possible future scenarios which 
may affect the exercise of the veto in the Security Council. 
However, in order to make sanctions effective, there needs 
to be a blockade of South African ports, requiring a high 
degree of cooperation among the major powers, and this may. 
be difficult to achieve. Furthermore, the underlying 
assumption of such international action is that it will 
somehow be translated into political reform in favour of 
the Africans, but this may well be questionable. Given the 
perceptions of the Whites, and particularly the Afrikaners, 
of the alternatives to White rule as chaos, it follows 
that their limits of tolerance to pressures for fundamental 
change are very high indeed. 
International sanctions may well have an immediate effect 
on the economy, preventing the export of vital foreign 
currency earners such as gold, wool and diamonds, and the 
import of oil, machinery and so forth, but it is debatable 
whether it will have the ultimate effect of causing the 
target group, the Whites, to bring about fundamental 
political, social and economic change in South Africa, short 
of total system breakdown, which remains a theoretical 
possibility. 
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2.1.8.2 Withholding of Labour ------------------------------
The cessation of labour in order to paralyse the national 
economy, thereby coercing reforms from Government is again 
potentially powerful as an instrument, but difficult to 
utilise successfully in South Africa. The main facts 
militating against the Africans are their poverty, lack of 
funds and organisation, which means that they cannot strike 
for long, and, .unless they are dedicated martyrs, are driven 
back to work by hunger, the will to survive and to support 
their families. In addition, a leadership which attempts 
to organise an industrial strike of any magnitude is likely 
to be incarcerat~d before the organisation can become 
effective enough to support its aims. With their low 
current state of countervailing power, it is possible that 
strikes by Africans will be counter-productive, leading to 
further repressive measures. 
2.1.8.3 Civil Disobedience 
Civil disobedience aimed at disrupting the three law 
enforcement agencies of the courts, police and prisons is 
neutralised in South Africa by severe penalties for the 
open flouting of authority. The courts are not over-
burdened because of fenders are simply not brought before 
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them. Again, the leaders who try to organise such movements 
are not likely to remain at large long enough to complete 
their tasks. Commenting on the technique of moral suasion 
used by, for example, the A.N.C., Fatima Meer says that 
"the movement had used satyagraha-social force, 
the human possession of freedom, and the firm 
conviction that right must triumph. It was 
using it in an age which had wholly rejected 
right, or God, or morality - an age of repression 
in which success demonstrated reality, and in 
circumstances where soul force could not 
succeed against nuclear power" (Meer in 
Sundemeier, (ed.), 1975, p.139). 
If the tone is a little exaggerated and the reference to 
nuclear power obscure, the point still remains that civil 
disobedience is not successful against force and legal 
sanctions, unhesitatingly used by a determined ruling elite. 
Even if the standing of the laws broken is low in the 
majority's eyes, and the character of their acts is impeccable, 
civil disobedience cannot succeed unless it is sufficiently 
extensive to swamp the system, and this in turn requires 
cohesion and organisation which are discouraged by a battery 
of Government measures. 
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2.1.8.4 Violent Means 
Assassination of a politi~al leader would bring about change 
only in a system in which power is highly personalised, so 
that the removal of the leader also removes his system. This 
would not be the case in South Africa, where a cohesive 
Nationalist Party would produce another, probably similar, 
leader. 
It is difficult to make an a priori assessment of the efficacy 
of terrorism and sabotage in South Africa, but it has not 
been demonstrably successful to date. Violence may intimi-
date some of the White population, while at the same time 
making others, including possibly the political leaders, 
more intransigent in their resistance to African demands 
for change. 
Rural-based guerilla warfare in South Africa, given the 
power imbalance between Whites and Africans, the geographical 
fragmentation of the Africans, and the lack of a unifying . 
ideology amongst them is unlikely to be an effective 
instrument for change at present, though it may become more 
powerful in the future if conditions change (for example, 
Homeland support for guerillas, fewer tribal, political and 
ideological differences amongst the Africans). 
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2.1.9 The Possible Impact of Pressures 
This underlines an important point, which is that the 
techniques outlined have both an immediate and an ultimate 
effect. The immediate effects may seem insignificant, but 
the ultimate effects may be significant, especially if the 
instruments are deployed in combination over a long period 
of time. 
However, both the internal and the external pressures which 
the Government can tolerate without losing effective control 
of the country are probably very wide. Martin Luther King 
once suggested that a riot is the language of the unheard : 
it may be that South Africa will see spontaneous or planned 
outbursts of frustration, anger and resentment by Africans 
and perhaps Coloureds too, increasing incidence of rural and 
urban guerilla warfare-against the Whites and acts of 
terrorism against both Whites and uncommitted Africans. 
These will exact a high psychological and economic price 
from all South Africans, but they are not sufficient to 
bring about the breakdown of the system. 
Externally, the will and capacity of the Western nations, led 
by the United States, to establish unity of purpose and 
action towards South Africa may increase, in conjunction 
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with the growing potential of Black Africa to retaliate 
against supporters of the South African system. However, 
the analysis of sanctions and direct intervention in this 
work suggest that the former is largely unworkable and the 
latter too costly, so external pressure is likely to act as 
a catalyst and secondary source of change, forming a 
dialectical process with internal pressures for change. 
Despite recent shifts resulting from the independence of 
Angola and Mozambique, and the Soweto uprising, together 
with the involvement of the major powers in the southern 
African subsystem, and the human rights stance of the American 
administration, which have led to the questioning of this 
premise, it still appears to be a sound assumption that 
the South African Whites will continue to control South 
Africa for the foreseeable future. 
The specification of the time period is important for those 
living under the South African system 
"Whilst many of their attitudes may stem from 
the colonial period, White South Africans are 
not settlers. Only one attempt at evacuation 
ever took place, when Arkansas, Colorado and 
Wyoming offered the Boers land in 1900. Such 
an of fer would be no more acceptable today 
than at the turn of the century : indeed in 
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many ways less so, for the Whites have built a 
modern industrial nation in Africa. They have 
built it, however; with the aid of all races, 
who cannot ultimately be denied citizenship in 
the country which they and their fathers have 
helped to create" (Lemon, 1976, p.245). 
Lemon does not define 'ultimately', but the point is that 
the non-Whites can be denied citizenship in the country they 
helped to build, and will probably continue to be denied 
citizenship until a force equal or superior to that of 
the South African ruling elite is mobilised and applied on 
behalf of the Africans. In the absence of such opposition, 
the South African Government can continue in power for a 
long time to come, and can continue, therefore, implementing 
its policies if it wishes to do so. 
Careful academic analysis still remains to be done on issues 
which are germane to a better understanding of the prospects 
for successful armed struggle· in South Africa. The sorts 
of questions which require thoughtful consideration are, 
inter alia : Do the Africans, Indians and Coloureds form 
natural allies against the Whites? What difference does 
the fact that most Whites in South Africa have no lines of 
retreat, unlike those in Algeria and Vietnam, make to the 
possibility of successful guerilla warfare to overthrow 
56 
White control? What is the degree of the West's dependence, 
if any, on a White controlled South Africa and vice versa? 
What are the likely long-term effects, highlighted in Soweto, 
of the concentrated location of urban Black populations? 
What are the implications of and the prospects for urban 
terrorism? Is there an answer to Kuper's question 'whether 
there are grounds for declaring that /the people/ pref er 
death to oppression, the finality of annihilation to the 
indeterminacy of existence'? (Hugo, 1977, pp.72-73). 
A thorough analysis of the meaning and possibility of 
revolution goes far beyond what was attempted by Van den 
Berghe : the foregoing discussion has thrown into relief 
some of the political topography which he left largely 
unexplored, to the detriment of his discussion on the 
possibil~ty of fundamental change in South Africa. 
2.1.10 Economic Growth and Social Change 
"White s_up_:i;emi!<::Y ~s busily digging its own grave in many 
ways other than ideological" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.279). 
Van den Berghe assumes without question that the changes 
wrought by industrialisation and economic growth will create 
strains that cannot be contained within the system. He 
describes the normal socio-economic and potentially 
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political impact of the industrialisation process and then ' 
continues : 
n ••• far from adjusting to the trends set in 
motion by economic changes, the political system 
has reacted in a maladjusting direction. South 
Africa thus presents the spectacle of an 
equilibrium system that has 'run amok', and 
where the polity, by introducing reactionary 
change, attempts to reverse the social, political 
and cultural tendencies brought about by 
industrialisation" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.213). 
"The result of such policies has, of course, 
been cumulative maladjustment between a modern 
expanding economic system on the one hand, and 
• 
a political dinosaur coupled with a racial 
caste system inherited from an agrarian society 
on the other hand" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.213). 
The challenge to undertake a more thoughtful economic analysis 
of South Africa was taken up by several analysts (whose works ,, . 
will be considered later in this thesis) after Van den Bergh.e, 
so that it is no longer possible to be simplistic about the 
impact of industrialisation and economic growth in bringing 
about change in the core characteristics of society. Van 
den Berghe does not question his assumption of the 
incompatibility of apartheid and economic growth. He there-
----- -- -
fore sees the increasing strains and contradictions arising 
I 
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from this source as another factor supporting his prediction 
of the breakdown of the South African system. 
2.1.11 Conclusion 
Van den Berghe contributes some inter~sting explanations and 
insights in his overall sociological analysis of South 
African society in its historical setting. He gives an 
explanation of the conditions that exist in South Africa, as 
well as the historical and sociological reasons for them. 
Van den Berghe clearly describes the groups which are formed 
by the institutionalised racial stratification in the country, 
and captures some of the textural richness in the fabric of 
South African society. There are sociological insights 
into the groups he is studying, which uncover underlying 
attitudes : for example, he says of the Afrikaner feeling 
after South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth and the 
establishment of the Republic that 
"the bitter hmniliation of defeat in the Boer War 
was wiped out. God had favoured His Chosen People 
and given them unlimited control over the Promised 
Land" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.105). 
Van den Berghe's term 'Herrenvolk-democracy', as Adam later 
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pointed out, describes the White political structure more 
. precisely than a comparison with the Nazis' leader cult or a 
one-party bureaucracy, and this is another example of his 
contribution towards understanding South Africa. 
His application of a modified structural-functionalism has 
heuristic value in enabling him to look at various facets of 
the South African system, and classify them according to 
whether he sees them as functional or dysfunctional, in terms 
of maintaining the essential equilibrium of society. The 
use of Hegelian dialectics gives a dynamic dimension to his 
analysis, and is useful in explaining, for example, the 
increasing polarisation of the races in a dialectical process. 
This is in keeping with his aim of establishing a theory of 
society which·achieves a balance between crude equilibrium 
and conflict models, which accounts for both stability and 
change. 
However, there are shortcomings in his study of South Africa. 
In a sense, Van den Berghe himself gives partial answers to 
the problems raised by his work. Despite the fact that he 
foresees the demise of the South African system, Van den 
Berghe acknowledges that 
"although there are probably limits to the amount 
of tension and internal contradictions which a 
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society can take without disintegrating, the South 
African case suggests that these limits are quite 
wide" (Van den Berghe, 1965, p.216). 
These tolerance limits are wider still than he· envisaged! 
Van den Berghe's study does not entirely meet its own 
objective of achieving a balanced analysis. It is the 
major weakness of his work that he delves more deeply into 
the dysfunction of South African society, without laying 
equal stress on what is functional. He considers conflict 
in some detail, but not conflict regulation. He examines 
the forces which tend towards revolution, but not the 
forces which are working against revolution. After all, 
the weight, domain and scope of White power over the Africans 
is overwhelming, so even if the preconditions are there, it 
is not easy to predict revolution as cavalierly as does Van 
den Berghe. 
The principal reasons for this are to be found in his theoret-
ical assumptions. A minor contributory factor could be 
his viewpoint on South Africa. This is not an ad hominem 
argument, but points out one of the pitfalls of political 
analysis. In his Preface, Van den Berghe approvingly quotes 
Danziger, who at one point says that subjective views of the 
social process do not merely lead to meditation, but also to 
social action, and that "he is nearest the truth whose 
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situationally transcendent ideas represent the interest of 
social forces which are favoured by the historical process". 
Van den Berghe points out the foolishness of pretending 
Olympian detachment, expresses his profound distaste for 
the system, and leaves it for the reader to decide to what 
extent his own values coloured his interpretations. Admittedly, 
moral indignation is compatible with a wide range of 
assumptions and conclusions. 
However, it is possible that Danziger's approach, and by 
implication Van den Berghe's, could result in misplaced 
emphasis or even misinterpretation of the situation. Objective 
analysis, however unpalatable the facts, is a precondition 
for realistic action. So it may be that a small part of 
the weakness in Van den Berghe's study is attributable to 
his wish to be near the truth. The forces favoured by the 
historical process at the time seemed indisputably to be 
those which were resulting in the overthrow of colonialism 
and White power, and the victory of ~he Africans, throughout 
Africa. It would appear that his own values, plus the ethos 
of Africa at the time, did somewhat colour Van den Berghe's 
interpretations. After all, it is difficult for personal 
cognitive maps not to influence the directions taken by 
explorers of South Africa's difficult political terrain! 
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This discussion of Van den Berghe's study of South Africa has 
highlighted an important point, namely that most societies 
exist in a condition of uneasy equilibrium (some more uneasy 
than others). As Stone points out, the model of society in 
a stable, self-regulating state of perpetual equipoise in 
which violent conflict is an anomaly, is a utopia, pre-
supposing consensus on values, social harmony and isolation 
from external threats. The opposite model is based on pure 
interest theory and postulates that the social order rests on 
physical coercion of the majority by a minority in order to 
·distribute material rewards and power in an inequitable way. 
The latter model doubtless has greater explanatory powers in 
relation to South Africa than the former, making it easier 
to overlook what the equilibrium model has to offer. South 
African stability is under pressure from a host of political 
conflicts, but it is not, at least at this historical 
juncture, held together by physical coercion alone. The 
alternatives for the future range in theory from totalitarian 
repression at one end of the spectrum, through changes within 
the system, to fundamental change of the system itself at the 
other end. Clearly, Van den Berghe believes that change of 
system is the most likely outcome of the political process 
he observed in South Africa. 
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2.2 HERIBERT ADAM 
2.2.1 Introduction 
In a sense, Professor Adam completes the work undertaken by 
Pierre van den Berghe, by examining in greater detail than 
Van den Berghe does why the South African system might endure 
rather than break down. 
"Modernising Racial Domination" (University of California 
Press, 1971) is based on five years of research in South 
Africa, beginning in 1966. Adam affirms that his study of 
South Africa differs from others in two respects :· by its 
focus on the political economy and the specific dynamics of 
the South African scene, and in trying to avoid the tone of 
moral indignation frequently found in writings on South 
Africa. 
Although personally opposed to racial discrimination, Adam 
suggests that 
"emotional abhorrence, derived from deep commitment 
to universal ethics, seems understandable, but is 
no substitute for realistic analysis. The 
dedicated activist too frequently suffers from 
illusions arising from wishful thinking" (Adam, 
1971, Preface). 
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Naturally his work is not entirely unaffected by personal and 
environmental factors. He studied South Africa during a 
time of quiescence, when apartheid was steadily strengthening 
its control and eliminating opposition; there was dis-
illusionment about the possibility of real freedom and 
democracy and self-respect for the vast majority of Africans 
in independent states throughout Africa. As Van den Berghe 
was possibly influenced by the hopes of an earlier era, so 
perhaps was Adam influenced by his own times. 
However, in his study of the dynamics of South African 
politics, Adam makes a.positive effort to transcend the 
influence of factors which he outlines 
"The failure of moralism against an overwhelmingly 
stronger reality and the ambivalence of pragmatic 
survival within it was for me the most striking 
aspect of the South African experience. My wife, 
herself a member of the South African subordinate 
group, has above all helped to clarify my 
perspective on this crucial question. My contact 
with her vulnerable Indian community in Durban 
has most contributed to my understanding of South 
Africa's ethnic problems" (Adam, 1971, p.x). 
The result is careful consideration of the facts and some 
perceptive political analysis. The most interesting facets 
of his study for this thesis are the reasons for what he 
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terms "stalled revolution", and the implicit theory of change 
which is contained in his work. The impact of the changes 
he envisages, however, are not likely to be such as to affect 
the core characteristics of the South African system in the 
short or medium term; it is doubtful whether these changes 
would lead to a change of the system itself even in the long 
run. What one concludes from his analysis, rather, is that 
the basic system will be maintained in the foreseeable future. 
His theory of change will be examined in detail after 
consideration of the basic structure of his argument. 
2.2.2 Methodology 
In discussing methodology Adam concludes that 
"without. a perspective applying a truly inter-
disciplinary approach including economic as 
well as political-insights, an isolated 
sociological analysis of racialism and 
colonialism is inadequate. The extreme case 
of South Africa's continued internal colonial-
ism reveals the shortcomings pf a strictly 
cultural focus instead of a socio-economic 
one, which alone can come to grips with the 
decisive contradictions among imperial 
interests" (Adam, 1971, p. 36). 
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2.2.3 Key Concept : "Pragmatic Racial Oligarchy" 
Adam says that the irrationality of racial beliefs does not 
necessarily characterise the implementation of racial 
discrimination, which can be rational and efficient with 
respect to its intended purposes. What Adam understands 
by Pragmatic Racial Oligarchy is 
"precisely this means - end rationality that 
seems the decisive new feature of South Africa's 
version of racialism. This pragmatism treats 
racial and related historical experiences only 
with reference to their practical lessons. It 
overrides the ideological implications of 
racial beliefs and is oriented solely toward 
the purpose of the system : the smooth, 
frictionless, and tolerable domination over 
cheap labour and political dependents as a 
prerequisite for the privileges of the minority" 
(Adam, 1971, p.53). 
Adam begins his explanation of the situation by stressing 
the differences between South Africa and other countries, 
particularly of the colonial type. 
"The Apartheid system has been viewed as simply 
the most outdated relic of a dying colonialism, 
yet possibly it is one of the most advanced and 
effective patterns of rational, oligarchic 
domination" (Adam,_ 1971, p.16). 
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This analysis stands in contrast to that made by Van den 
Berghe. He then goes on to show that standard conceptions 
may not entirely explain the South African case. 
The main conceptual schemes are cultural pluralism, 
colonial imperialism, totalitarianism and fascism. 
In a comparative analysis of all these with his key concept 
of pragmatic racial oligarchy, Adam sets out to show why 
they all have weaknesses in comparison to his concept. 
There is a vast and complex literature on cultural pluralism 
and indeed on the other conceptual schemes. Adam has a 
facility for summarising the findings and putting them into 
perspective (though his approach certainly should not be 
taken as putting the full stop to the debate on each one) . 
His conclusion on the first of these schemes is that cultural 
heterogeneity should not be reified into a quasi-natural state 
of affairs, and ethnic identifications should be seen as the 
result of efforts by subordinate groups to improve their lot 
through mobilisation (I suppose the Afrikaners are an 
excellent example, whichr moreover, succeeded); or, 
conversely, as the result of efforts by superordinate groups 
to preserve the privileges they enjoy by exploiting subjected 
groups (the Afrikaners seem to have used both blades of a 
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double-edged sword to their advantage). 
Crude theories of colonialism cannot be applied to South 
Africa. Adam distinguishes between colonies of exploitation 
and settler colonies. The latter are neither exploited in 
the interest~ of a foreign power, nor degraded to a market 
for foreign surplus commodities. They might or might not 
exceed metropolitan colonies in degree of exploitation of the 
indigenous population. . Adam points out that 
"as a ruling class, the settlers are also forc~d 
to maintain a degree of harmony in the system. 
They have more at stake than a foreign colonial 
power : their own survival. Their coexistence 
in the same social system with strange people whom 
they cannot integrate is for them a source of 
permanent frustration but mitigates against 
direct colonial brutality at the same time" 
( 4) 
(Adam, 1971, p.33). 
South Africa is thus seen as a case of domestic colonialism. 
In the sense that a regime is totalitarian if it excludes 
alternatives to the established system, South Africa is 
totalitarian. However, says Adam, South Africa is not a 
(4) A powerful portrayal of "direct colonial brutality" is 
Joseph Conrad's "The Heart of Darkness", which underlines 
Adam's point. 
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totalitarian state when compared to the features ,of such 
states as outlined by Friedrich, Brzezinski, Neumann and 
Coser. For example, Coser says that totalitarian states 
destroy traditional groups and replace them with new, 
controlled units. Adam points out that the opposite is 
true in South Africa : 
"the government attempts to keep the traditional 
power structure and ideologies alive in order 
to use them accordingly in a framework of a 
divide et impera policy" (Adam, 1971, p.39). 
Adam then gives a summary of the groups that result from the 
"officially propagated pluralism" in South Africa (it occurs 
to one that if the differentiation in South Africa were 
purely 'cultural', there would be little to distinguish the 
Afrikan~r and Coloured peoples) .< 5> 
(5) Since the differentiation is, in fact, on grounds of colour, 
the so-called 'Coloured' people in South Africa form a 
'marginal' group, whose plight is reflected in a verse by 
Guy Butler : 
"This is the man the Empires made 
From lesser breeds, the child of Trade 
Left without hope in History's shade; 
Shouldered aside into any old place, 
Damned from birth by the great disgrace, 
A touch of the tar-brush in his face" 
(Butler, "Inscapes", OUP, Cape Town, 1976, 
p.105). 
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The most interesting comparative analysis is that between 
apartheid and various forms of f ascisrn, particularly 
national socialism. The decisive difference between them 
is their goals : national socialism was aggressively 
expansionist from the start, whereas apartheid, affirms 
Adam, is designed to preserve the status quo. They resemble 
each other in the need of the privileged owners to create a 
strong state machinery without relinquishing it to the 
democratic control of the populationi and in the importance 
of suspending competition and limiting upward mobility to 
the privileged. 
Another difference between the two sterns from the different 
levels of political development : in Germany the state had 
to do away with a democracy that had universal franchise, 
whereas in South Africa, the point was to prevent such a 
situation from the beginning. Adam quotes Barrington Moore 
as saying that fascism is inconceivable without the prior 
existence of democracyi in South Africa democratic conditions 
have never existed. 
In a racially fixated society such as South Africa, says 
Adam, the race conflict constitutes by definition the back-
ground of all policies. I have characterised South African 
politics as chromodynarnics, or colour-politicsi but the 
-
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problem with this definition, and also with what Adam says, 
is that it neglects other dimensions such as a class struggle, 
which is not of necessity coterminous with colour in South 
Africa. 
Whereas a unifying ideology for the racially separated masses 
is incompatible with the policies of the ruling elite in 
South Africa, and might not work anyway even if it were tried, 
what is required is a legitimising ideology : 
"domination.generally, in so far as it does not 
perpetuate itself solely through coeFcion, has 
to refer to a justifying basis, especially where 
its character does not allow for rational 
argument. The theoretical Apartheid programme 
fulfils the ideological function of an apology 
with the appearance of rationality" (Adam, 1971, 
p.45). 
The content and role of ideology in general and apartheid in 
particular may also be endlessly debated. Apartheid can be 
seen as simply a cynical rationalisation of White rule. It 
may have some genuine idealistic content. Stadler 
(University of the Witwatersrand, unpublished manuscript) 
has argued that apartheid cannot be analysed in terms of the 
interests and functions it serves, but that ideologies create 
interests by making specific actions appear to be sensible 
and coherent. 
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Adam sees South African race ideology as different from 
German antisemitism and previous colonial policies; it has 
evolved away from stressing the inferiority of one race as 
compared to another to assertions that the races are simply 
different. The irrationality of the apartheid programme 
lies in the assumption of 'natural' as opposed to socio-
cultural differences between the race groups, which are 
obviously reinforced by the imposed separation. Apartheid 
is practically fictitious, says Adam, but theoretically 
consistent (the latter lends zeal, through its plausibility, 
to those charged with implementing apartheid in all its 
forms throughout South Africa) . 
Yet another difference between national socialism and the 
South African system is that the White oligarchy does not 
glorify the leader along fascist lines. The egalitarian 
aspects of the Afrikaner past have survived to some extent, 
at least within the group. 
There is a legal opposition, which serves to maintain the 
appearance of a democracy, while being an ineffective 
democratic ornamentation. In contrast with fascist states, 
South Africa depends on a semblance of democratic legitimacy. 
Since the law legalises White supremacy, it is scrupulously 
adhered to by the Whites, gives legislative respectability 
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to all measures adversely affecting the non-Whites, and gives 
the appearance of civilised standards compared to the law-
lessness elsewhere in Africa. 
Also in contrast to other totalitarian regimes, the South 
African ruling elite seems relatively undisturbed by 
consuming power struggles amongst themselves. Such 
differences as there are do not reflect life and death 
struggles as in fascism, but differences in approach within 
the understood fundamental principle of the preservation of 
Afrikaner rule (seen as necessary in order to secure Afrikaner 
survival as a distinct people). 
Adam says that even though antisemitic attitudes are latent 
and widespread, there has been no manifest discrimination 
against Jews, which is yet another difference between South 
Africa and Nazi Germany. In addition, the connection 
between South Africa and Israel militates against overt 
antisemitism. 
For these reasons, Adam rejects simple comparisons with 
fascist states, while at the same time noting less important 
similarities. Though he says that racial prejudice may be 
practically realistic to those who harbour it in South Africa, 
as opposed to merely irrational and emotional, the evidence 
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suggests that he overstresses the practical aspect of apart-
heid and underestimates the sheer, irrational racialism 
which is deeply embedded in South African politics and 
society. 
Having made all these comparisons with other conceptual models 
Adam suggests that his own, that of a pragmatic racial 
oligarchy, is a more useful concept for analysing South 
African society, since it takes into account the flexible 
and realistic domination over the racially separated majority. 
There is no doubt that this has been a valuable analytical 
approach which has yielded impressive explanations of the 
South African system. Using his key concept he has been 
able to explain the means of social control in South Africa 
and the removal of non-instrumental or symbolic manifestations 
of the apartheid system. Adam suggests that one consequence 
of the pragmatic approach is that revolution in South Africa 
now seems a remote possibility. 
2.2.4 Stalled Revolution 
Like Van den Berghe and others before him, Adam saw what are 
usually regarded as p~ereguisites for revolution in the 
South African system, on which were based predictions of 
violent revolution and a bloody demise for White rule. 
75 
Clearly, the system was one of domination by a privileged 
minority, blatantly based on colour and enforced by harsh 
tactics. Since the Second World War, Africans were 
increasingly drawn into the modern economy and must have 
been made aware of their relative deprivation. 
There are two opposed but plausible views on this subject. 
One is put by Kuper : "the greater the advance (of the 
urban African) the greater the impatience with arbitrary 
restraint" (Kuper, 1965, p. 404). The contrary view is 
that if revolution is to have a chance to succeed in South 
Africa, the economic situation will have to grow worse 
instead of better. Those who wish to see revolution succeed 
regard economic gains by Africans as 'worsening' the 
situation. 
Adam would probably say that his central hypothesis of an 
advanced and effective pattern of rational, oligarchic 
domination can explain why revolution can be contained, 
whatever the preconditions might be; and his reasoning 
\ 
will be examined in the following pages. 
Adam discusses a variety of :factors that "stalled" revolution 
in South Africa : the exclusion of non-Whites from the 
essential sources of power is institutionally rooted and 
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total; internal resistance has failed and police control 
is virtually unchallenged; South Africa's economic boom 
has produced real gains for all urban groups and has had, 
at least temporarily, a neutralising political effect; and 
the policy of separate development has had some psychological 
success. Although the gap between the reality and the 
ideological ideal of viable homelands remains enormous, Adam 
points out that separate development has provided some 
political compensation for real rights through local govern-
ment and caused further political fr~gmentation of the 
Africans. It may be that it is not in the Government's 
interests for the Homelands to be both viable and recognised 
by the outside world, so that in reality they remain 
dependent on South Africa and unable to take a strong stand 
against it. 
The experience of self-government in the Homelands, together 
with the increasing need for a skilled Africah labour force 
and the growing differentiation of the Afrikaners and their 
interests, constitute the three processes which Adam sees 
as having the potential to bring about change and forestall 
system breakdown. This theory lies at the core of Adam's 
thinking on the possibilities of internal change. Before 
it is examined, however, his assessment of the chances of 
change being brought about by external pressures will be 
considered. 
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2.2.5 External Pressures 
Adam begins by quoting Keppel-Jones as saying "whatever 
changes, it will not be forces within South Africa" and Van 
den Berghe stating that "one can safely predict that external 
pressure will steadily increase and eventually help in 
bringing about radical change in South Africa". However, 
Adam is more cautious in his approach than other writers. 
He concludes that 
"only if the United Nations, with the support of 
the United States and the Soviet Union, were 
prepared to engage in armed conflict would the 
imposition of economic sanctions be an effective 
first step" (Adam, 1971, pp.133-134) and that 
"while one might hope for such benign influence 
(what Kuper called a 'world ethics of racial 
equality'), it would seem more realistic to 
expect change from the gradually changing 
interest constellations within South Africa 
or on war from without" (Adam, 1971, p.134). 
In his analysis Adam places more emphasis on the dynamics of 
the internal political and economic scene, particularly 
since the Whites actually want to avoid reliance on brute 
force alone, and would prefer a legitimation of their 
policy. He also concludes that economic sanctions as a 
kind of limited warfare can .only be successful if those 
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who impose them are prepared to intervene militarily; 
otherwise the demand for sanctions remains "the militant 
decoration of actual passivity" {Adam, 1971, p.135). 
The conditions he sees as necessary for intervention are 
acute polarisation to the point of war, interests which 
are jeopardised by the polarised conflict, and the realistic 
expectation of high gains (not just moral rewards) for those 
intervening. Two out of three would constitute minimum 
conditions for intervention. I tend to disagree with Adam, 
believing that the powers would only intervene after war 
broke o~t, and preferably after it was clear which side was 
winning : that way it would be easier to devise a strategy 
to ensure maximum gains for those intervening in a post-
bellum South Africa or Azania. However, I take Adam's 
point about the illusionary striving after committed external 
intervention, but disagree again when he says that it is as 
apolitical as the belief that the use of force is the only 
way for the oppressed to change their situation : it may 
be that the structural yfolence of the South African system, 
which he and other observers have noted, will call forth a 
violent response {prolonged and bloody guerilla warfare in 
Rhodesia was a critical factor in forcing concessions from 
the Whites there). 
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However, Adam argues that in the light of the enormous 
differential in military power of the antagonists in South 
Africa, reliance on an (unrealistic) violent solution leads 
to apathy, since it relies on what is impossible and neglects 
to do what is possible within the contradictions of 
oppression. He says that fhis approach, doing what is 
actually possible, does not imply giving up the full demands 
for abolition of racial domination, but brings the goal 
nearer by actively combating the growing despair, resignation 
and ignorance on which so much of the system's stability 
rests. 
Adam's thinking has similarities with other meliorist approaches 
to South Africa's problems, and his thinking is based on his 
analysis. However, he does not sufficiently develop his 
observations on the internal-external interplay, and is 
perhaps too optimistic about the possibilities of internal 
reform. Had he been studying post-Soweto South Africa, he 
might have wished to downplay the 'rational' component in his 
description of a pragmatic racial oligarchy. 
2.2.6 The Southern African Subsystem 
Although Adam describes how "the weakness of the independent 
African states is the strength of White South Africa" (Adam, 
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1971, p.136), his work would have been enhanced by a deeper 
analysis of regional politics. 
As Cantori and Spiegel have shown, by not considering the 
importance of regional international relations within 
regions, those scholars who were preoccupied with the 
state, took too restricted a view, while those who concerned 
themselves with the international system as a whole, had 
too broad a perspective. Studies which have focused on 
the intermediate conceptual focal point of the region have 
yielded interesting results. 
· Ken Grundy has described how a southern African regional 
subsystem based on diplomatic-organisational criteria, 
differs markedly from regional relationships based upon 
economic and other criteria, and makes it clear that there 
is an absence of long-standing and cross-cultural agreed-
upon patterns of political interaction that could be 
translated into stability and government security. Politics 
in many African states is still a fundamental struggle 
over the ground rules by which to structure the socio-
poli tical order and to direct change. 
Grundy traces the economic and transport relationships, 
the political and diplomatic networks, examines the 
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'bridge-builders', revolutionary thought and practice, the 
'outward-looking' policy and draws certain conclusions. 
For example, the total international environment has been 
passively protective (the regional environment has not 
been allowed to be solely determinative) and White 
governments have been brought to realise that to hurt 
weaker African states could well be to hurt themselves; 
however, the Africans cannot depend on this and must work 
to achieve conditions of symmetry and equality. The 
passivity became active with Soviet intervention in 
Angola and Mozambique, and this intervention has introduced 
a new element of uncertainty into regional affairs, 
although the core sector of South Africa shows a continuing 
high level of cohesion. An interesting way of looking at 
the subsystem is to construct different maps, for example, 
a simple geographical map, a racial map, an economic map 
and others the subsystemic panorama is ever changing,· 
and so are the limits of what is possible at any time. 
Grundy's final conclusion is that the southern African sub-
system seems to be A fundamentally unstable one. 
"In the long run its core is predicated on 
what was historically proven to be an 
insecure as well as a morally objectionable 
foundation" (Grundy, 1973, p.301). 
82 
This useful approach is taken further than both Adam and 
Grundy's work by Timothy Shaw in a sophisticated analysis. 
Shaw says that although there has been a shift in the 
southern African balance of power since the independence of 
Mozambique and Angola, and increased pressure on the Whites 
in Rhodesia and South West Africa, the area continues to 
be dominated by the hegemony of South Africa. The regional 
subsystem is characterised by substantial economic and other 
interactions. The political economy of the region has yet 
to undergo significant change in the direction of either 
socialism or self-reliance. He suggests that changes in 
the region might best be understood as shifts in multinational 
coalitions among a rich diversity of actors. These complex 
coalitions involve relations of both conflict and cooperation 
amongst actors at sub-national, national, regional, 
continental and global levels over several important issues. 
The article examines the alternative regional orders proposed 
by the White regimes and by the Liberation movements and the 
impact of these on the future regional political economy. 
Shaw supports the points made by Adam concerning change from 
within not being sufficiently seriously considered. What 
he describes as the UN-OAU coalition has not.tried to 
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identify and support groups in South Africa advancing change, 
whereas a more sensitive strategy would not depend on 
Liberation movements alone, but employ several approaches 
simultaneously, leading to actions which collectively 
reinforced the trend towards change~ Instead they have 
minimised the prospects of nonviolent change. 
Shaw contributes a clear synopsis of the different strategies 
of the two opposed coalitions. The minority (White) 
coalition seeks political order and economic growth, whereas 
the majority (African and allies) faction demands economic 
redistribution and political disorder. The important point 
is that the strategy of the UN-OAU coalition is based on the 
assumption that acceptance of the current minimum order may 
prevent any transition to a future optimum order, so that 
co-existence now will threaten majority rule later. 
South Africa's interrelated schemes for dialogue, coprosperity 
and detente are all designed to protect White power and 
affluence. The UN-OAU coalition is more concerned with the 
political and economic status of the Africans in southern 
Africa. The two multinational coalitions represent different 
interests and advocate different priorities and time scales. 
Neither one has been prepared to compromise or to recognise 
the concerns of the other. South Africa has not seriously 
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considered African demands for political and economic control. 
The UN-OAU coalition has not given sufficient consideration 
to the potential for change possessed, for example, by multi-
national corporations or by the Homelands. 
Had Adam undertaken this sort of analysis, his explanation 
of the weakness of independent African states being the 
strength of White South Africa would have been clearer. 
Beyond the impact of regional politics, he might have con-
sidered the potential role of; for example, multinational 
corporations in bringing pressure to bear on South Africa. 
As Vernon has written, multinational corporations draw their 
special strengths from the ability and opportunity to think 
in terms that extend beyond any single country and to use 
resources that are located in more than one jurisdiction 
(Vernon, 1973). However, and this is a flaw in the thinking 
of the Carter Administration, it is by no means certain 
that governments will get compliance from the multinational 
corporations to do what the governments want, rather than 
what the businessmen believe to be in their best interests. 
How will pressurising South Africa benefit them in terms of 
their global strategy and expectations? This is the 
question that has to be answered in detail to show how 
multinational corporations can contribute to change in South 
Africa. 
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Shaw concludes his analysis by suggesting that 
"predictions about the direction of change in 
southern Africa have been inaccurate either 
because they ignored transnational and 
international actors, or because they under-
estimated the adaptiveness of the established 
regimes and their foreign associations . . . 
Recognition of the complexities of regional 
politics in southern Africa should lead to 
caution about predicting when or whether 
liberation and/or socialism are likely to 
be achieved in the subsystem" (Shaw, 1976, 
pp.18-19). 
Although Adam's consideration of these questions clearly 
does not delve sufficiently deeply, he makes a useful con-
tribution in showing the adaptiveness of the existing 
regime in South Africa, and in stressing the complexities 
of the situation, (rather than making simplistic pre-
dictions on the basis of what ought to happen, or what he 
would like to see happen). 
2.2.7 Factors for Change 
The core of Professor Adam's theory of internal change 
concerns three interrelated processes within South Africa 




to change the relationship structure of the South African 
polity in a more equitable direction. 
First, non-White awareness and organisation will be 
strengthened by separate development, especially when local 
rule becomes an at least de jure if not de facto reality, 
as in Bophuthatswana and the Transkei. Second, Adam tends 
to believe that economic expansion eventually erod~s petty 
apartheid and traditional raciali~m by demandin9_a stable .. --
and skilled African labour force. _.Third, he suggests that 
Afrikaners themselves are undergoing a massive class 
differentiation as the rapid rise of Afrikaner industrial 
investment has developed an educated class that narrows 
the traditional Afrikaner-English split, divides the ruling 
Nationalist Party into verligte and verkrampte, and leads 
to world-orientated realists who favour a gradual lessening 
of racial discrimination in their own economic interest. 
Each one will be considered in turn. 
2.2.7.1 Homelands ------------------
It is difficult to separate the actual state of affairs from 
proposed consolidations, but at the moment the Homelands 
appear to be the following : Transkei, Ciskei, KwaZulu, 
Lebowa, Venda, Gazankulu, Bophuthatswana, Basotho Qwa Qwa, 
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Swazi and S Ndebele, of which Transkei and Bophuthatswana 
are now independent states. 
The Homelands comprise some 13% of the territory of South 
Africa. 
"In designating these territories as Homelands, 
homogeneous societies have not been sought. 
Rather, the Republic has relied on tradition, 
propinquity, practicality and political 
expediency" (Butler, Rotberg, Adams, 1977, p.2). 
Heribert Adam argues that the granting of political rights 
to the Homelands contains the nucleus of future conflicts 
which will change the system. In one of the more powerful 
passages of his study, Adam says that "suppression is 
either absolute and total or it develops an inner dynamic 
towards its own abolition", and continues that 
"In this sense, the promise of independence for 
the Bantustans and similar self-governing 
bodies for the other groups indicates not only 
strength but also the retreat of formerly 
undisputed domination" (Adam, 1971, p. 75). 
One conclusion about South African politics which emerges is 
that the Nationalists have failed to satisfy either the 
requirements of democracy, or to achieve the efficient 
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streamlining of a totalitarian state. Instead, they have 
used an unpopular authoritarian system, which uses force 
while still allowing a measure of dissent, to implement 
policies which require absolute totalitarianism. 
Adam traces the ways in which the Homelands might produce a 
countervailing political power to that of the Whites in the 
longer term. 
"The more clearly the non-White administrators 
become aware of their pseudo-control, the more 
their resentment increases . . . Subversion 
wi~hin the scope of permitted political activity 
could become difficult to control. As long as 
such activity uses the logic and the jargon of 
the government, it remains relatively safe . 
Similarly, the pressure emanating from the 
voters, merely administered on behalf of the 
real power, increases. Granting the franchise 
for all Xhosas of the Transkei inevitably raises 
the question for the voter as to what his vote 
_really means and decides. Politicised for the 
first time by fictitious alternatives, they will 
probably feel more frustrated in the long run 
than before, by having formal political rights 
and yet remaining basically rightless subjects. 
Having launched the program of self-government 
for ethnic minorities, however, its initiators 
cannot now reverse the process even if it 
should backfire on them. A return to the former 
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baaskap policy is no longer possible. Were 
the government to withhold the realisation of 
these heightened expectations, greater dis-
satisfaction and subsequently more direct 
oppression would be the inevitable consequence" 
(Adam, 1971, pp.79-80). 
Adam's approach to the Homelands serves to illustrate clearly 
the perennial schismatic thinking on any issue in South 
Africa between those who believe in liberal policies, 
amelioration and peaceful evolution, and those who believe 
in confrontation and revolution as the only way to bring 
about equitable change. Shaw's synopsis applies to 
attitud~s towards the Homelands : the one side feels that 
acceptance of the current minimum order may prevent any 
transition to a future optimum order; the other side argues 
that, since there is no current alternative, even slight 
possibilities for change in the existing minimum order 
should be exploited to the full. Both sides have a . 
logically constructed argument; it is doubtful whether 
one side will ever concede that the other has a case; and 
one's own view depends on fundamental values and perhaps 
even personal taste, over which, of course, there can be no 
dispute. 
The conflicting attitudes towards the Homelands can be 
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illustrated by the debate on foreign investment in them. 
Richard Blausten (in Charles Harvey et al, 1975, pp.102-
108), makes a case in favour of investment in the Homelands, 
while recognising that they represent an inequitable 
distribution of territory, and are unworkable in the sense 
that they cannot be viable economic units in themselves. 
However, it is argued by Blausten that the Homelands provide 
the only lawful way for Africans to organise themselves 
politically; the Homeland system is White-inspired so its 
manipulation to counter apartheid would be less of a 
clearcut issue for White resistance than would be flouting 
of existing laws or a bloody insurrection of the Africans; 
the Homelands are a training ground, so that when the 
Africans do take over, they have the necessary political 
and economic skills; they provide an opportunity for 
Africans to establish a working relationship with foreign 
powers. The argument is self-serving to the extent that 
it is partly aimed at making friends with the Africans 
against the day South Africa is under a new dispensation, 
but the factors for change identified remain valid 
contributions to the debate. 
The other side of the case, against investment in South 
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Africa's Homelands, is made by Jonathan Steele, (Steele in 
Charles Harvey et al, 1975, pp.120-137). The Bantustans 
are meant to give practical expression to the theory of 
separate development; they are meant to justify the whole-
sale removal of Africans from the 'White' areas, keeping 
those who are required by the economy as rightless migrant 
labourers; the Bantustans are designed to bolster the 
dwindling authority of African tribal chiefs by setting 
them up as heads of the new Homelands; they foster separate 
tribal loyalties and weaken the cohesion of African feeling; 
the Government sees the Bantustans as a way of deceiving 
foreign opinion and creating a facade of respectability. 
From Pretoria's point of view, investment in the Bantustans 
increases the stake of powerful outside forces in maintaining 
stability in South Africa, and provides the extra capital 
which South Africa has been unwilling to generate for 
Government-approved developments. Independence would be 
nominal, particularly in economic, defence and foreign 
policy matters. The Bantustans cannot effectively challenge 
White supremacy, and they are not an equitable substitute 
for rights in a common South Africa. 
Adam does not adequately deal with these objections to 
seeing the Homelands as instruments of change, although he 
does recognise the existence of counter-arguments : 
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"All the more so could the homeland concept serve 
as a union substitute even for the urban worker, 
a rallying point and organisational platform for 
emerging notions of black power and a new 
African nationalism in Azania. Independence is 
not necessarily a prerequisite for this kind of 
homeland power. On the contrary, having 
pressed for independence, some African 
politicians are now holding back. They feel 
that formal independence would finalise the 
white-dictated distribution of land the world 
would be unlikely to support claims for lost 
land after independence" (Adam, 1971, p.183). 
It may be that he himself underestimates the control over 
the Homelands which will be wielded by what he calls 
"effective technocrats who are establishing an increasingly 
unshakeable oligarchy" (Adam, 19 71, p .181) . 
A recent study concludes that whether independence becomes 
meaningful for the Homelands, and whether it can improve 
prospects for the Africans within the remainder of South 
Africa, depends ultimately on the price that the Homelands 
and their allies can compel Whites in South Africa to pay. 
Despite the ruling elite's affirmation that sharing power 
in the core area is not an available option, a federal 
sharing of power may become the only way of ensuring that 
the Homelands become allies rather than enemies. 
·' 
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"South Africa could conceivably use the present 
homelands as a nucleus of an arrangement of 
institutional power-sharing or as the core of 
some form of partition that is not against the 
interests of Africans now or in the future. If 
it does, the homelands may constitute a way 
station, useful to blacks as well as to whites, 
on the road to a restructuring of South Africa" 
(Butler, Rotberg, Adams, 1977, p.231). 
The impact of the Homelands' policy is one of the critical 
unknown variables in the complicated equation which has to 
be solved to explain the unfolding political process in 
South Africa. 
The idea that industrialisation and economic growth will 
erode apartheid via the need for a stable and increasingly 
skilled labour force will be examined in depth in the 
ensuing sections on O'Dowd and the Radical Revisionist~. 
Therefore, a brief discussion will suffice here. 
Adam may be correct.in saying that higher living standards 
for Africans over time will enhance their ability to strike 
effectively, and although he sees the flexible administration 
of geographical and occupational controls as the hallmarks 
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of a pragmatic racial oligarchy, it does not follow from 
this that there will be flexible administration of political 
and residential controls, which are only peripherally 
necessary for growth. As Johnstone and others have pointed 
out, actual apartheid takes the form of 
(a) keeping African numbers to the essential minimum 
in White areas by influx control and other 
regulations maintaining the migratory labour 
system; 
(b) reducing the status of those who stay permanently 
in the towns to that of rightless workers, with 
no right to own property; 
(c) diverting industry where possible to the border 
areas via the Environmental Planning Act; 
(d) a flexible job colour bar which relaxes job 
reservation when needed by temporary exemptions 
or the dilution of skilled jobs to allow blacks 
to do these at lower wage rates; and 
(e). by such methods as 'call-back' the migrant 
labour system is worked in such a way as to 
avoid serious reduction in efficiency or labour 
shortages. 
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There is not much in this analysis to comfort the proponents 
of change through the mechanism of the demands of economic 
growth. Such changes as might take place would be related 
to increased efficiency at marginal cost to the basic 
relationship structure between African and White. 
With regard to the differentiation amongst the ruling 
Afrikaners, Adam argues that the 
"historical friction between the English and 
Afrikaans speaking populace is gradually being 
replaced by class contradictions within the 
two groups. As an entrepreneur, an Afrikaner 
has more in common with his English speaking 
counterparts than with his poorer fellow 
Nationalists 
The differences between verligte and verkrampte 
would seem in the long run to be more severe 
and persistent than their common ethnocentric 
frame would suggest • . . 
This does not mean that the present policy of 
the verligte is likely to change basically. 
What can be expected is only that for such a 
policy, ideological considerations will not 
be decisive, but that it will remain 
sufficiently flexible to adapt itself to new 
conditions and, if necessary to compromise •• 
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"Above all, the rational racial domination is 
most likely to falsify the assumption that 
mounting internal tension will make a violent 
revolutionary change inevitable" (Adam, 1971, 
pp.179-181). 
Naturally, it is not only the rational rule of the Whites, 
but also the lack of any force powerful enough to implement 
it that effectively prevents revolutionary change. Adam 
understresses the basic unanimity of the Afrikaners, and 
indeed of the Whites, on the core issue of White control 
over their own affairs and those of the South African state. 
The processes described by Adam have a theoretical potential 
to brirtg about marginal changes, but his point, with which 
I concur, is that these changes are unlikely to bring about 
fundamental transformation of the system, even in the long 
run. 
Change of system, therefore, is unlikely. Changes within 
the system could result from forced accommodation between 
Whites and Blacks, since the latter are not entirely 
powerless. 
This point is illustrated in a succinct analysis of the 
future of South Africa written by Austin Turk in 1967 in 
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which he summarises the various sources of Black power, 
potential if not actualised. 
Turk notes that power is being transferred to the Africans. 
Though the fountainhead of power is still with the Whites, 
who of course want to keep it there, the derived power 
which is given to the Africans through the creation of 
puppet Homelands does increase their power base. There 
cannot be immediate surveillance and control of everything 
that goes on in the African sectors. Turk then gives 
some reasons for maintaining that the Africans have some 
strength to force concessions from the Whites : 
"Their (1) numerical superiority, (2) indispensable 
role in the economy, (3) tribal affiliations and 
cultural memories of not always unsuccessful 
military encounters with the whites, (4) 
educational advances, (5) external sources of 
ideological and other weapons, and (6) psychic 
resources derived from long and intimate 
contact with whites, who themselves are not 
really entirely indifferent to the pressures 
of 'common humanity', point inexorably to 
accommodation. African power is a fact that 
will not go away" (Turk, 1967, p.409). 
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2.2.8 A Unifying Black Ideology? 
In the decade since the article was written, there has been 
a growing articulation of Black( 6) consciousness, by groups 
such as the Black People's Convention (BPC) and the South 
African Students' Organisation (SASO), which are now 
banned. The Blacks appear to be doing what the Afrikaners 
did before them looking at their position in the South 
African context and attempting to form a unifying ideology, 
consequently acting in concert for the betterment of their 
group. A further irony is that the system provides them with 
a unifying factor, a subordinate position owing to a black skin. 
These and related ideas were coherently argued in two 
articles (Thami Zani, Black People's Convention Publicity 
Secretary, The Cape Times, 28.4.1977 and 3.5.1977) in which 
it was stated that "the overall analysis ·based on the 
Hegelian theory of dialectical materialism is therefore as 
follows - that since the thesis is white racism there can 
only be one valid antithesis, a solid black unity to 
counterbalance the scale". The author rejects the liberal 
argument which says that it is racialistic for the Blacks 
to come together as a self-conscious group, since arguments 
of this type have served only to divide the Blacks. The 
(6) In this section, the word 'Black' is understood as 
synonymous with 'African; (whereas it usually encompasses 
Africans, Indians and Coloureds). 
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founding president of SASO and honorary president of the BPC, 
Steve Biko, who died while in detention, saw Black conscious-
ness not only as a way to restore self-pride in Blacks, but 
also as a way to dispel White prejudice about Blacks. 
Though the publicity secretary might be misrepresenting 
Hegel, one can still take his oft-repeated point, that White 
racialism is fostering Black racialism. 
Although Thami Zani affirms "we cannot be conscious of our-
selves, and yet remain in bondage", in the present context 
it seems that the Black consciousness movement will have 
private psychological and moral consequences in terms of the 
restoiation of pride in being Black and healthy self-image, 
rather than success as a political movement in the public 
domain. The weight of White power is too overwhelming for 
it to do that, but it may well lay a solid foundation for 
future Black efforts aimed at amelioration of their 
situation. 
A unifying Black ideology would be a prerequisite for 
collective Black action, because, as Adam and others have 
noted, 
"nothing seems further from reality than to assume 
a conscious homogeneity of non-White interests as 
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opposed to their rulers. In Marx's categories, 
they constitute most certainly a class 'in 
itself' but they are further away than the 
European proletariat ever has been from a 
consciousness with which they form a class 
1 for itself'" (Adam, 1971, pp. 71-72). 
Conflicts between the Africans themselves, such as tribalism, 
militate against Black unity and provide opportunities for 
the Government to exploit in its policy of divide and rule. 
Adam talks about a widespread ethnic narcissism in all 
groups which responds to the right to keep their cultural 
identity : that for which minorities in other parts of the 
world struggle is granted readily in South Africa. Is it 
granted because of Afrikaner history and reverence for other 
people's nationalisms, or is it a calculated device for 
perpetuating White domination? Reality is usually a mixture 
of factors, but more weight should be assigned to the latter. 
2.2.9 Conclusion 
·Adam's central hypothesis is that the apartheid system is 
an advanced and effective pattern of rational, oligarchic 
domination. In summary, some assessment has to be made of 
its usefulness in furthering explanation and understanding 
of South African politics. 
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His key concept of a pragmatic racial oligarchy goes a long 
way towards answering Van den Berghe's question about how 
South Africa can survive for so long in a state of acute 
disequilibrium. Adam does not overlook other reasons, 
such as overwhelming White power, Black disunity, economic 
interdependence and so forth. However, whereas Van den 
Berghe tends to underrate the adaptive and innovative 
capacity of the South African Government, Adam probably 
gives the Government's rationality too high a rating in his 
analysis. 
As already mentioned, if Adam had been researching South 
Africa at the time of Soweto and its aftermath, he might 
have been left with less of an impression of 'rationality', 
and more of an impression of determined force willingly used 
to defeat any challenge to domination. 
The use of force to quell disturbances could, of course, be 
looked upon as entirely pragmatic. However, what Adam 
seems to have had in mind when using the concept pragmatic 
domination is the truly frictionless rule of a Huxleian 
brave new world, or at least a movement in that direction 
a more pragmatic racial oligarchy in South Africa could, for 
example, attempt to govern with the cooperation of African 
elites. As Du Toit points out, the failures prior to 
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October 1977 to restore civil order by coercive means alone 
must have made it clear to the Government that some political 
accommodation was necessary (Du Toit, 'The Cape Times', 
30.6.1978, p.10). Cooperation with African elites would 
not threaten National Party unity or the apartheid system, 
though it might be incompatible with exclusive White privilege 
and social segregation. It is a step like this which Adam 
would characterise as "pragmatic racial domination". How 
pragmatic the ruling elite can be without splitting itself 
will be a major factor determining changes within the system 
in the future. 
In his study of the dynamics of South African politics, Adam 
outlined interrelated processes which could bring about 
changes, though not fundamental ones. Even though one may 
not agree with the way he relates the variables and the 
weights he assigns to them, his work is a useful exercise in 
clarifying the complexities of the South African political 
process. 
Adam's study offers the understanding that the Whites are 
playing a survival game, that the rules are not immutable, 
and that the business of politics is often to trade one thing 
for another, and that there could be a shift in the relative 
economic and social status of Africans and Whites as a result 
of economic growth and education. 
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2.3 MICHAEL O'DOWD 
Michael O'Dowd has contributed an explicit theory of change 
in South Africa! first in the form of unpublished manuscripts 
in the 1960's: then in a chapter in Leftwich ('South Africa: 
Economic Growth and Political Change', London, 1974), and 
more recently, in the Schlemmer and Webster volume ('Change, 
Reform and Economic Growth in South Africa', Johannesburg, 
1978). 
Since his theory· is based on the writings of Professor W.W. 
Rostow, <7) a thorough assessment of the O'Dowd view of change 
and the future of South Africa requires a critical analysis 
of its origins. This will be followed by an exposition of 
O'Dowd's application of Rostovian concepts, and then a 
critique of his work, in order to arrive at some conclusions 
about the validity of his theory of change. 
2.3.1 The Rostovian Model : A Critique 
Professor Rostow appears to have been influenced by Karl Marx's 
(7) Rostow's 'stages of growth' theory has also been applied to 
South Africa in a short historical review by D.Hobart-Houghton 
in his widely-read book 'The South African Economy', 
Oxford University Press, 1973 (3rd edition). 
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sequence of stages in which feudalism gave way to bourgeois 
capitalism followed by socialism and then communism, and 
other similar theories, and consequently, was stimulated to 
write 'The Stages of Economic Growth : A non-communist 
manifesto' • The stages of growth were intended "to challenge 
and supplant Marxism as a way of looking at modern history". 
He suggests that in the process of economic development, 
societies pass through five distinctive basic stages the 
traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the 
take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass 
consumption. International conflict, notably war, is also 
related to the stages of growth. Rostow affirms that his 
stages of growth are not merely descriptive, but have "an 
inner logic and continuity. They have analytical bone 
structure, rooted in a dynamic theory of production" 
(Rostow, 1960, p.12). 
that 
The essentials of the theory are 
"in the forward momentum of the economy certain 
leading sectors are prominent which, in their 
early stages of development, grow rapidly; there 
are sectoral optimum positions determined ideally 
by the trend of income and population, by 
. technology, the quality of entrepreneurship, and 
by the empirical fact that deceleration is the 
normal optimum path of each sector. These optima 
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postulate a sequence of optimum patterns of 
investment. But the actual course of investment 
and of the deployment of resources generally 
differs from these optima in being influenced 
not only by private choices, but also by social 
decisions and government policies, and the 
impact of wars. 
certain leading 
growth of which 
However, at any given time, 
sectors can be identified, the 
was vital in propelling forward 
the economy. Their position is determined by 
supply and demand in the widest sense. Thus the 
pattern and allocation of resources are governed 
by the complex social, political and economic 
forces affecting them" (Bauer and Wilson, 1962, 
pp. 19 2-19 3) • 
Bauer and Wilson continue to say that 
11 the exposition thus vacillates between the 
suggestion, on the one hand, that the configuration 
of societies in particular stages of development 
and their progress from one stage to the next 
are shaped by certain specified key variables, 
and the suggestion, on the other, that they 
depend on a large number of interrelated variables 
and influences, which are often unspecified and 
the operation of which depends largely on local 
circumstances. These additional variables or 
other qualifications are sufficiently numerous, 
or stated in sufficiently general terms, to 
reduce much of the argument to unhelpful statements 
such as that economies will advance if there are 
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enough progressive sectors, or that in economic 
life all factors are interrelated and everything 
depends on everything else. A theory which depends 
on such escape clauses cannot be effectively 
refuted. But equally it cannot explain anything" · 
(Bauer and Wilson, 1962, p.194). 
Rostow's work does not offer clearly defined specific 
criteria for the definition and dating of the stages of 
growth, which makes it difficult to come to grips with his 
argument. Phrases such as "self-sustaining growth" are 
not helpful, in that growth cannot be self-sustaining in 
the sense of continuing irrespective of attitudes, 
institutions and policies. His account of development 
after the take-off deals entirely with countries already 
part of the developed world this is one reason why it 
is simplistic for O'Dowd to transplant the theory to South 
Africa. 
A key question which applies to both Rostow and O'Dowd is 
"Are there any general propositions in the social 
sciences implying that all societies can reach 
broadly similar levels of development, regardless 
of natural resources, historical experience, 
political institutions, social customs and the 
economic qualities and customs of the population?" 
(Bauer and Wilson, 1962, p.199). 
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It would require some audacity to state that there are. 
Rostow's proposals, based on his key variables, seem to 
reflect a belief in economic development without cultural 
change. 
In the context of a study on European industrialisation, 
Alexander Gerschenkron points out that "depending on a 
given country's degree of economic backwardness on the eve 
of its industrialisation, the course and character of the 
latter tend to vary in a number of important respects", so 
that it is not possible to suggest, as Rostow does, "that 
the process of industrialisation repeated itself from 
country to country lumbering through his pentametric 
rhythm" (Gerschenkron, 1966, pp. 353-355). 
Rostow, in common with others writing with ideological intent, 
appears to ignore the richness and diversity of history! 
2.3.2 The Rostovian Influence O'Dowd's Key Concepts 
and Theory of Change 
O'Dowd belongs to what might be termed the Oppenheimer 
school of thought : South Africa began to industrialise 
only as recently as 1886. Around 1970 it reached the 
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stage of changing from labour intensive to a capital intensive 
system, and in this phase there are opportunities for Africans 
to do skilled work, and therefore, over a period of time, to 
improve their social and economic position, and perhaps be in 
a better position to wrest political concessions from the 
Government. 
If South Africa is allowed time to continue the industrial-
isation process and to prosper, it will become possible to 
have political changes which are both fundamental and peaceful. 
During the transition period to full industrialisation, while 
half or more of the population is still living in the 
subsistence economy, there is bound to be both discrimination 
and hardship. 
A useful parallel is the case of the Irish in the 19th 
century who were manipulated to suit the needs of the English 
economy. They may not have been legally discriminated 
against, as Africans are in South Africa, but O'Dowd quotes 
the cynical aphorism showing that there are more subtle 
forms of discrimination : "The doors of the Court of Justice 
stand open to all~ like the doors of the Ritz Hotel". O'Dowd 
says that 
"it is perfectly clear that there is not equality 
of opportunity in other developing countries. Even 
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where there is no blatant class system (as there 
is in Spain atid India), no overt or covert tribal, 
language or religious discrimination and no gross 
political discrimination based on party membership 
- and there are not many countries left when we 
have excluded these - there remains massive 
inequality based on access to educ~tion, as long 
as there are not sufficient educational facilities 
.for everybody. Indeed the attempt to remedy the 
eff?cts of these inequalities is one of the major 
preoccupations of the highly developed countries 
today" (O'Dowd, 1974, p.38). 
O'Dowd accepts Rostow's idea that society passes into a fairly 
short period of about thirty years during which there is 
accelerated economic growth resulting in a take-off into 
self-.sustained growth (whatever that may mean) . This phase 
is usually characterised by a minority government dedicated 
to growth, and harsh conditions for the majority, but this 
gives way to the next phase in which there is reform in a 
democratic direction. In O'Dowd's view, South Africa is 
already in the early period of the reform era. 
2.3.3 Exposition and Assessment of O'Dowd's Theory 
O'Dowd does not convincingly demonstrate the nexus between 
economic growth and equitable, qualitative, political and 
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social changes in society; nor does Rostow postulate a 
simple determinate outcome from growth as a basis for O'Dowd's 
optimistic and simplistic long-run political predictions. 
Rostow does not succeed in identifying clearly the circumstances 
under which different societies have experienced sudden 
acceleration of the pace of advance in conditions which led 
to long-term progress, and neither does O'Dowd, whose argument 
that South Africa is following a Rostovian pattern is partly 
based on the indisputable fact that there has been economic 
growth. 
In addition, says O'Dowd, there has been the typical movement 
of population from the country to the towns, and the 
transference of economically active people from agricultural 
to non-agricultural pursuits. The differentials between 
White and African earnings, it is argued, are similar to the 
differentials between skilled and unskilled workers which 
'· 
are a normal feature in all developing countries~ Yet can 
one infer from these, as O'Dowd does, that South Africa is 
following a predetermined pattern? As Leftwich writes, 
even if South Africa "is not sui generis, it is not easily 
or satisfactorily compared either with the advanced 
industrial societies (now, or in their past) or with the 
so-called 'under-developed' countries. It may be that 
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this amounts to little more than saying that any attempt at 
systematic comp.arison must proceed with caution" (Leftwich, 
1974, p.127). Far from proceeding with caution, "and with 
a predictive daring that takes one's breath away, Michael 
O'Dowd, in applying Rostow's account about the stages of 
growth, foresees 'major constitutional reform in a liberal 
direction in or about 1980, without serious disturbance'" 
(Leftwich, 1974, p.125). 
O'Dowd appears to be making a plea give South Africa the 
critical two or three decades that Rostow talks about, and, 
thereafter, growth will be regularly sustained and used to 
pay for concessions wrested by the Africans from the Whites. 
As Habakkuk points out, 
"whether there were periods so critical and so 
precisely compressed in time is a question of 
fact, and I can only say that I do not believe 
that the European experience conforms to this 
pattern. Growth has been more rapid in some 
periods than in others, and some innovations, 
for example the railways, have had much more 
profound effects than others; but I see no 
evidence that there has been one, and only one, 
decisive phase in the history of each growing 
economyn (Habakkuk, 1961, p.600). 
O'Dowd suggests that as South Africa becomes more wealthy, 
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it will be cheaper and easier to make concessions to African 
demands than to resist them by force. 
Therefore, South Africa will follow the example of countries 
like Britain and undergo radical but peaceful change leading 
to liberal democracy. Obviously, it is a tenuous thread 
indeed which links South African development to the events 
that produced democracy in Britain with its specific 
historical experience, traditions and relatively homogeneous 
society. 
Reading O'Dowd's work, and indeed much of the writing which 
is characterised as 'Liberal', one is aware of the high degree 
of Eurocentrism of Whites (particularly English-speaking) 
transplanted by historical movements into an African setting. 
In Europe, socio-political modernity came with industrialisation 
and economic modernisation, but it does not follow logically 
that this is so in all societies. Liberal thought seems to 
have roots in the theories concerning change from a 
'traditional to a modern, from a Gemeinschaft to a Gesselschaft, 
society, from one which is ruled by custom to one which is 
ruled by rationality. 
Thus it is argued that the logical imperatives of 
industrialisation will eventually transcend the irrationality 
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of race discrimination and subject it to the logic of 
impersonal labour markets, of competition between workers on 
the basis of industrial aptitude, not colour. 
The foregoing underlines a weakness in some thinking on South 
Africa : it is automatically assumed that changes in the 
economy will directly affect the political structure. 
Although theories such as O'Dowd's are able to explain 
concessions in apartheid ideology, which are made to 
preserve a strong economy, they are probably mistaken in 
extrapolating from economic concessions to those in the 
social and political spheres, which are not regarded as 
vital to economic progress. A situation of economic 
interdependence and social and political 'independence' 
could be engineered to exist for a long time to come. 
However, the observation by O'Dowd that during the period 
of rapid growth there is usually minority government has 
received some support from a recent study by Huntington and 
Nelson, in which they discuss the problem of political 
participation by the poor (in South Africa one can 
substitute 'Black' for 'poor'} in developing countries. 
The authors begin with the observation that political 
participation is a complex phenomenon designed to influence 
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government. It is hardly surprising that participation by 
the poor, through sizeable and durable organisations that 
are concerned largely with their problems, should be the 
most effective channel for altering the attitudes of the 
poor and improving their condition in the long run. But 
the most striking fact about such participation is its 
rarity. Huntington and Nelson suggest that in most of the 
developing nations, for some time to come, the poor are, less 
likely to be involved in politics through this than through 
other patterns. Their impact on government policies, there-
fore, wi11 be correspondingly limited. 
South Africa is, as O'Dowd says, a developing country more 
like Mexico and Spain than Australia or Canada, and indeed 
it does conform to some of the patterns of other countries 
in a similar position. ( 8) However, it is deeply racially 
divided, by history and custom and draconian law, unlike 
other developing countries, and this racial factor may prove 
(8) It is difficult to decide precisely what this position is: 
for example 1 the World Bank regards South Africa as developed 
whereas the International Monetary Fund sees it as belonging 
to a special group amongst developing countries. A recent 
study ('International Business' by Daniels et al, Addison-
Wesley, Massachusetts, 1976) classifies South Africa as a 
developed nation, and ranks it 37th in the world in terms of 
GNP per capita. However, South Africa does have similarities 
with other countries characterised by dual economies. 
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to be far more intractable than O'Dowd appears to think. 
"In the context of socio-economic development, 
the levels, forms and bases of political 
participation are shaped by the priority that 
elites, groups, and individuals give to 
political participation as a goal of development, 
its value, in their eyes, as a means to achieve 
other developmental goals, and the extent to 
which political participation is itself a by-
product or consequence of development" 
(Huntington and Nelson, 1976, p.160). 
Priorities in South Africa are determined to a very high 
degree by the elite, rather than groups or individuals 
within society; and the elite does not see political 
participation by the majority in a common South Africa as 
a goal of development. The elite could be described as 
trying to maximise gro~th while simultaneously minimising 
political participation by the mass, and pursuing policies 
designed to prevent the creation of a gap between people's 
expectations and the state's willingness or ability to 
fulfil them. 
However, political participation as a means to achieving 
. . 
other developmental goals, notably growth, is a possibility, 
given the indispensable role of the urban Africans in the 
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economy, and the pressures to give them genuine representation 
and a measure of control over their own affairs. 
The third possibility is the 0 1 Dowdian one of political 
participation as a by-product or consequence of development, 
and although it remains a theoretical possibility of a 
relatively painless way to include the poor in politics, the 
"relationship between development and broadened 
participation is neither steady nor uniform. 
The level and forms of participation in a 
society during any period are affected by 
communal tensions that may be unrelated or 
only peripherally related to modernisation 
. . • (thus) other factors may produce far 
greater or far less participation than the 
country's degree of social and economic 
modernisation would lead one to expect" 
(Huntington and Nelson, 1976, pp.166-167). 
This analysis is more interesting than O'Dowd's, in that it 
considers the variety and complexity of such problems. 
Huntington and Nelson say that political participation 
constrains the political choices of elites; as development 
proceeds, participation becomes increasingly costly to 
suppress. 
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In South Africa, one would think that the Whites in general 
and the Afrikaners in particular are prepared to pay a very 
high cost to maintain political control of the country. Even 
if the economic position of the Africans improves, there is 
no necessary correlation between this and increased African 
participation in the political system. 
However, if the poor do become mobilised, the ruling elite 
will be constrained, so the Huntington and Nelson argument 
runs, to channel rather than to suppress participation, that 
is, to control its forms and guide its selection of issues. 
"As some groups become politically active, others 
are under pressure to do likewise in order to 
protect their relative positions. This process 
of defensive and imitative group mobilisation is 
particularly characteristic of ethnically divided 
societies" (Huntipgton and Nelson, 1976, p.168). 
' 
The above analysis seems to lend support to a specific O'Dowdian 
or general meliorist approach to change in South Africa, but 
Huntington and Nelsorrs conclusions dispel hopes of an easy or 
inevitable transition to a bourgeois democracy and welfare 
state : "the difference in the forms, bases, and overall 
patterns of participation, while influenced by general social 
and economic trends, are primarily the products of the 
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decisions of the political elite" (Huntington and' Nelson, 
1976, p.171). 
Thus the questions that have to be answered concern the 
nature and aims of the political elite in South Africa, to 
assess whether these are compatible with broadened political 
participation by the masses in a common South Africa : the 
' 
evidence points to the contrary. It is doubtful whether the 
political elite will voluntarily decide to broaden 
participation, <9> and it is equally unlikely that the 
endogenous forces outlined by O'Dowd will lead to fundamental· 
changes in the core characteristics of the system against the 
preferences of the elite. 
2.3.4 Some Conclusions on Industrialisation, Economic 
Growth and Political Change 
In conclusion, O'Dowd's contribution will be placed in 
(9) The Government's new constitutional proposals exclude the 
majority of the population, the Africans; and, although it 
is too early to judge, the way Colouredsand Indians are 
included may merely be a cover for effective continued 
White domination. On the other hand, it can be argued that 
"by National Party standards the constitutional proposals 
represent a radical progression towards a system of 
meaningful power-sharing, and as such are at least a step, 
faltering though it may be, in the right direction" (Van 
der Vyver in De Crespigny and Schrire, p.256). 
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perspective as regards the debate over the alleged 
incompatibility between apartheid and economic development. 
This discussion will serve to further test the validity of 
his theory of change, and will provide a context for a 
discussion on new perspectives on economic growth and 
political change in the ensuing section of this thesis. 
Hughes says that skirmishes between the 'Liberal' and 
'Radical' views can be traced to O'Dowd's "vision of manna 
from heaven" (that growth and development would Ey_ 
themselves force the dismantling of racial discrimination) 
being somewhat dented by the sociologist Herbert Blumer. · 
"Blumer argued that, contrary to O'Dowd, 
entrepreneurs suffering the costs of racism 
would be more rational to accommodate racism 
than to underwrite the costs of attempting to 
change the existing racial order" (Hughes, 
1977, p.49). 
Blumer's 1965 analysis of the "structural requirements or 
the logical imperatives of industrialisation" (Blumer in 
G. Hunter (ed), 1965), including the commitment to a 
rational and secular outlook, the replacement of status 
relations by contractual relations, the development of 
impersonal markets, physical and social mobility, and an 
in-built dynamic condition which presses to keep the 
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preceding characteristics in play, shows that industrialisation 
can produce a dynamic situation. However, and this is where 
Blumer's analysis may do more credit to complex reality than 
O'Dowd's, he does not see economic factors as the seminal 
ones from which all others flow, overriding racial, political 
and social factors. The dynamic situation brought about by 
industrialisation may adapt itself to pre-existing racial 
discrimination, finding it easier to operate within the 
system (a point which has been greatly developed by 
subsequent wrifers) : "the organisation and operation of the 
industrial structure bend to the racial patterning that is 
present in society" (Blumer, 19 65, p. 243). 
There may be only a conceptual difference between 
industrialisation and social and political events. However, 
industrialisation generally tends to cause social changes, 
but the results of this process are affected by political 
decisions, particularly in South Africa. 
O'Dowd has been criticised for a simplicity which has 
provided (in the opinion of the authors quoted below) a 
target for Marxist analyses of South Africa : 
"The 'conventional wisdom' under attack is not 
really all that conventional. It is true that 
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some liberals, indulging in the habitual liberal 
pastime of wishful thinking, have argued that 
there is a determinate relationship between 
economic development and political reform. A 
high rate of economic growth will eventually 
lead to greater political democracy. Existing 
inequalities in South Africa are the inevitable 
by-product of economic development, but as 
national wealth increases the living standards 
of the less privileged will rise, antagonisms 
will diminish and political reforms, 6n the 
lines of the nineteenth century British model, 
will take place. • • • it is true that liberals 
have expounded such simple (not to say simple-
minded) notions and in this way have provided 
a target for the Marxists. The most prominent 
present exponent of this approach is M. O'Dowd 
who accepts without question Rostow's 
discredited stages theory of growth and on this 
foundation proceeds to erect an exceedingly 
flimsy structure" (Kantor and Kenny, 1976, p.36). 
This particular critique gives the impression of being an 
overreaction to both O'Dowd and other 'Liberal' writers on 
the one hand, as well as to Marxist writers on the other 
hand. Yet the important point is that some sort of debate 
did emerge in the past decade or so (Hughes notes that it 
is rather one-sided, since none of the 'Liberals' have 
chosen to reply - but what of Bomberger's reasonably agnostic 
paper on the industrialisation theme?); the debate includes 
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not only the so-called 'Liberals' ahd 'Radicals' but 
'Radicals' debating between themselves and reacting against 
the 'Old Left', (lO) and incursions by the 'Right' into the 
fray. 
Yudelman gives a summary of the debate as he sees it 
"In fact industrialisation makes the situation 
more dynamic. Though this does not make 
significant change inevitable, it does tend to 
encourage it. One's analysis of industrialisation 
can depend to too large an extent on one's attitude 
to the possibility and desirability of change, and 
one's preferences on how it should take place. To 
illustrate the point one need only refer back to 
the differences between the liberal-reformists and 
the radical-revisionists. The former largely live 
in South Africa and are committed to evolutionary 
change : their theory points to the possibility 
or inevitability of change coming peacefully 
through industrialisation. They wish to encourage 
increased economic growth through increased 
industrialisation and capital investment. The 
radical-revisionists, on the other hand, 
generally live out of South Africa (frequently 
(10} Edward Roux, for exan1ple, in "Time Longer than Rope", 
says that "the most potent factor for change is the 
industrialisation of the country" (Roux, 1964, p.433}. 
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against their own wishes) and are cormnitted to 
revolutionary change : their theory suggests 
that the inner dynamic of South African 
industrialisation perpetuates racial discrimination 
and that some external agent must be added to the 
equation if structural change is to be realised. 
The radical-revisionists strongly oppose foreign 
investment in the South African economy, and 
this opposition is directly related to arguments 
suggesting-that industrialisation is either 
neutral to social and political change, or an 
active retardant to it. Both the liberal-
reformist and radical-revisionist arguments, then, 
tend to be self-serving" (Yudelman, 1975, p.94}~ 
Yudelman is aware that there is a variety of perspectives 
amongst the writers he terms "radical-revisionists" but 
refers to them, probably for ease of description, as 
though they constitute a school : this category has come 
into increasing usage without adequate explanation and 
justification, a point which will be considered in the 
next section. 
More importantly, he suggests that they "are committed to 
revolutionary change": this may be so, but it is not 
evident from their work. Most of the writers concerned 
are historians trying to explain past changes, for example, 
from segregation to apartheid, and prediction is not 
124 
intrinsic to their work. However, one Marxist study which 
does consider the hypothetical possibility of change, by 
Arrighi and Saul, will also be examined in the following 
section of this thesis. 
This brief discussion of the debate has pointed, inter alia, 
to the dangers of oversimplification : in the case of O'Dowd 
and similar writers the simplifications of a progressivist 
and modernisation view of history : O'Dowd, for example, 
states quite boldly that the stages of economic growth. (as 
he sees them) are 
1. Confusion; 
2. Repressive minority rule (of which both Fascism 
and Stalinism were examples); 
3. Old-fashioned Liberalism; and 
4. Welfare state (O'Dowd, 1978, p.41). 
Admittedly, the O'Dowd thesis is mellowing with time 
"In my original presentation ..• I took an 
essentially mechanistic economic determinist 
view but now I see the matter rather in the 
terms that socio-economic growth is a single 
process with social changes as indispensable 
125 
to economic change as economic changes are to social 
change, and furthermore that it is probably not true 
to regard the mechanism and motivation of the 
development as entirely economic" (O'Dowd, 1978, 
pp.42-43). 
Together with his economic determinism, another feature of 
O'Dowd's thesis is the downplaying of race as a factor of 
importance in itself in the explanation and understanding of 
South African politics and society. He suggests rather 
that in the process of development the race question will be 
solved, "or perhaps will turn out never to have existed 
except as a cover for economic cleavages" (O'Dowd, 1978, p.37). 
The possible arguments against this will also be considered 
,in the course of this study, but even O'Dowd has accepted 
that "to the extent that I have in the past suggested that 
economic growth would lead to the disappearance of language, 
religious and other groups I was wrong" (O'Dowd, 1978, p.45). 
There appears to be a growing realisation in O'Dowd's 
writings that economic growth may not be the sole panacea for 
South Africa's problems. 
Moreover, as Kane-Berman points out 
"apart from the fact that Mr O'Dowd appears to 
ignore political factors (such as a White 
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minority bent on preserving its supremacy) which 
may hinder the kinds of economic changes that 
economic conditions might seem to necessitate, 
he also underestimates the ability of the present 
system to adjust itself to meet economic needs 
without altering the basic structure of White 
domination" (Kane-Berman in Schlemmer and Webster, 
1978, p. 52) •. 
O'Dowd assumes that the Government will opt for a "rich and 
mixed'' as opposed to a "poor and White" South Africa; it 
remains to be seen whether this assumption is correct, and 
whether economic richness and political Whiteness in South 
Africa are incompatible in the longer term. 
It may be that ways will be found to ensure that "the Black 
man's labour is used for the laying of golden eggs in the_'" 
White man's nest without his getting even the shell". Cll) 
The figures for changes in the ratios (which O'Dowd agrees 
is what is important) of White:Black incomes which are given 
in the following section appear to invalidate a significant 
part of O'Dowd's general thesis, which is that for development 
(11) This is quoted from "African Perspectives on South Africa" 
by Van der Merwe et al (eds), 1978; perhaps some allowance 
should be made for exaggeration for dramatic effect. 
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.1· 
to take place in the way he envisages, the African majority 
must be accommodated "on the right side of the economic 
fence" (O' Dowd, 1978, p. 37). 
O'Dowd further says that 
"we are at present at the equivalent stage of 
development to Britain in the early 1860's 
and to America in the first decade of the 
century and major politic al change <12 ) equivalent 
to the Reform Act of 1867, or to the accession 
of the Democrats in 1912 which was accompanied 
by the breaking up of trusts and the legalising 
of trade unionism is to be expected before the 
end of the current decade. I would go so far 
as to say that if no such change takes place 
the O'Dowd thesis will have been disproved" 
(O'Dowd, 1978, p.40). 
On the one hand, one cannot rule out O'Dowd's general 
modernisation and ensuing political liberalisation approach 
as a theoretical possibility (with perhaps a longer time 
scale than that suggested by O'Dowd), although there are 
serious flaws in his view of change and the future of South 
Q2) O'Dowd does not say whether he considers the new 
constitutional proposals to constitute "major political 
change" if implemented. 
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Africa. On the other hand, it can be cogently argued that 
the political, social and economic forces at play are too 
complex and conflicting to permit a straightforward O'Dowdian 
four-phase movement towards a contented welfare state in 
South Africa early next century. 
2.4 RECENT PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY AND POLITICS 
2.4.1 Analytical Categories Controversy and Clarification 
There has been a cornucopia of recent writings on the history 
and politics of South Africa, from a variety of perspectives, 
which has added new dimensions to studies of South Africa. 
Controversy has surrounded the labelling of some of these 
writings as 'Radical' or 'Revisionist', in what is evidently 
an effort to include them all into an (undiscriminating) 
analytical category. 
Since the writings so characterised add important new 
dimensions to South African studies, the problem of taxonomy 
will be dealt with in detail before consideration of the 
works themselves. 
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Views on the use of the adjectives 'Radical' and 'Revisionist' 
will be given by a variety of academics. (l 3 ) Some of them 
are considered to fall into the category under question, 
though not necessarily by themselves; others are not 
considered to be 'Radicals', either by themselves or by 
others. 
Martin Legassick describes one of the results of the 
industrialisation debate as the 
"emergence of a body of writing which has on 
occasion been labelled erroneously as 
'revisionist' or as 'neo-Marxist' (in the 
context, pejoratively) . The label is wrong 
because there does not exist any single new 
'school'. In fact the consequence of shattering 
the hegemony of the liberal conventional 
wisdom within the South African English-
speaking social sciences, and amongst 
prominent elements of British and American 
thought on South Africa has been the 
blooming of more than one flower. Some 
follow Weber; others (including myself) 
would see themselves in the Marxist 
tradition, of which there are of course a 
number of strains. Others would not want 
U3) These views will be given in their own words : this 
necessitates a certain amount of quotation from the 
academics involved. 
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to tie themselves down so closely under one 
label or another. Even conservatives are 
challenging the liberal wisdom" (Legassick, 
1976, pp.224-225). 
The challenge to the "conventional wisdom" has led to the 
"revision" of standard interpretations of South African 
history and politics, and the main group of analysts who 
achieved this were writing from a generally left perspective 
it has been pointed out that 
"since Western capitalism has so far failed 
to solve the problems of the Third World 
and is itself experiencing a profound crisis, 
it is not surprising that the main drive 
behind the current revival of history comes 
from a radical pessimism which draws its 
inspiration, though not always its teaching, 
from Marx" (Hopkins, 1976, p.32). 
The analyses of scholars like Johnstone, Arrighi, Atmore, 
Wolpe, Trapido, Legassick and others have added a new 
dimension to South African studies. Shula Marks places 
them in historical academic perspective : 
"Despite the tremendous outpouring of 
literature on contemporary South Africa -
perhaps more than on any other part of 
Africa - one of the major gaps in the 
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study of South Africa, again until the last few 
years, has been an adequate study of the 
twentieth century particularly from a socio-
. economic standpoint. Yet even elementary 
studies of White politics have been lacking. 
Much of the work until the late sixties 
focusing on Afrikaner nationalism, the 
ideology of apartheid and contemporary 
political developments fails to examine the 
nature of the South African state, what 
interests it was mediating, the conflicts 
within it or the precise function of racism 
in South African society. Heribert Adam in 
his 'Modernising Racial Domination' was perhaps 
the first to depart from the prevalent view of 
the Afrikaner state as representative of an 
outmoded colonialism. Work by F.A. Johnstone, 
John Rex, Harold Wolpe and Martin Legassick, 
took this process considerably further in their 
examination of existing interpretations -
largely pluralist - of South African society, 
and their own analyses of its structure and 
purpose. Within the last couple of years, 
further new work has been undertaken, on the 
structural determinants of White power, the 
nature of White class interests and White, 
especially Afrikaner accumulation, and the 
implications of this for the regional economy 
as a whole and for South Africa's internal 
Black majority in particular" (Marks, 1976, 
pp.194-195). 
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The words underlined represent the critically important 
questions to which recent studies of South Africa have 
addressed themselves; the answers to these questions have 
provided new explanations, insights and evidence, thereby 
making valuable additions to understanding and knowledge of 
.South African history and politics. 
Yudelman says of the writers contributing to these achievements 
"that it is difficult to call them a 'school', 
since they do not share any set of ~oherent 
and unique principles;" but adds that''they are 
young, generally hav~ South African backgrounds 
or experience, are nee-Marxists to varying 
degrees and concerned to fit South Africa into 
some world framework or paradigm involving 
concepts like capitalism, development and 
exploitation; they are nearly all Whites 
opposed to White rule, and have a (barely 
disguised) contempt for the liberal view which 
believes in evolutionary change, encouraged 
by economic forces" (Yudelman, 1975, pp.82-83). 
Wright expands on the variety which is discussed by Legassick 
and Yudelman : 
"It is no easier to classify the radicals than 
to classify the liberals. All the radicals 
are influenced by Marxist thought to some 
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degree. But Marxist thought is always in a 
state of growth and change as theories are 
developed, applied, and variously accepted, 
discarded, or revised. Neo-Marxist and other 
Marxist schools oppose each other on the subject 
of South Africa. For some radicals the 
development of theory is the basic aim; others 
have a more empirical approach. Because 
radicals have written no large synthetic 
history of South Africa, furthermore, any 
depiction of the current radical interpretation 
must be a mosaic constructed out of many 
different papers on specific topics. Nonetheless, 
although there are differences among them, both 
of theory and of substance, in general the 
radicals rely on, refer favourably to, and 
provide reinforcement for each other's work. 
Neo-Marxism provides the most dynamic 
theoretical influence. Concern with the impact 
of capitalism on race relations, particularly 
since the mid-nineteenth century, provides a 
common set of problems" (Wright, 1977, pp.19-20). 
In a trenchant critique of Harrison Wright 1 s work, Peires 
says that many of the writers mentioned 
"are not primarily 'liberals' or primarily 
'radicals' but rather historians doing their 
best to build on what is correct and reject 
what is wrong in the work of their predecessors. 
That they make mistakes and reach conflicting 
conclusions should surprise no-one. The 'false 
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dichotomy' (which Wright fulminates against on 
pp.72-3) and the 'procrustean bed' (p.83) of 
liberal/radical schools is not only analytically 
valueless but destructive of analysis. Names 
have a habit of sticking, and labelling becomes 
a substitute for thought. It is far easier to 
categorise a person as a 'liberal' or a 'radical' 
and therefore not worthy of consideration than 
it is to come to grips with his evidence and 
interpretation, especially when it conflicts with 
one's own" (Peires, 1977, p.66). 
Yet what is one to make of the admittedly invidious tendency 
towards indiscriminate categorisation when many well-known 
Africanists contribute to a new volume which is explicitly 
labelled "A Radical Reader"? 
One of the clearest expositions of 'radicalism' is given by 
Waterman, one of the two editors of the volume ("African 
Social Studies : A Radical Reader" edited by Gutkind and 
Waterman, Heinemann, London, 1977). He notes that 
"over the last ten years or so there has appeared 
a clear and growing tendency away from the 
conventional wisdom enshrined in the bulk of 
writings and teaching on African history, 
sociology, economics and politics in the West. 
The generic term used for this tendency is 
'radical'. Yet it appears that no-one has 
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examined the phenomenon, to define its limits or 
catalogue its content" (Waterman, 1977, p.l). 
Waterman continues to examine radicalism as a commitment, 
as an approach, and as an interest, before suggesting limits 
for the use of the term. 
The following is a synposis of his argument, with commentary 
included in parentheses. 
Radicalism as a commitment is usually overt moral or political 
commitment in writings on African studies, phrased in terms of 
opposition to imperialism and concern for Africa's masses with 
a preference for socialist political and economic solutions 
(this description could also apply, say, to Black nationalists). 
Most radical writings have a similar approach in evincing 
great interest in theory and method, which are often matters 
of central concern. What distinguishes radical from reformist 
Africanists is the radical condemnation.of mainstream "Western" 
African studies (presumably such as those embodied in the 
"Oxford History of South Africa"). Moreover, there are 
differences between the radicals themselves on the presentation 
or non-presentation of alternative approaches, and, amongst 
those who do present alternatives, in their relationship to 
Marxism (which will be discussed in the following section) • 
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Waterman quotes Arnilcar Cabral on the importance of explicit 
theory : 
" ••. we would recall that every practice 
produces a theory, and that if it is true 
that a revolution can fail even though it 
is based on perfectly conceived theories, 
nobody has yet made a successful revolution 
without a revolutionary theory." 
He then suggests that the greatest activity amongst the 
theoretically inclined radicals has been directed towards 
destroying the conventional Western approaches, and that 
much of the criticism is well-informed and original, but 
"if the horse is dying, does it really need such a flogging?" 
(Waterman, 1977, p.6) outdated theories will be defeated 
not so much by attack as by the increasing irrelevance of 
the questions they ask and the answers they provide. 
An examination of the literature of the last ten years seems 
to reveal certain problems, areas or themes of special 
interest to radicals. These include methodology, history, 
economy, social structure, and politics. 
Waterman concludes that radicalism ought not only to have 
the connotations discussed above, but also those of 
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'primary, fundamental, of the roots', thereby contrasting 
radicalism with the conservative African studies, which 
'despite their frequent sophistication and elegance', have 
findings which are 'banal and trivial'. In this sense, 
any work which ignores the.superficial and epiphenomena!, 
which uncovers basic structures and root problems, can and 
should be considered radical (Waterman, 1977, p.14); (but 
what of radical liberals, radical conservatives, and so 
forth?). 
Sufficient has been said in this section on analytical 
categories, to describe the "labelling" controversy, and 
more importantly, to clarify the meaning of radicalism as 
far as possible, and to outline some of the variety of 
perspectives which have been applied to studies of South 
Africa by various writers. 
2.4.2 Methodology and Marxism 
Marxist perspectives have contributed to what Legassick 
calls "the breaking of an intellectual log-jam, in which 
new kinds of questions, historical, sociological, and 
economic, are being asked, and new kinds of source material 
being explored" (Legassick, 1976, p.225); and, since they 
1" 
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have influenced recent writings to a greater or lesser extent, 
will be considered prior to the works themselves. 
Waterman refers to the position of Basil Davidson, who says 
that in one sense he is a Marxist, and quotes him further as 
saying : 
"I think that every serious student of Africa would 
have to be one. You must be familiar at least with 
the first volume of Das kapital, with Pre-
capitalist economic formations, with The Civil War 
in France, and some other of Marx's writings. 
And you must have thought about these matters with 
deep and constant. care. Having said that, I would 
strongly resist the title 'Marxist'" (Waterman, 
1977, p.6). 
Marxist thought offers a general theory with explanatory 
powers, a vocabulary with which to analyse the problem, and 
prescribes solutions, so, as Hopkins has pointed out, it 
has inherent attraction, especially when all else is seen 
to have failed. Much recent writing on development and 
Third World problems (including South Africa), has taken 
place in an intellectual atmosphere of disillusionment with 
the lack of beneficial effects of economic growth for the 
majority of the people in developing countries. 
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The Third World experience of the past decade or so, in which 
growth took place in enclaves without benefit to the mass, 
belied the optimism of liberal economists about the happy 
effects of growth on income distribution and political 
liberalisation. 
In studies of South Africa, it is a short step from saying 
that growth per se is not beneficial to the Africans in 
South Africa, to arguing that growth actually works against 
the Africans by strengthening White supremacy. Thus if 
one understands the imperatives of capitalist growth and 
the nature of the racialist system, this argument suggests, 
it is evident that there are no forces for reform within 
the system. 
More specifically, the contrast between conventional inquiry 
and the Marxist approach is explained by Johnstone, who says 
that the philosophical tendencies of idealism and empiricism 
underlie much of social science : 
"Idealism refers to a tendency of seeing and 
explaining social realities solely or 
essentially in terms of mental and psychological 
factors, such as attitudes, ideas, beliefs, 
values and ideology. Empiricism refers to a 
tendency to proceed in inquiry on an 'ad hoc' 
basis, of attempting to understand and explain 
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things merely by 'describing what is', of 
equating reality with its specific form, with 
the picture of reality immediately apparent 
to the investigator and those in the situation 
under investigation, and of treating all kinds 
of dependent and derivative factors as 'given' 
• • • These approaches are weak, both 
intrinsically and in the degree to which they 
are relied upon" (Johnstone, 1976, p.8). 
He suggests that Marxist analysis, in contrast, is an 
integral part of a more general theoretical framework, from 
which it derives whatever explanatory power it has, and 
continues to say that 
"if the Marxist approach seems superior to 
idealist and empiricist approaches, especially 
for the kinds of things this study is 
concerned with, it is not in any arrogantly 
absolute sense but in relative ways, by 
virtue of the fact that it avoids the real 
pitfalls of empiricism and idealism, but 
does not, if handled with care, replace 
them with other deficiencies of equal weight" 
(Johnstone, 1976, p.9). 
Johnstone summarises the relative scientific value of the 
Marxist approach : 
"Class analysis has come to mean various things, 
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but Marxist class analysis means something quite 
specific, and its specificity must be recognised. 
It is obviously completely distinct from idealist 
class analysis (in which class is defined in 
terms of such things as status) of the kind 
evident in American sociology. And, more 
importantly, it does not mean, and is quite 
different from, empiricist-materialist class 
analysis (which merely involves an empiricist 
'attention to economic factors' and selection 
of 'class variables', such as income and 
occupation, and the correlation of such factors 
with others in an empiricist study of 'social 
stratification', without forming part of any 
general society theory with explanatory power, 
and tending to lead only to re-description 
rather than substantial explanation of social 
inequality). What it means, above all, is the 
systematic elucidation of the differential 
relationships of individuals and social groups 
to means of production in historically and 
structurally specific systems of production 
and social formations, and the elucidation of 
the various ramifications of these structural 
differentiations, within a general theory 
about these systems and formations, from which 
it acquires its explanatory power (Johnstone, 
1976, pp.9-10). 
The Marxist approach contributes to the widening of 
conceptual and theoretical paraineters, and the marshalling 
of new evidence, in intellectual work on the subject of 
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South African politics, as will be seen from the following 
sections. 
2.4.3 New Perspectives on Race, Industrialisation, Economic 
Growth and Political Change 
Yudelman says that the attack on the "liberal reformist" 
school by the "revisionists" deserves consideration for 
three main reasons : 
"a) it has important implications for general 
theories of the relationship of 
industrialisation (westernisation, 
modernisation, urbanisation, growth) to 
race relations (or social change, cultural 
change, political change); 
b) it has important implications for the 
understanding of Twentieth Century South 
African history; 
c) it is of vital moment for contemporary 
political debates about South Africa, 
about foreign investment policies towards 
it, and about the probability and 
desirability of revolution within it" 
(Yudelman, 1975, p.82). 
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2.4.3.1 Attitudes Towards Race and Class -----------------------------------------
One of the first notions 'revised' by recent writings is the 
long-standing one that the frontier was the origin of South 
African race attitudes 
and 
"if race attitudes are not attributable - in an 
almost mysterious, or at least a geographical 
sense - to the 'influence of the frontier' -
a la McCrone and Walker - where are they to be 
sought?" (Marks, 1976, p.193) 
"with the new appreciation of the African side 
of South African history, however, this 
weakness of White power (in the zone of Black 
and White contact) takes on a new significance 
and opens again the question - at what point 
and why and by whom and in whose interest was 
White supremacy ultimately imposed?" (Marks, 
1976, p.194). 
The origin of race attitudes lies not so much in frontier 
interaction and hostility, but in class interests. The 
answers to the questions asked by Marks, arrived at through 
a class rather than a race analysis, are provided by 
various Marxist studies of South Africa. 
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In his introduction to "Class, Race and Gold", for example, 
Johnstone says that conventional studies see racial 
domination in modern South Africa as a."dysfunctional" 
intrusion upon the capitalist economic system, stemming from 
non-material factors outside it such as prejudice, racism, 
nationalism, and social and cultural pluralism, but doomed 
over the long-term to destruction by the inexorable 
imperatives of rational industrialism and colour-blind 
capitalism. Johnstone affirms that this perspective is 
the root cause of the inadequacy of much accepted and 
attempted explanation. 
His own approach is a Marxist structuralist one, which sees 
and explains the system of racial domination as a product 
of the system of production of which it forms a part. His 
thesis attempts to explain the system of racial 
discrimination in the gold mines : the racial system is 
most adequately explained as a class system (as a system 
of class instruments which are referred to as "class colour 
bars"), generated and determined in its specific nature and 
functions, by the specific system of production and class 
structure of which it forms a part. 
However, Johnstone's approach does not take into account 
that race in South Africa acquired a significance 
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independent of other variables : "to hold this view is 
not, as Johnstone accuses theorists of the plural society 
concept of being, to be guilty of 'ethnological determinism' 
(Johnstone, 1976, p.208). Merely it i~ to say that racial 
domination cannot be explained solely as a product of the 
system of production" (Welsh, 1978, p.34). 
to say that 
Welsh continues 
"there are problems for a Marxist analysis posed 
by the existence of a politically significant 
White working class : if the working class is 
divided into politically free (White) and ultra-
exploitable unfree (Black) segments how does 
one reconcile this with an explanation derived 
from the relations of production unless race 
operated at some time as an independent factor?" 
(Welsh, 1978, p.34). 
This critique also applies to other Marxist studies. 
The correspondence between race and class is further 
explained by Wolpe, who says that with few exceptions, most 
of the literature (radical, liberal and racist alike), 
describes South Africa in terms of racial concepts. Even 
where the relationship between classes is incorporated into 
the discussion, race is treated as the dominant and dynamic 
force. Owing to this perspective, the state in South 
Africa is treated as the instrument of White oppression 
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over the Africans, but as neutral in the relationship 
between classes. However, "it in no way detracts from the 
conception of the State as an instrument of White 
domination . . . to insist that the South African State is 
also an instru.."'tlent of class rule in a specific form of 
capitalist society ... (Wolpe, 1972, pp.428-429). 
There is a similar explanation by Legassick, who notes that 
most prevailing commentary has tended to see some paradox 
in the conjunction of continued capitalist economic growth, 
authoritarianism and racial discrimination. The 
assumption has been that the authoritarian and racially 
ascriptive features of the society are archaisms, which 
would disappear with the inevitable emergence of a liberal 
capitalist democracy. Legassick abandons the assumption 
that bourgeois democracy is a necessary or inevitable 
product of the capitalist mode of production in favour of 
an attempt to examine the specific social relations 
generated by the specific character of the capitalist mode 
in its internal and international context. 
2.4.3.2 Industrialisation, Economic Growth and Political 
-----------g5~~s~----------------------------------------
South Africa, Legassick continues, is dominated by capitalism, 
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a mode of production in which the economic surplus is subject 
to private appropriation and in which ownership of the means 
of production is severed from the ownership of labour power. 
The thesis which emerges from the various studies has 
important implications for change : since racial domination 
flows from the needs of the capitalist mode of production, 
there is no possibility of national liberation while 
capitalism is the dominant mode of production. Legassick 
concludes that : 
"ultimately it would seem that such national 
· liberation could be achieved only coterminously 
with the abolition of capitalism in South Africa. 
The struggle of the South African proletariat and 
the struggle of the African national liberation 
movement under the hegemony of the African 
proletariat and peasantry have the same ends. 
The duality of the contradictions in South Africa 
can only finally be dissolved together" 
(Legassick, 1974, p.286). 
Wolpe echoes this conclusion 
"The major contradiction of South African society 
between the capitalist mode of production and 
African pre-capitalist economies is giving way 
to a dominant contradiction within the capitalist 
economy. The consequence of this is to integrate 
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race relations with capitalist relations of 
production to such a degree that the challenge 
to the one becomes of necessity a challenge to 
the other" (Wolpe, 1972, p. 454). 
Legassick evaluates the implications of this situation for 
strategies of socialist change : 
"Two, perhaps not mutually exclusive, directions 
suggest themselves. On the one hand a left 
movement must return to the pre-1928 attempt 
to develop proletarian class-consciousness 
amongst workers in industry, based on an analysis 
and an organisational structure which can explain 
the different circumstances of class struggle 
among White and Black workers. 
On the other hand the national liberation 
movement can only base itself on those 
institutions and areas which still define its 
existence as a nation. Indeed the colonial 
dimension of South African society has been 
such as to actually absorb territory from the 
oppressed nation, and indeed the main means of 
colonial surplus transfer is now the export of 
labour-power. But the immediate meaning of 
the national struggle in South Africa would 
seem to be the struggle within the 'Bantustans' 
and the other areas subjected to South African 
imperialism for restoration of resources 
(demands for land, etc.), and for greater 
determination over local resources. The class· 
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hegemony in this struggle may be of different 
kinds though, if, as Marx wrote, 'the proletariat 
of each country must, of course, first of all 
settle matters with its own bourgeoisie', then 
these areas will be the forum for this struggle. 
Indeed, national liberation cannot be completed 
within these limits, circumscribed as they are 
in territory and resources. Yet equally it is 
doubtful if the struggle against capitalism in 
South Africa can proceed, through the unification 
of the interests and circumstances of Black and 
White working class, without the leverage that 
might be achieved by a Black proletariat using 
its 'national' institutions to their fullest 
extent" (Legassick, 1974, pp.286-287). 
Although the Radical analysis is powerful and disturbing, 
the prescriptions are less easily immediately applicable to 
the South African situation, as a perusal of, for example, 
Legassick's evaluation of strategies for socialist change 
suggests. 
Developing class consciousness effectively amongst African 
workers in South Africa, given the system of political, 
social and industrial surveillance and control, and also the 
embourgeoisement of the workers' aspirations, would be a 
difficult task (although it is possible that if the workers' 
aspirations are not satisfied, they will become a 
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mobilisable urban Black proletariat in Marxist terms). 
However, even more difficult would be the task of persuading 
White workers that their true interests lie in solidarity, 
not with the Afrikaner nation, not with the Whites generally, 
but with their African, Coloured and Indian fellow-workers: 
Although thoughtful 'Radicals' avoid "vulgar, mechanistic 
materialism, and always recognise the crucial importance of 
values and ideology in social life" (Johnstone, 1976, p.9), 
they do not place sufficient emphasis on the fact that 
"ethnic or cultural plurality is a world-wide reality with 
a definite political significance" (Van der Vyver in De 
Crespigny and Schrire, 1978, p.248). 
As regards the national liberation struggle of the Africans, 
if the analysis earlier in this study is an accurate 
reflection of reality, a revolution and national liberation 
are not achievable aims in the foreseeable future. In the 
meanwhile, a non-optimum South African system, capable perhaps 
of lesser changes, but not of fundamental alteration of its 
core characteristics, may be maintained, like an industrial 
and commercial monopoly, through lack of effective challenge 
and competition. 
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As has been noted, most of the writers under consideration are 
historians and their studies, whilst they have implications 
for predictive efforts, are not intrinsically concerned with 
predicting change. However, there is one Marxist study which 
does discuss change as a hypothetical possibility, and 
therefore has greater inherent interest as regards the 
central thrust of this thesis on South Africa and political 
change. 
The authors of the study, Arrighi and Saul, coinment on the 
poverty of academic debate on the relevance of socialism for 
the development of sub-Saharan Africa, and suggest that 
socialism is a historical necessity for the further develop-
ment of the area. They add that the "quality of debate 
among socialists concerning the actual possibility of 
revolutionary, socialist transformation in Africa in the 
present historical conjuncture also leaves much to be 
desired" (Arrighi and Saul, 1973, p.44). They continue 
that oversimplification (owing to undiscriminating 
analytical categories) has prevented correct identification 
of the forces which tend towards keeping the present 
African situation stable and also of the contradictions 
which might have inherent in them possibilities for 
progressive action. These are points which have been made 
previously in this study. 
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The article begins by affirming that the solution of 
Africa's problems can only result from the revolutionary 
praxis of the African people. The study assesses Western 
capitalism's interest in Africa, and the centrality of 
South Africa to international capitalist concern, because 
it does not easily fit into the pattern of 'rationalising' 
world capitalism. The Whites' social and economic 
privileges derive from their control over the State 
apparatus, whereas the power of international capitalism is 
mainly based on control over economic structures. Thus 
the Whites have everything to lose from an African neo-
colonial solution and are determined to prevent it. Given 
the Whites' entrenchment in the political economy, such a 
solution could only be brought about at the cost of 
widespread disruption of the southern African economic 
system : it is therefore naive to expect international 
capitalism, either directly or as mediated by various 
Western states, to risk a profitable outlet for investment 
and exports for the sake of marginal improvements in the 
"logic of the market". 
The authors see South Africa as having unique problems and 
potentialities for revolutionary action, relative to the 
rest of Africa, mainly because of the advanced stage of 
economic development. The African subsistence economy has 
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been irreversibly upset. Therefore populist objectives are 
not enough, and Black aspirations can only be fulfilled by 
controlling the industrial apparatus itself and reorientating 
it towards the economic and social uplifting of the African 
masses. The African bourgeoisie is structurally weak, and 
cannot play a hegemonic role in the struggle. In conclusion, 
they affirm, the "revolution in South Africa, . if it is 
to come, can only be a proletarian 0. 4) and a socialist 
revolution and the liberation struggle will not succeed unless 
it is restructured in accordance with this premise" (Arrighi 
and Saul, 1973, p.65)~ 
Arrighi and Saul stress that marginal improvements in race 
relations and normalisation of contracts with other African 
states will in fact probably retard thoroughgoing liberation 
(by which they presumably mean a proletarian and a socialist 
revolution) in South Africa. The success of South Africa's 
policy depends in part on the extent to which internal 
liberalisation in South Africa and/or the establishment of 
military dictatorships in independent Africa will relax 
(14) It has been estimated by Doctor and Gallis, International 
Labour Review, No. 2, 1966, p.166, that in tropical Africa 
by 1960 at most 11% of the work force was dependent on 
wage employment; the comparable figure for southern Africa 
was 63%, a significant degree of proletarianisation. 
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ideological barriers between the two. In many African states 
the ruling elite has more to lose than to gain by radically 
restructuring relationships with international and South 
African capitalism, although they too are under pressure from 
other Blacks, as South Africa is under pressure from her own 
indigenous Black population. In the foreseeable future, 
though, 
"the picture which emerges from our discussion 
is not bright. International capitalism, under 
the hegemony of the United States, seems about 
to rationalise its domination of Black Africa, 
a trend which may be supplemented by an economic 
and diplomatic offensive fr.om South Africa. The 
bankruptcy of independent Africa's development 
policies in the last decade, has, at the same 
time, prepared a favourable environment for the 
success of both such moves" (Arrighi and Saul, 
1973, p. 86). 
The writers suggest that the liberation struggle in southern 
Africa is the key to continental liberation, but warn 
against "any illusions concerning the nature and short-term 
prospects of the struggle in southern Africa. Yet, at the 
present historical moment, this provides the main, if not 
the only, leverage for revolutionary change in sub-Saharan 
Africa" (Arrighi and Saul, 1973, p.87). 
155 
The two main elements in their argument are the emphasis on 
the continental sweep of strategic calculation in contemporary 
Africa, and the importance of the development of subjective 
conditions, requiring increased clarity of analysis and a 
deeper understanding of the forces involved. In an 
important passage Arrighi and Saul state that 
"Only when concepts of 'nationalism' and of 
'pan-Africanism' are fully demystified and 
liberated from the cultural grip of the ruling 
classes and their ideologies can they be put 
to progressive use as political instruments. 
It is then too that a patently two-edged 
sword like racial consciousness can realise 
its full progressive potential - when, in 
other words, it is related to (though not 
sµbmerged by) a growing realisation on the 
part of African radicals that their revolution 
is part and parcel of a worldwide anti-
imperialist struggle" (Arrighi and Saul, 1973, 
p. 91). 
There are counter arguments to the ones that have just been 
examined, and they will be given both for the sake of 
completeness and to consider further the economic debate 
and its implications for change in South Africa. 
will also help to evaluate the preceding analyses. 
This 
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Broroberger, for example, has tried (to use Martin Legassick's 
description) to define rather more closely the kinds of 
changes that particular aspects of the industrialisation 
process are likely to effect. 
He begins with a synopsis of the views, as he understands 
them, of the 'revisionists', followed by a nu..mber of counter 
assertions which· constitute one of the few attempts to 
actually reply to points made in order to form a structured 
debate. 
The synopsis is that for Africans economic growth generates 
poverty .<15 ) If the absolute level of income per head does 
not decline or stagnate, at least it will decline relative 
to that of the Whites. Economic growth depends on forced 
.labour or labour repression. Institutional manifestations 
of the system are the trade union bar, which is important, 
and the limitations on geographical and occupational mobility, 
which are less important. Economic growth strengthens White 
US) Leg as sick has recently argued (in Webster and Schlemmer, 
1978, p.74) that the real economic question is that of the 
material situation of the total population. He puts 
forward the hypothesis that "under certain conditions 
rising real wages are compatible with increasing unem-
ployment (or a declining rate of job creation at least) 
and therefore with a potential static or declining real 
income for the population at large". · 
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supremacy. Growth depends more heavily on the White 
monopoly of political power as forced labour arrangements 
are intensified, but it also supports that monopoly with 
increased resources, which Whites possess the political 
will to use effectively. 
The counter assertions include the fact that economic growth 
creates employment for a rapidly growing population. In 
addition, it creates a demand for skilled labour at a faster 
rate than is compatible with the retention of conventional 
and statutory colour bars.. Growth also produces a 
geographical distribution of population which is not optimal 
from the point of view of White security, so Whites do and 
will trade security for increased prosperity. There are 
now good reasons for treating separate development in the 
Homelands as a risky strategy seriously undertaken in the 
hope of averting long-run disaster, and continued growth will 
make possible with less felt sacrifice the diversion of 
resources to various forms of projected economic activity in 
these areas. 
Brornberger makes the following propositions 
a) "There is no doubt that growth has been 
associated with African poverty. It is 
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far from clear that it needs to be - or 
will in fact continue to be." 
b) "'Forced labour' or 'labour repression' are 
ill-defined terms but as customarily used 
they do apply to an important element in 
South African economic history." 
He reiterates the way in which increased labour demand reduces 
statutory rigidity, however, and the way in which growth helps 
to 'foot the bills' for such tentative changes as are taking 
place. 
c) "On the grounds that I have just argued I do 
not agree with the simple proposition that 
'economic growth strengthens White supremacy'. 
I would accept it as a description of recent 
developments but in a longer-run perspective 
this is not true." 
Bromberger's paper 
and 
"is constructed as a close criticism of certain 
left-revisionist writings (Johnstone, Wolpe, 
Legassick) published up to 1972" 
"it undeniably fulfils its critical objective 
••• lapses·of logical rigour, ellipses in 
'model' specification, sometimes an incomplete 
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marshalling of evidence - these are identified 
in the chosen sources, and Bromberger's role 
of positivist cat amongst the political-economy 
pigeons seems vindicated" (Archer, 1976, p.233). 
The criticism of the 'Radicals' as having a limited time-
horizon is taken up by Kantor and Kenny : 
"The Whites have been able to have their cake and 
eat it. But is there any reason to assume that 
this trend will continue indefinitely and that a 
choice will not have to be made between continued 
supremacy, as the Whites see it, and continued 
industrialisation? The fact that a choice may 
not be urgent today hardly means that it may not 
be tomorrow there is little reason to 
assume that White supremacy and rapid economic 
growth are mutually reinforcing and many reasons 
to assume that they are not" (Kantor and Kenny, 
19 7 6 , p . 3 9 ) . <15 ) 
A consideration of the economic debate makes it abundantly 
clear that the sorts of difficulties raised require further 
research and empirical data. 
(16) Criticisms of the 'Radical-Revisionists' which state that 
their approach is ahistorical and undynamic are now common-
place (though the same criticisms apply to the 'Liberal 
Reformists'), and are made, for example, by Wright, (1977, 
pp.89-90), Yudelman (1975, p.95), Katzen (1975, p •. 212) and 
Leftwich (1974, pp.130-131). 
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The positions and optimism of O'Dowd and Bromberger, for 
example, are seriously challenged by available figures. 
O'Dowd predicts (in Webster and Schlemmer, 1978, pp.37-38) 
that South Africa has moved from the stage of initial rapid 
growth, under harsh government and with underlying social 
discontent, into the stage of rapid growth coupled with 
social reform : 
"So he expects increases in Black wages, education, 
etc. But his figures, for 1970-73 show White: 
Black average real wage ratios which either narrow 
slightly or even widen, depending on what 
deflation index is chosen {p.49). Similar results 
emerge from a valuable paper by McGrath, on income 
distribution. He finds that in the decade 1960-70 
White:Black personal income ratios per earner 
narrowed fractionally, from 10,94:1 to 10,70:1, 
but the ratios per capital {sic) widened, from 
13,03:1 to 14,18:1, because of the relatively 
higher {and continuing) growth rate of the 
African population {p.155). So even if one 
fully accepts Bromberger's injunction {p.60) to 
ignore how unequal things are today in favour of 
'the trend' (his emphasis), the results are not 
inspiring. The same goes for education. 
Bromberger enthuses in support of O'Dowd 'If 
modern technological developments demand a 
massive human transformation of the labour force 
.•• then that is what will materialise' {p.61) . 
. Perhaps, but when? He shows that in the full 
decade 1961-71, the proportion of Black pupils in 
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secondary schools increased from 2,9 to 4,7%! 
As McGrath soberly concludes, closing the gaps 
at this rate is something the Black population 
is not very likely to wait for" (Orkin, 1978, 
pp.69-70). 
In the six years between a Sanlam survey and the one by 
McGrath on income distribution, there seems to have been 
only a slight movement up and down (the figures in both 
the following tables are from the same source, which is 





















U7) Since the Sanlam/McGrath comparison shows only a marginal 
improvement of 0,2% in African income over the period, while 
White share has decreased from 73,7% to 71,9%, the difference 
has presumably gone to the Coloured and Indian population 
. groups. 
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Although these figures are approximations based on a set of 
pyramiding assumptions, the order of magnitude is what is 
important, and it is roughly correct. The relative and 
highly unequal positions seem to be stagnant, which seriously 
calls into question the positions of Bromberger and O'Dowd. 
TABLE II : INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA* 
Summary by : (a) Estimated race-group share; 
(b) Race differential; 
(c) Richest decile. 




White 17.8 - 21.6 69.0 - 78.0 
African 67. 9 - 70.0 17.7 - 20.6 
Asian 2.3 - 2.9 1.6 - 2.1 
Coloured . 7. 9 - 9.4 4.1 - 5.5 
(b) Ratio of Income per Head 
White/African 12.1:1 - 15.4:1 
White/Asian 4.7:1 - 7.2:1 
White/Coloured 5.2:1 - 8.8:1 
White/Black 
(AAC) 8.5:1 - 13.6:1 
(c) Percentage Share of highest decile 
All Race Population Share of Total Income, 1971 
Richest 10% . 58% plus 
Other useful information could be gained from comparative 
analysis of the development patterns (specifically the 
*Source for Table I and Table II : Mr Sean Archer, Centre for 
African Studies Lecture 5, University of Cape Town, April 10, 
1978. 
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relationship between growth and income distribution) of 
countries such as India, Brazil, Egypt and South Africa, which 
have modern sector islands of wealth in a sea of underdevelop-
ment and poverty. For example, the percentage share of 
income for the richest 10% is 58% plus in South Africa and 
50,8% in Brazil, as against 29,8% in Japan and 22,4% in 
Israel. 
The criteria used in judging complex concepts such as 'income 
distribution', 'welfare' and 'development' differ, so that 
comparisons are difficult. As already mentioned on page 114, 
the World Bank considers South Africa to be a developed 
country, whereas the International Monetary Fund regards 
South Africa as part of a special group amongst developing 
countries. 
Experiments with productive redistribution, through 
mechanisms such as taxation and education, in developing 
countries, and efforts such as affirmative action or positive 
discrimination in the United States, could be evaluated, and 
their applicability to South Africa assessed. 
Experiments with scientific socialism elsewhere in Africa 
and in the developing world need to be examined and assessed 
in order to test their relevance to South Africa's problems. 
In summary, a great deal of empirical data needs to be 
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gathered from rigorous research, to help answer the sorts of 
problems raised by the debate on South Africa's politics and 
economics. 
2.4.4 Conclusion 
It is both inevitable and desirable that the debate on the 
interrelated factors which together constitute the complex 
entity 'South Africa' will continue int6 the foreseeable 
future. It is inevitable because it is unlikely that an 
irrefutable theory (as in the physical sciences) will be 
established, with which scholars and activists who prefer 
one interpretation can persuade those who prefer another. 
It is desirable because, in the process, various facets of 
the subject under examination become clearer. 
Hughes says that 
"the revisionists have made a contribution in 
two important and undisputed ways : by 
calling attention to very important facts 
which while they were not unknown before, 
were generally overlooked or undervalued; and 
by injecting a little venom into a debate which 
was previously altogether too gentlemanly and 
high-minded" (Hughes, 1977, p.57). 
The 'radical' analysis is often cogent, and raises awareness 
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of important issues, philosophical and political. 
A critical calculation made by revolutionary Marxists is 
that the suffering which usually follows revolutionary 
violence ought to be weighed against the structural violence 
and suffering which is part of the status quo. Revolutionaries 
do not follow laws, but radical.perspectives question whether 
the laws themselves are just, and whether order is not simply 
enforced for their own benefit by the Whites who have 
something to lose through fundamental and equitable change. 
Intellectual Marxists (whether revolutionary activists, 
academics, or both) operate within the tramework of an all-
embrac~ng paradigm, which offers explanations for the 
observable political, social and economic phenomena of a 
society. Is Marxist theory sufficient for explanation and 
understanding of society, and is Marxist ideology, once applied, 
the solution to the problems of society? The insights 
derived from Marxist perspectives renders them necessary, 
but that is far from saying that they are sufficient, for 
understanding and solving the problems of people and 
society : for example, Marxism does not resolve the problem 
posed by the absence of an inter-racial working class 
solidarity~ 
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However, the radical analysis has deepened understanding of 
class and capitalism, of exploitation and underdevelopment 
in South Africa, of Black history, of the possibility and 
desirability of revolution and other related subjects, and 
this approach "to South Africa's twentieth century history 
is clearly going to be a major growth history" (Marks, 1976, 
p.195). On intellectual radicalism, Waterman concludes 
that "we contemporary Africanists need only remember with 
Gramsci (who for believing so died in one of Mussolini's 
prisons) that truth is revolutionary, and with John Hus 
(who for stating so was burned by the church), that it will 
conquer" (Waterman, 1977, p.14). 
Regrettably, however, the 'truth' is not easily established 
"no doubt, when the revolution is already battering at the 
gate the Marxist pedants wlll still be w~angling over how 
many angels can dance up and down on a mode of production!" 
(Hughes, 1977, p.56). 




A sununary of my analysis and conclusions in Part II will be 
given as Section 1 of Part II.I for comparison and contrast 
with the positions of the selected writers. This will 
also form the background for the further discussion in 
this concluding section of (2) conflict and current 
political trends, (3) attitudes towards social conflict, 
(4) the nature of change and the possible futures of South 
Africa and (5) selected scenarios of South Africa's future 
which can be compared with the hypotheses put forward in 
this study. 
3.1 SYNPOSIS OF ANALYSES 
(~r agree with Van den Berghe that the structural sources of ,_ 
conflict in the South African system are such that conditions 
""'· for a change of system exis€~ I disagree with his 
) 
prediction of imminent revolution (" .•. the likelihood 
of revolution seems high. Mounting internal strains and 
external pressures doom White supremacy and racial 
segregation within the near future", Van den Berghe, 1965, 
p. 262) • The prediction made a dozen or so years ago has 
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not materialised because White power is sufficient to contain 
the conflict, and, together with a degree of interdependence 
between the racial groups, to maintain an uneasy equilibrium 
in society. However, given a weakening in the position of 
the Whites over a period of time (through, for exarnple, 
effective economic boycott and prolonged guerilla warfare) 
and a strengthening of the African position (through, for 
example, greater power to disrupt the economy, increasing 
moral and material support from abroad), the theoretical 
possibility of change of system cannot be ruled out in the 
longer term. 
Adam's hypothesis of a modernising racial oligarchy fits 
the facts in South Africa, but only up to a certain 
critical point : that point is probably reached when the 
oligarchy perceives any given change as threatening the 
overall power of the ruling elite over the destiny of 
South Africa. No 'pragmatic' concessions are likely to be 
made by a Nationalist Government which threaten National 
Party unity, and, by inference, overall Afrikaner and White 
control of the country : pressures for change which 
challenge these are likely to be met with force and 
suppression, whereas lesser changes may be countenanced as 
pragmatic responses to social conflict. However, the 
nature and pace of change under the policy of separate 
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development (which Adam recently described as a "blueprint 
of expedience",. The Cape Times, 7.7.78, p.2) is unlikely to 
satisfy African demands and therefore halt the polarisation 
of the races. The implementation of the system requires 
extension of the coercive apparatus of the State. 
It is unlikely that -bi:-. forces identified by O' Dowd will 
"'--- ;~~ 
bring about more than marginal changes in the system. . The 
O'Dowdian model might apply if 
a) the growth rate of productive employment is greater 
than the growth of population throughout the life-
cycle of the economy; and 
b) the development in any one period generates the 
correct group behaviour for continued development 
in subsequent periods (Orkin, 1978, p.70). 
However, the figures given in Part II upset the first 
condition;. and political factors (the maintenance of White 
domination) may well override the need for marginal 
improvements in the logic of the market. 
I agree with the general thesis of the writers considered 
at the end of Part II, that racial discrimination was 
historically and still is functional both_ to White security 
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and White supremacy, though this need not necessarily remain 
so in the long term. Much depends on whether the Whites 
wish to maintain power largely in their hands and the current 
mode of production. 
The sources of conflict are institutionalised in the South 
African political structure 
"To a substantial extent the racial conflict in 
South Africa revolves around its institutionalised 
inequalities of power, wealth, opportunity and 
status. There are no inherent or intrinsic 
reasons why groups of differing colours and/or 
culture should not be able to live together in 
harmony colour (or ethnicity) derives its 
salience because it symbolises particular 
positions in a hierarchy, and it is the 
hierarchical nature of the society that 
determines its distributional patterns, i.e. 
who gets what, how and when" (Welsh, 1978, p.30). 
The ruling elite controls the patterns of social mobility, 
ascribes roles in society according to race, predetermines 
status according to colour, and controls the allocation of 
resources and wealth. 
The degree of conflict, latent or overt, at any time is a 
reflection of the differential acceptance of the Africans, 
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Coloureds and Indians of the specific form of distribution 
of power, resources and status in South Africa, and the 
ability of the Whites to control the manifestations of 
dissatisfaction. 
Since there is an excess of claimants over opportunities 
for adequate reward, the most powerful group is likely to 
use its power to contain the resultant strain and conflict, 
by a variety of methodsf ranging from physical coercion to 
'pragmatic' concessions. This group is likely to attempt 
to maintain its power, privilege and wealth for as long as 
possible; and it is unlikely to be dislodged until equal or 
greater power is raised against it. This, naturally, is 
not to say that the cohesion of South African society 
depends on the unhesitating use of power alone; clearly, 
there are cross-cutting cleavages which help to maintain 
some sort of equilibrium in society. 
3.2 CONCLUSIONS ON CONFLICT AND CURRENT POLITICAL TRENDS 
The conclusion that the sources of conflict are 
institutionalised in the South African political structure 
to a large extent is also supported by a survey of the 
various sources of conflict by Schlemmer (SchlewJner in De 
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Crespigny and Schrire, 1978, pp.160~175). 
The prime source of conflict in South.Africa is the issue of 
political rights for the Black majority. The two opposed 
positions are those which, on the one side, wish for universal 
franchise in a non-racial unitary state, and, on the other 
side, separate franchises and political domains for different 
race groups, and unequal participation in decisions about the 
central resources of society. 
This is the seminal conflict source, from which all others 
flow. Blacks disagree about acceptance of separate 
development, more specifically, about the relative efficacy 
of working within or outside the White imposed system for 
its overthrow. Whites differ amongst themselves over the 
sort of society South Africa should be 
or a racially separated one. 
a common society 
There are value conflicts in South Africa : over ideological 
differences, over the inclusion of Africans in a broad South 
Africanism; by Africans themselves over whether Whites, 
Indians and Coloureds should be included in their projected 
South Africa, or whether to aim for Black supremacy; and 
over the relative desirability of an essentially capitalist 
or communist socio.,....economic system. 
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Job inequality, low African wages and enforced lack of 
African bargaining power through recognised trade unionism 
is an obvious source of discontent. 
The partition (13 1 7% for the Homelands and the rest for 
Whites) of the land resources of South Africa is an enduring 
source of conflict. Schlemmer notes that the differential 
access to the resources of the 1 White 1 or 1 coromon 1 area is 
a source of conflict. 
Differential access to educational facilities is one of the 
most important sources of conflict, and was at least the 
proximate cause of the Soweto uprising. Clearly, there is 
deep resentment amongst Blacks against a system of education 
which is designed to fulfil a Nationalist vision. 
Expenditure on Black education is low in comparison (and it 
is the comparison which is important, not the absolute level) 
with expenditure on White education. It is the antithesis 
of what young Blacks want, which is the same education as 
Whites, and equa:i_ life-chances in what is a de facto black-
and-white state, characterised by economic· interdependence. 
The major causes of discontent do appear to be rooted in 
the apartheid structure of society. If the apartheid state 
were dismantled, and a common unitary state founded~ would 
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the residual and irreducible (at least in the short-run) 
conflicts of ethnicity, religion, tribalism, ideology and so 
on be politically and socially significant? Experience 
elsewhere in the world suggests that there is no clearcut 
answer to this question : examples range from peaceful and 
prosperous plurality (Switzerland), through uneasy co-
existence (Belgium, Canada) to bloody confrontation (Lebanon). 
The particular structure of the South African state produces 
not orily the conflicts outlined, but also conflict regulation, 
in ways_both direct and indirect. 
The South African state is an authoritarian one, deploying 
considerable and powerful legal and extra-legal means of 
preventing or stifling dissent. If Adam's definition of 
totalitarianism is accepted ("the suppression of all 
attempts for change detrimental to the superordinate group" 
Adam, 1971, p.39), then South Africa is a special case of 
such a state. The South African Government excludes, by 
force if necessary, alternatives to the established system 
of involuntary colour politics. However, a measure of 
dissent is allowed, provided it is largely ineffectual as 
a challenge to the established SY.Stem. Furthermore, this 
gives the appearance of rational, open exchange of views. 
It is more subtle for a pragmatic oligarchy to dissipate 
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energies along channels which it controls than to rely on 
stark physical coercion alone. If a channel of dissent is 
judged to be a nuisance, it is closed down, as the security 
measures of October 19th, 1977, blatantly showed. 
When a government which has superior capabilities eliminates 
ambiguities in the rules which govern its subjects, most 
people tend to follow the rules and fall into apathy and 
resignation, so conflict is contained. Black energies are 
further dissipated by splits over the Homelands issue 
(divide et impera)( by inter-ethnic conflict (fostered by 
Bantu Education), and by ideological differences. Economic 
growth and interdependence between Whites and Blacks is seen 
as increasing prosperity and decreasing the chances of 
unrest by offering material rewards to the Blacks which 
counterbalance their social and political demands. Thus 
conflict is regulated by what has pithily been described as 
the 'whip of hunger and the butt of the gun' in a hierarchy 
of crude to subtle controls . 
. 
Conflict is simultaneously aroused and controlled by the 
South African system. The system would be self~defeating 
if it could not contain the conflicts to which it gives rise, 
but it has so far proved successful in its own terms. 
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The Whites in South Africa, who derive significant privileges 
from the existing system of allocation of power, wealth and 
status, perceive an attack on these privileges as an attack 
against the social order itself. The system is designed to 
preserve these very privileges, so the conflicts outlined are 
intrinsic to it, and will remain to influence every facet of 
political, social and economic life in South Africa as long 
as the system itself remains. 
It is difficult to see, therefore, how the conflicts can 
be resolved within the system (they can only be contained); 
the particular conflicts which beset the present South 
African system can only be resolved by a change of system, 
which would in turn give rise to a society with its own 
conflicts. Progress would only have been made if the new 
social dispensation gave rise to fewer and less virulent 
forms of conflict, and-allowed greater cooperation towards 
achieving those aims which are fairly universal amongst 
people. (In this context it is self-evidently desirable to 
agree v1i th Barrington Moore that· the task of honest thinking 
is to rise above the preconceptions of both capitalism and 
communism, and ~o uncover the causes of oppressive tendencies 
in both systems in the hopes of overcoming them.) 
Van den Berghe says that 
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"the end of White supremacy must come in South 
Africa, and it will come through revolution 
and violence. But the end of White supremacy 
will not mean the end of racism. I have little 
doubt that the first African government in 
South Africa will be better than the present 
government. It could scarcely be any worse. 
Unfortunately I am not convinced that it 
would be enough of an improvement to want to 
fight for it" (Van den Berghe, 1969, p.42). 
Whether or not Van den Berghe is correct, his statement 
underlines the complexity of the situation and explains why 
many South Africans are deeply divided over their perceptions 
of the political alternatives. 
In the meanwhile, political life revolves around the issues 
generated by the present system. What do the various groups 
feel about these conflicts? 
3.3 ATTITUDES TOWARDS SOCIAL CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
As Barrington Moore has pointed out, "we cannot do without 
some conception of how people perceive the world and what 
they do or do not want to do about what they see" (Moore, 
1966, p.487). 
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Much of what would otherwise be pure speculation on pos.sible 
ways to resolve conflict in South African society can be 
substantiated by empirical evidence on how Whites and Blacks 
see things, and what they want to do about what they see. 
In June 1978 there was a symposium in Freiburg, West Germany, 
on the prospects of peaceful change in South Africa. 
Attitudinal surveys were conducted amongst both Whites and 
Blacks by Professor Theodor Hanf and his group in South 
Africa. The findings which follow are attributable to the 
Freiburg group. ( l) 
The aspirations of Whites and Blacks are in conflict : 74% 
of Whites are prepared to fight to maintain South Africa as 
they know it today, while 83% of the Blacks want the existing 
system to be replaced by a one-man one-vote system. 
The Government is enjoying massive and growing support 
amongst the Whites, whereas 50% of the Blacks have a feeling 
of powerlessness. Those taking part in the attitudinal 
survey were asked to express agreement or disagreement with 
(1) The findings of the Freiburg group have been published in 
German and are due to be published in English later this 
year. Judgement as to their value will have to await this 
publication. In the meantime, the figures cited have been 
culled from a variety of press reports. 
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a number of statements. The percentage of those agreeing· 
with each statement is given after the statement. 
(1) Improvements for Africans will come through patient 
negotiation between White and Black l·eaders - 67, 4%. 
(2) The only way .of bringing improvements for Africans 
is by making trouble in public or by strikes - 10,2%. 
(3) Africans will never get improvements without fighting 
and violent actions - 27,6%. 
(4) Fighting and violence will harm the Africans very much 
more than the Whites because the Whites are very 
strong - 47,7%. 
(5) Africans should never think of fighting and violence 
because hurting anybody, even Whites, is very bad 
- 61%. 
A majority of Africans then, still prefers peaceful 
negotiation, and regards violence as bad in principle; the 
investigators say this is partly attributable to religious 
attitudes. The Freiburg Report also says that Black 
political leaders fear that this could quickly change; that 
with the progress of urbanisation and the growth of 
education, disillusionment increases and hopes of peaceful 
change decrease; and that readiness for conflict is 
growing above all amongst the African youth. 
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The Freiburg Group indicates that Chief Buthelezi has 
strong support amongst urban Blacks, and not only amongst 
Zulus. At the July 1978 Grahamstown conference on the 
future of South Africa, Buthelezi sununarised his views. He 
said the Whites will make the smallest possible shifts to 
withstand a relentlesslx increasing pressure; that the 
v folly of apartheid may give rise to the greater folly of a 
triple parliament and a· super cabinet, and that no leader 
of a Black group would survive long in that travesty of 
democracy; that it is not too late to bring about fundamental 
\ 
changes_ by peaceful means, but that they were not likely to 
materialise, not because Blacks would not permit it, but 
because Whites were intent on a last-ditch stand which 
conceded as little as possible. 
The Freiburg Survey, which took several years to conduct, 
can be compared to other attitudinal surveys. One of 
these is the Markinor socio-political barometer (reported 
in "The Argus", 1st June 1978, p.11). The results were : 
69% of the Whites interviewed are confident that 
there will be a happy future in South Africa for 
all races; 28%·are not confident. By contrast, 
62% of African men interviewed and 54% of African 
women are not confident of the futureo However1 
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37% of the women and 31% of the men did express 
optimism. 
89% of the Whites thought Mr Vorster was doing 
a good job leading the country, with 64% 
choosing the "leading the country very well" 
answer, to 25% who chose the "fairly well" 
answer. The Africans feel otherwise 89% of 
the men and 70% of the women did not think he 
was leading the country well, and the large 
majority chose the strongest disapproving 
answer. 
By a large majority Whites saw their personal 
relationships with other groups as being either 
good or very good, but the results from the 
other groups suggested that some Whites were 
deluding themselves. Africans again have a 
different view : 54% of the men and 46% of 
the women see Black/White relations as poor or 
very poor. The survey showed that there was a 
realisation amongst Whites of some degree of 
dissatisfaction amongst Africans, although it 
did not reach the same degree as the actual 
dissatisfaction expressed. 
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Africans tended to see themselves as being worse 
off economically than they were a year ago, 
while Whites, Asians and Coloureds tended to 
believe they were no worse off. 
On all these issues there was less of a discrepancy between 
the Coloured, and particularly the Asian group and the 
Whites, which is probably a reflection of the differential 
incorporation of various groups into the mainstream of 
South African society. The feelings of the Africans 
expressed in the above survey are not surprising on the 
basic premise that the system under which they live is 
specifically designed to maintain the power, privileges 
and wealth of the Whites. 
An interesting part of this survey's findings is that 
Indians show a high level of satisfaction and support for 
the status quo. 
It is natural that the Africarnshould compare their own 
situation, not with Blacks elsewhere in Africa, but with 
that of the Whites in South Africa. <2> If, in addition, 
(2) However, the fact that such comparison is made need not 
imply dissatisfaction in all cases: "we must never take 
the identification of a person's comparative reference 
group as providing in itself an adequate explanation of 
his resentment at the patterning of social inequality" 
(Urry, 1973, p.181). 
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they question the legitimacy of the system which allocates 
power, privilege and wealth differentially according to 
·colour, and furthermore have no channels to express their 
discontent, sociological analysis suggests that some of the 
conditions for rebellion are present amongst the Blacks. 
However, this is not incompatible with the findings of the 
Freiburg Group that a majority would still prefer the 
changes they wish for to come about peacefully. 
Professor Schlemmer's study of political attitudes in Durban 
refers to the perception by Blacks that the system is 
positively geared to depriving Africans of their legitimate 
entitlements. Whites, however, appear to be unaware of 
the seriousness of the potential for conflict : in a nation-
wide study, Schlemmer found that amongst Afrikaans-speaking 
Whites 16% considered Africans to be very dissatisfied and 
42% felt them to be fairly dissatisfied; the remainder 
viewed them as satisfied. Amongst non-Afrikaans-speaking 
Whites, 39% felt the Blacks were very dissatisfied. (The 
Markinor survey suggests that 62% of Whites felt there was 
not much satisfaction w~ongst the Africans.) 
The Schlemmer survey suggests that White political control 
is seen as essential for the continued existence of the 
White community in South Africa; only 9% of non ..... Afrikaners 
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and 3% of Afrikaners answered that no serious or permanent 
danger to White interests would result from Black rule 
(interests being defined as order and living standards, with 
culture and language being accorded low priority). 
The most interesting part of his survey is that which offers 
insights into the question of why open violence or overt 
confrontation is not as yet characteristic of Black South 
Africa, despite Soweto and its aftermath. Some 40% of 
African respondents exhibited a strong sense of the 
immutability of White authority and control. White 
domination tended to be seen by these people as a massive, 
rock-like edifice, an all-encompassing political reality 
which ~othing could change~ Substantial minorities 
displayed self-denigration or adopted pro-Homeland or pro-
separatist stances. These were seen as second-best options, 
but the only way of reacting to the impossibility of doing 
anything else. When all the adaptive responses were added 
up, only some 20% of respondents remained who consistently 
and emphatically rejected all aspects of the system. Will 
this percentage increase over time? 
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3.4 THE NATURE OF CHANGE AND THE POSSIBLE FUTURES OF 
SOUTH AFRICA 
With these views as background, one can look at the sorts of 
conclusions which can be reached about political, social and 
economic trends, and their impact on the future. 
It appears that the range of possible outcomes for South 
Africa is that between repression on the one hand and 
revolution on the other. 
Beyond stating the range of possible outcomes, it might be 
wise to venture no further prediction. Given the richness 
and variety of the society under examination, and the 
multitude of forces at play, though, one might hazard a 
guess and say, as Alice did in Wonderland, that things in 
South Africa are likely to become "curiouserand curiouser" 
in the future! 
The future is full of potential and should be looked at with 
fresh eyes. In order to do this, ·as Du Toi t has affirmed 
(The Cape Times, 26th, 27th and 30th June, 1978, p.8, ·p.8 
and p.10 respectively), some things have to be avoided. 
The first is the 'Doomsday' and 'Uhuru' syndromes, which 
envisage either gaining or losing absolutely everything. 
The second is the projection fallacy, which is seeing the 
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future as a projection of the present. The third obstacle 
to clear thought is re.sidual fixations, or the retention of 
perceptions that have ceased to be relevant. It is not 
possible to make predictions in the social sciences in the 
same way that predictions are made in the physical sciences. 
However, some conclusions can be drawn, and tentative 
hypotheses put forward, to be verified, modified or refuted 
by empirical evidence and unfolding events. At this 
historical juncture in South Africa, it appears that 
revolution is remote; effective external intervention is 
unlikely; and the establishment of a unitary multiracial 
democracy through internal forces illusory since the power 
_elite rejects this as a possibility: 
"The sole and non-negotiable aim of South African 
Government policy is the preservation of the 
lives, lands and life~style of the White 
minority. The means currently proposed for the 
attainment and maintenance of this end are 
'separate development' within South Africa and 
an 'outward' policy within the continent 
directed to the establishment of a zone of co-
prosperi ty in the Third Africa" (Butterworth, 
1977, p.27). 
The South African Government is not different from other 
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governments which take action based on political expediency, 
which discount the future and emphasise the present, which 
take ill-considered decisions and pay insufficient attention 
to the possible consequences of present actions. However, 
the South African Government also gives the impression of 
being a Janus-like creature, facing towards doctrinal 
inflexibility and ruthless implementation of its policies on 
the one side, and towards pragmatic responses and devolution 
of power on the other. ( 3) This combination appears to have 
been successful. After all, Cassandras have been predicting 
the demise of White supremacy for over half a century, but 
(3) Beard writes that "the African population of 'White' South 
Africa will always exceed the White population, and even 
granting that the status of Africans resident in 'White' 
South Africa will be that of foreign visitors, will South 
Africa be able to continue to discriminate against Africans 
by refusing to accord them the same rights and privileges 
as are accorded to White resident aliens and visitors 
from abroad? It would seem safe to assert that racial 
equality is not envisaged by the National Party Government, 
and 'baasskap' cannot be eliminated as long as people are 
classified and accorded rights and privileges purely on 
the basis of race or colour. 
South African policies thus appear to be paradoxical or 
even self-contradictory . • . On the one hand separate 
development gives to Africans a degree of power and a 
relative security from harassment which they have never 
before enjoyed •.. , but on the other hand the position 
of Africans in 'White 1 areas has never been more uncertain 
and the position of leaders who have emerged in political 
and para.,..political organisations which do not enjoy 
government sponsorship has never been more insecure" 
(T.V.R. Beard in Van der Merwe et al (eds), "African 
Perspectives on South Africa", 1978, p.10). 
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judged in their own terms, the Whites have been remarkably 
successful in achieving their aims. <4> The Republic is 
theirs, and there does not appear to be a force or combination 
of forces capable of overthrowing them. They might reason, 
therefore, that even if there is conflict and deep 
dissatisfaction, it is regrettable but does not really matter 
as long as it can be contained. If they ensure that the 
weight, scope and domain of their power over Blacks remains 
stronger than the power of the Blacks, (S) they might remain 
in control for a half-century or more, preserving the 
privileges of the Afrikaners specifically and the Whites 
generally (who are supporting the Nationalists in increasing 
numbers). The fundamental White perception is that White 
rule is essential for survival. This perception may or may 
not be correct, but it does inform the thoughts and actions 
of White South Africans. (
6
) 
(4) Even eminent science fiction writers have been predicting the 
certain demise of the White-controlled South African system! 
Arthur Clarke wrote "Death and the Senator" in 1961, projecting 
the story into the future to the year 1976. He makes the 
Senator say in 1976 that "he could even think, without pain 
or bitterness, of his own son, who had travelled this road 
before him and now lay, one cross among many, in the United 
Nation's cemetery at Cape Town. He had never visited Martin's 
grave; in the days when he had the time, White men were not 
popular in what was left of South Africa." 
(5) The term 'Blacks' here includes Africans, Coloureds & Indians. 
(6) Indeed, perceptions like these take the form of self-fulfilling 
prophecies after a while, analogously to the way in which 
theory 'x' managers give subordinates no responsibility, and 
then say they are irresponsible • • • • 
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The various surveys have shown that a majority of Africans 
still want peaceful moves away from White domination, and that 
they are neither united in implacable opposition to the Whites, 
nor in a revolutionary ferment. This situation may continue 
for a long time, but the process of separation and exclusion 
of the Africans will not only weaken them in some ways, but 
will also act to increase over time the numbers of them who 
opt for confrontation and violence in the face of White 
intransigence and unwillingness to listen. 
That there will be increasing pressures on the present system 
seems reasonably certain. The surveys indicate considerable 
dissatisfaction amongst the Africans, which in the absence of 
alternatives might increasingly be translated into attempts 
to change the structure of the system itself. The example 
of the Afrikaners, who opted for racial and ethnic separation 
and identity, and who gained power in doing so, may be 
emulated by the Africans as the way to improve their collective 
position. Gatsha Buthelezi has drawn this parallel, amongst 
others (Buthelezi in Van der Merwe et al, 1978, p.585). 
In a comparative study of race relations in six 'Anglo 
fragment' countries, it is concluded that 
"change seldom occurs at the initiative of 
) 
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White society. Rather, that society tends to 
respond and accept change (even changes which 
may limit its power and pr-ivilege) only when 
it is confronted by groups which, having 
mobilised their resources, can utilise pressure 
and competitive resources as a means for 
bringing about change" (Baker, 1975, p.19). 
The South African state will probably not allow the Africans 
to mobilise their tangible resources to the extent that they 
can challenge the basic structure of the system. It is 
difficult, though, to prevent the spread of an intangible 
Black consciousness if the Africans finally become united in 
their perceptions of the White-imposed system as being the 
source of their problems. As Fanon made clear in the 
"Wretched of the Earth", Whites have ruled partly by 
shattering the Black man's identity; in South Africa, 
however, the ethnic identity of various groups is emphasised 
by the Government to facilitate a divide and rule policy. 
In either case, it is likely that a dialectical process will 
lead the Africans to form a new consciousness as a. 
countervailing power to the common consciousness of Whites 
that they (i.e. the Whites) must rule South Africa. 
Pierre van den Berghe wrote that 
191 
"a South Africa divided against itself awaits 
the impending and inexorable catastrophe. 
The Whites claim a right to survival which 
hardly anybody denies them. But in claiming 
to assert that right, they have set themselves 
against the course of history, and have become 
an arrogant, oppressive albinocracy" (Van den 
Berghe, 1965, pp.263-264). 
In reaction to this, one possibility for the future is that 
more Africans will come to think that the calculus of 
suffering likely to result from revolutionary violence must 
include that which will come from prolonging the present 
state of affairs. Barrington Moore suggests that "as long 
as powerful vested interests oppose changes that lead 
towards a less oppressive world, no commitment to a free 
society can dispense with some conception of revolutionary 
coercion" (Moore, 1966, p.508)~. 
As long as Africans, and to a lesser extent, Coloureds and 
Indians, are oppressed, there are likely to be mounting 
pressures against the Whites both internally and from the 
outside world., The South African system arouses strong 
emotions because it ~as institutionalised racial 
discrimination, and, on a more subtle level, because it 
touches the world conscience and is a microcosm of world 
problems : 
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"South Africa is an expression on the face of 
the White world in history, and one which even 
yet the White world does not care to erase. 
For to erase the meaning of South Africa is 
more than merely to risk the West's 
considerable economic and political investments 
there; it is to alter a policy and behind 
it a habit of thought, that grew with power 
itself. Yet the meaning of South Africa is 
no less to the world of colour, and all 
humanity may find it too costly a meaning 
to maintain" (Segal, 1967, p.132). 
"It is being increasingly realised that what 
you are attempting to solve here is, in 
microcosm, the same conflict between races 
and between rich and poor that is going to 
confront the world on a vaster scale in the 
near future" (Lord Redcliffe-Maude in Gerber, 
1973, p.63). 
"Southern Africa's.distinctive racial 
characteristics provide a model of the racial 
situation all over the world. There are a 
number of vexing moral and philosophical 
issues present, for example, the basis of 
government legitimacy" (Grundy, 1973, 
Preface). 
In his Preface, Grundy goes on to say that 
"one can conceive of the total world picture of 
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international relations as a complex and complete 
system, much like a gigantic electric circuit, 
although not nearly so predictable. An action 
at one point in that circuit sets off a reaction 
els~where in the system, and so forth." 
If this is true, then it partly explains why South Africa 
arouses so much interest in the outside world. The resolution 
or otherwise of the conflict between White and Black, rich 
and poor, and the changes that take place in South Africa, 
may indeed be a microcosm of the larger world in certain ways. 
In the complex interplay of facts and values, of manmade 
decisions and impersonal social forces, there are changes 
taking place continuously, at different levels, which might 
have unforeseeable consequences. The population increase 
in South Africa is an example of non-purposive change which 
might have a significant impact on future politics. 
It has been estimated that there will be six million Whites, 
five million Coloureds, one and a quarter million Indians, 
and thirty-five million Africans in South Africa in the year 
2000. The Homelands, independent, federated or otherwise, 
will not be able to support even half of the Black population, 
so that between seventeen and twenty-five million Africans 
will be living and working within the areas designated as 
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'White' South Africa. Eleven more cities the size of Cape 
Town would have to be built by the turn 0£ the century to 
house the growing White, Coloured and Indian population, and 
eight more cities the size of Soweto for the increase in 
African population. These trends lead to social problems 
such as squatting, overcrowding, disease, crime and poverty, 
but these are ultimately political prob-lems, so there will 
be concomitant pressure on the political system. 
Politics revolves around the allocation of scarce resources, 
so that_ a greater population means more people pursuing 
limited resources, which in turn leads to conflict and 
political demands. The Africans working in South Africa 
will want to be recognised as an integral and permanent part 
of the country in which many are born, work and die, that 
is, as citizens with political, social and economic rights. 
Developments such as these strengthen the assertion that 
"it is desirable to have some concept of the 
alternative futures towards which policies may 
tend before policies are formulated. Otherwise 
points of no return may be passed without any 
conscious awareness that the panoply of choice 
is so great or the future so uncertain. I£ 
these be speculation or nightmares then - as 
they are ~ rather than science, prognostication, 
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or, except with respect to limited aspects of 
the problem, technological extrapolations, 
they (or something similar but better) ought 
nonetheless to be part of the intellectual 
equipment of modern man." (Kahn, 1967, p.357). 
3.4.1 Reasons for Hypothesis on the Nature of Change 
Drawing together the foregoing discussion, and given the 
following principal reasons, amongst others : 
(1) that the Whites generally and the South African 
Government specifically perceive the continuation 
of White domination as imperative for survival 
(the 'doomsday' or zero-sum game syndrome in which 
both sides tend to think in terms of either gaining 
or losing everything); 
(2) that the policy of separate development can provide 
only limited relief in terms of deflecting political 
aspirations and defusing dissatisfaction amongst the 
Africans; 
(3) that the inescapable logic of (particularly) African 
population growth, and the inability of the economy 
·to absorb the increase into the economy constitute a 
demographic time~bornb (Africans are likely to see the 
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economic question of unemployment as being, in the 
final analysis, a political question); 
(4) that there is neither enough time nor economic growth 
for the co-optation of sufficient numbers of Africans 
through embourgeoisement to significantly change the 
situation in terms of giving enough of them a vested 
interest in the status quo; 
(5) that the growth rate is dependent on significant foreign 
investment in South Africa, but that this investment 
will be curtailed or inhibited because of internal 
policies; 
(6) that external pressures on South Africa will increase 
over time (White domination in South Africa might be 
seen as all the more intolerable once Namibia and 
Zimbabwe are independent Black-ruled states); 
(7) that there are no known plans in the pipeline for 
bargaining over a genuine sharing of power with 
Africans and disaggregation of government in the 
direction of, for example, evolving the Homelands 
policy towards some sort of consociational democracy; 
(8) that the percentage of African respondents who 
"consistently and emphatically reject all aspects of 
the system" will increase in view of the above; 
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one can put forward a tentative hypothesis for the foreseeable 
future in South Africa. Following Adam's assertion that 
"suppression is either absolute and total or it develops an 
inner dynamic towards its own abolition" (Adam, 1971, p.75), 
and given the factors su..rnmarised above, the most likely trend 
for the near future in South Africa is change in the direction 
of increased authoritarianism (pace O'Dowd!). 
The hypothesis is that changes which are not perceived as 
challenging the overall power and control of the ruling White 
elite will be countenanced and even implemented by the 
oligarchy : the new constitutional proposals might be an 
example of Adamsian pragmatic concessions at lesser levels. 
However, changes which do appear to threaten ultimate White 
power in South Africa (and future demands by Africans, Indians 
and Coloureds are increasingly likely to be for precisely these 
sorts of changes) will be resisted and suppressed by all 
available means, so that each new pressure on the system is 
met and controlled by even greater state power. 
Clearlyf the important caveat here is that there are a number 
of other courses for South Africa to follow, including a 
variety of ways in which there can be genuine and negotiated 
power-sharing between Whites, Africansf Indians and Coloureds .. 
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such as some form of federal structure or consociational 
democracy, but they seem a little less likely to materialise 
than the one adumbrated above at this time. 
Although the continuation of overall White control seems likely 
at this point, past patterns should certainly not be raised to 
the level of future inevitabilities. The future in South 
Africa will be partially determined by what has happened in 
the past, but it is still largely open : future choices, both 
in South Africa and abroad, could have a decisive impact on 
unfolding events in a way not foreseeable now. 
As Francis Wilson suggests 
"any number of plausible hypotheses can be put 
forward regarding the shape of the future, 
ranging from fundamental change by 1984, 
through second-best solutions, to an entrenched 
racial oligarchy living off the backs of 
impoverished Blacks far into the next century. 
All one can really do, we suggest, is try to 
clarify our understanding of the forces at 
work, to interpret some of the apparent trends, 
and to be ready, in the light of new facts or 
further insights, to modify or abandon our own 
particular assessment." (Wilson in Butler and 
Thompson, 1975, pp.199-200). 
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The analysis in this work suggests that the Government has 
the power to suppress political, social and economic demands, 
by violent means if necessary. If this course is chosen, it 
could succeed for a considerable length of time, but the 
psychological and economic costs might increase to the 
point where life is unpleasant for all South Africans, despite 
a superficial order and stability. 
The alternative of serious negotiation with the chosen 
leaders of the African, Coloured and Indian population does 
not appear, at this point in time, to be an important 
political objective of the ruling elite. The Government 
probably also has the power to change direction significantly 
without losing the majority of its supportf but whether it 
will actually do so or not is a moot point. Consummate 
practitioners of the art of politics might deliberately choose 
to negotiate, and to do so genuinely, but at the same time 
protract the negotiations for a generation, so that the 
necessary changes in structure and attitude can be brought 
about surely yet smoothly; the process of genuine negotiation 
might also decrease world hostility and increase investment 
to fuel growth, which in turn can be partially used for paying 
for the changes required to build a more stable society. 
The Rhodesian example suggests that glacial movement by Whites 
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towards accommodating African aspirations leads slowly but 
inexorably to a situation in which they have to negotiate 
from a position of weakness, faced with the hostility of the 
majority of the indigenous population and the outside world. 
As time passes, moderate Black leaders lose credibility in 
the eyes of their people for not being able to coerce 
concessions from the Whites, while the leaders who opt for 
fighting for their rights tend to gain more and more support, 
and have less incentive to bargain with the Whites. South 
Africa is different to Rhodesia in important respects, but 
the analogy could hold to a limited extent. 
It might well be, of course, that South Africa will always 
have to be content with a second-best solution, or even 
worse : there is no logical reason for suggesting that an 
equitable solution can be found to South Africa's political 
problems, or that conflicts can be resolved rather than 
contained. 
However, political scientists, philosophers and thinkers have 
suggested a variety of ways of regulating conflict and 
bringing about a more equitably-based society (not necessarily 
in relation to South Africa alone). Thus the plea that 
there is no alternative to present policies can be answered 
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by reference to work which has been done on pluralism as a 
prescriptive formula, whether it takes the form of the 
consociational alternative or extra-parliamentary democratic 
pluralism or corporate bargaining, to the work which has been 
done on partition as a possible solution for South Africa, 
and to studies of conflict regulation. 
If the individualistic democracy of Locke and Mill is held 
to be untenable in a deeply divided society, and a first 
past the post system of transfer of power in an open society 
is unlikely to be acceptable to either Whites or Africans, 
then political evolution could take place along the lines 
suggested by the Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart, 
that is, some form of consociational democracy, in which 
there isconsociational activity between ethnic groups to 
protect each group and provide linkage between them. Examples 
are given of common associational democracies such as 
Austria, Holland, Switzerland, Belgium and Malays·ia; 
together with another democratic pluralistic variant, which 
is the Norwegian system of extra-parliamentary organised 
pluralism and national bargaining. Society has to accept 
differences between the ethnic groups; the elites of each 
group must be able to exercise control over their followers; 
the elites must.be prepared to compromise, understanding that 
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more is to be gained by cooperation than by conflict. The 
argument is that conflict will be moderated if no group is 
indefinitely excluded from power, that the contractual 
spirit provides security for all, and that consociational 
democracy can effectively respond to the needs of the various 
groups. 
Eric Nordlinger has written interestingly about conflict and 
conflict regulation in divided societies, in a way which 
suggests that conflict regulation is possible, without down-
playing the difficulties. For example, he notes that : 
"Among contemporary non-Western societies, 
socio.,..economic modernisation detracts from 
the likelihood of conflict regulating 
outcomes. The modernisation process 
further exacerbates already intense 
conflicts, promotes non.,..elite rejection 
of regulatory practices, and facilitates 
a violent response." (Nordlinger, 1972, 
pp . 117-119 ) . 
This point is supported by Kuper, who says that "as the 
economic process generates competitive pressures, so 
counteracting political processes are released in an attempt 
to restore equilibrium by increasing the racial repression 
of the system" (Kuper and Smith, 1971, p.187). 
-
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Separation in South Africa has become synonymous with a 
facade of White domination, but a variety of thinkers have 
suggested that separation could be implemented morally and 
equitably. In a single chapter on alternative geo-political 
solutions of the race problem, Lever (Lever, 1978, p.290-302) 
mentions a number of people who have advocated separation, 
noting that most of them are outspoken critics of the 
policies of domination : Hoernle, Ngubane, Carter, Turk, 
Tiryakian, Cowen, Schlemmer, Cilliers and Paul Malherbe. 
In addition one should note the 'demotomic line' proposed 
by Dr Jan Graaf£ in 1960, cutting South Africa and the 
former British protectorates into two parts of roughly 
60:40 land proportion for Whites and Blacks; the radical 
partition suggested by Dr J. Blenk, a geographer, and Dr K. 
von der Ropp. a political scientist, in a report for the 
German Foreign Affairs Review; the plan proposed by the 
Sabra Chairman for consolidating the Homelands into four 
major independent blocks, three of which could be joined to 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland; and the alternative of a 
mixture of White, Black and multiracial states proposed by 
Harry Schwarz. 
Lever notes that the notion of ethnic differentiation is apt 
to be regarded as conservative by outside observers, but 
that there are good reasons for incorporating a notion of 
204 
separation as an ingredient in any solution of the race 
problem in South Africa, and approvingly quotes Schlemmer 
on the subject (Lever, 1978, p.291). 
It may well be that Professors Lever and Schlem.i.~er and all 
the others are too sanguine in expecting the Whites to 
voluntarily bring about a gee-political solution which is 
genuinely moral and equitable; without the will on the 
part of the Whites to actually give up some considerable 
measure of power, privilege and wealth, even the most 
ingenious proposals will remain a shell without substance, 
or, indeed, the wrong sort of substance in the form of 
continued White domination, which is probably not a long-
term solution to South Africa's political problems. 
r 
However, on the admittedly hopeful assumptions that the 
'--ruling elite develops the will towards such solutions, and 
that the intellectual climate in South Africa changes to 
actually encouraging thoughtful alternatives to present 
policies, enough evidence has been given to suggest that a 
combination of external and internal political thinkers, 
using what is available from a variety of perspectives, 
could develop solutions which are practical, workable, 
acceptable, and possibly uniquely South African contributions 




3.5 SELECTED SCENARIOS OF THE FUTURE 
Finally, it is worth looking at what Herman Kahn termed the 
"speculations or nightmares" of a few chosen writers on the 
future of South Africa, to compare and contrast them with my 
conclusions as put forward in the preceding section on the 
possible fut~res of South Africa. 
Fisher, Schlemmer and Webster distinguish between three types 
of possible changes : 
(1) Change towards a more stable but highly unequal society, 
iri which there is sufficient improvement of material 
conditions for Blacks to prevent their sense of relative 
deprivation from rising to a threatening level; 
(2) Change towards a materially more prosperous societyf 
but one in which class tensions increase in spite of 
improved standards of living, and in which the 
increasing preponderance of Black workers within the 
economy puts them in a position to force a radical 
restructuring of society; 
(3) A situation in which, owing to continued White 
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intransigence, there is relatively slow overall growth, 
little or no improvement or even a decline in the 
standard of living of_ the Blacks, leading to rapidly 
increasing social tension, and, perhaps with outside 
aid, a rapid restructuring of the society, either in 
the direction of socialism or Black capitalism 
(Schlemmer and Webster (eds), 1978, p.25). 
Whilst it seems that this last scenario is the most likely 
at present, I disagree that the outcome of the "rapidly 
increasing social tension" will be a rapid restructuring of 
the society : rather, there is likely to be suppression of 
dissidence and opposition, until equal or greater power is 
raised against the ruling elite. The analysis in this 
thesis suggests that the raising of such power, either 
internally, or in combination with external support, is most 
unlikely now, or in the foreseeable future. Naturally, it 
must be reiterated that the other two scenarios, and indeed 
a good many more, could all be regarded as plausible, 
precisely because the future is unknown : but following 
Kahn's suggestion that one ought to have some idea of the 
likely futures, one puts forward hypotheses in humble 
readiness to alter them in the face of changing evidence. 
One conclusion which clearly contradicts mine - that the 
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Whites are likely to remain in power for a while to come -
is that by Colin Legum, who suggests that southern Africa 
is experiencing a shift of power of historical importance, 
and continues to make two predictions : 
a) "that it is already clear that it is only a 
matter of time before Black power replaces 
White power throughout the entire region" 
b) "the second predictable factor is that this 
decisive change will occur within the next 
five to ten years{ making the coming 
decade a period of turbulent crises and 
upheavals" (Legum, 1977, p.3). 
The first statement seems reasonable enough~ for after all 
Black power might predominate one day, but that could be 
half a century hence. However, it requires a certain amoun,t 
of daring to predict the overthrow of the South African 
system in the next five to ten years : if the analysis in 
this thesis is accurate, it would require a deus ex machina 
for that to happen! 
Ruth Butterworth suggests that "the outcome depends on the 
rates of change in three interlocking variables. These 
are, first, the performance of the South African economy; 
secondly, the behaviour of the White electorate; and 
I 
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thirdly, the political development of Black Africa, <7 > 
including the Black majority within the southern third of 
the continent" (Buttervvorth, 1977, p. 27). There seems 
little in these variables to suggest fundamental changes. 
However the South African economy performs in the 
foreseeable future, the day when it weakens to the point of 
forcing White South Africans to capitulate to Black demands 
is a far-off one indeed. The all-White electorate will 
probably offer the South African Prime Minister and the 
Government as much support as is enjoyed by an elected 
leader elsewhere in the world. Whatever the political 
development of the Black states around South Africa, or the 
internal politicisation of the Africans for that matter, 
they are unlikely to successfully tackle the might of White 
South African power. Butterworth's own conclusions talk 
rather vaguely about 11 destabilisation" of one form or another. 
In a more interesting analysis, Gwendolen Carter asks what 
political changes that satisfy Blacks will be acceptable 
by Whites? Wisely, she leaves the question unanswered, 
except to point out that South Africa is a bundle of 
(7) By "Black Africa", the author presumably means the states· 
around South Africa, including Namibia and Zimbabwe, 
which will be ruled by Blacks. 
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contradictions and that the Homelands policy is not working, 
and then asks two more questions : 
"The Organisation of African Unity still considers 
South Africa an African state but one with the 
obligations to dismantle its apartheid system. 
Will Afrikanerdom accept the challenge? Or 
will South Africa remain the battleground, and 
an ·ever more dangerous one, of Afrikaner and 
African nationalism?" (Carter, 1977, p.134). 
What is interesting about these questions is the implicit 
suggestion that whereas one possibility is the retirement 
of Afrikanerdom into the laager to hold out as long as 
possible, the other is that Afrikaner nationalism will 
"once.again display the pragmatism that led to the 'outward-
looking policy' and accept in fact, as well as in words, 
the inevitability of the permanence of the urban Blacks, 
thereby acknowledging the basic fallacy of separate 
development" (Carter, 1977, p.134). 
One recent predictive effort which centres on the importance 
of international forces is that by R.W. Johnson, who paints 
the following scenario : an endless guerilla war which can 
only get worse, accompanied by a rising tempo of unrest 
among urban Blacks in South Africa. 
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"At this point (and only at this point) the US 
will gain the same leverage over Pretoria that 
Pretoria held over Smith in 1976. The US, 
for its part, will wish to 'save' South Africa 
for the West at all costs and will presumably 
attempt to force South Africa to accept 
majority rule as the price of .a major US 
commitment to South Africa - perhaps in the 
form of the SATO agreement always hungered 
after by Pretoria" (Johnson, 1977, p.326). 
The book raises more questions than it answers. Why, for 
example, should the US necessarily want to save South Africa 
for the West at all, let alone at any price? 
Sippel and Selfe (1978, p.86) point out that Johnson's 
discussion of the role of the South African Black population 
is inadequate, mainly because the book reveals no under-
standing of the rise of Black consciousness, and no serious 
consideration is given to Black organisations, be they the 
ANC, Inkatha or other urban-based internal groupings. The 
critics suggest that Johnson's process of mistaken inference 
(which they term 11 inductive leapfrog") does not arrive at an 
approximation of a theory of social change; and soberly 
point out that there is no general theory of revolution at 
this stage, so that prediction is a hazardous occupation! 
Johnson's suggestion that if the South African Government 
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pursues a "sufficiently ruthless and brutal policy at home", 
while abstaining from military intervention in its border 
states, "it's future would seem secure enough well into the 
1990's", and this "10 - 12 year period of respite places 
the decisions to be faced then comfortably beyond the time 
horizon of working politicians now" (Johnson, 1977, p.314), 
appears difficult to refute in the face of the evidence 
currently available about the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of the South African Government and the forces 
opposed to ...... 1 l-. 
A more rigorous academic analysis by Austen Turk (1967, 
p.402-412), examines a range of alternative outcomes of 
racial_ conflict, extending from the one extreme in which 
the Africans may drive the Whites into the sea, to the 
other where Africans are decimated to bring a White man's 
country into being. Of the eight alternatives considered, 
he feels that the most probable solution lies with the 
separatist set of possibilities "segregation is • a 
highly probable resolution as a transition from a conflict 
between dominant and suppressed racially and ethnically 
distinct peoples to the federal pattern" (Turk, 1967, p.411). 
Evolving the Homelands policy into some sort of federal or 
consociational pattern is a potentially rewarding path to 
follow, but as yet there is no indication that the ruling 
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elite is seriously considering this route into the future. 
Turk continues to say that 
"while nonracial democracy, implying freedom 
of marriage among other freedoms, may well be 
the most stable resolution of racial conflicts 
over power-authority in the long run, it is 
very unlikely unless and until : 
(i} assimilation is deliberately and 
ruthlessly forced by an external party; 
(ii} there has been a multigenerational 
history of participation in a federal 
political structure in which the units 
are in large part racially distinctive; 
(iii} interpersonal.contacts involving all 
the possible combinations of racial 
identity and authority have been 
experienced by very large proportions 
of the relevant populations for two or 
more generations; 
(iv} racialism has been displaced as a 
cultural element" (Turk, 1967, p. 411}. 
South African realities seem rather far removed from this 
scenario at present, but need not necessarily remain so in 
a longer historical perspective. 
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One factor has become abundantly clear in the course of this 
study : if the solutions chosen are to be both workable and 
acceptable to all South Africans in the long-run, there will 
have to be selflessness and willingness to relinquish some 
considerable portion of power, privilege, wealth and status 
by the Whites and especially by the ruling elite, in the 
interests of possible, but not certain, gain in the future. 
It is understandable if the Whites are hesitant, but future 
South Africans of all races may find it difficult to forgive 
them the consequences of not having the courage or the 
vision to try to establish a more just society while they 
had it in their power to do so. Can South Africa develop 
a political dispensation which most of society will want to 
preserve, in the knowledge that it allows its members to 
fulfil their aspirations as far as possible? 
Edward Roux suggests 11 that history has lessons to teach us 
no one will deny. Whether any ruling class has ever taken 
such lessons seriously is not so certain" (Roux, 1948, 1964, 
p.433). Regrettably, it could be argued that it is not even 
certain whether history has lessons to teach us : trends 
which appear to be immutable do change, long~standing empires 
and ideas go into decline, quantum leaps in knowledge change 
priorities and possibilities in society, and at the current 
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rate of change in the world it is safer to rely less on 
historical lessons as a guide, and to view the future as 
largely open. 
Whereas Roux~s remark is probably correct in most cases, 
history has recorded some far-sighted and magnanimous 
gestures. For example, the German Swiss Cantons, having 
militarily defeated the French Cantons, instead of subjugating, 
exploiting and expropriating the people and wealth in the 
usual way of conquerors, immediately pardoned them and gave 
them full status in the Confederation Helvetique, thereby 
limiting postwar bitterness to a minimum and ensuring maximum 
French Canton interest in the peace and security of 
Switzerland. 
It is an unpersuasive argument which suggests that the 
psychology of South Africans is. so peculiar that it renders 
intelligent bargaining and compromise impossible. A more 
plausible reason for the apparent lack of compromise is the 
perception by Whites that White interests (including the 
basic one of survival as a distinct group) are mutually 
incompatible with African interests( which are seen as 
leading ultimately to African supremacy and control of South 
Africa. This perception precludes serious negotiation with 
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the Africans because the end product of any such "weakening" 
as bargaining is seen as leading inexorably to the demise of 
White society in South Africa; the alternative is viewed 
as being the maintenance of effective control by all 
available means. It remains to be seen whether these 
perceptions will change, thereby allowing the Whites to 
develop the will to find alternative fundamental and equitable 
solutions to the conflicts in South African society, at the 
least cost for the maximum long-term benefit of all South 
Africans. 
In the meanwhile(. academic studies such as those by Pierre 
van den Berghe, Heribert Adam and the others analysed in this 
thesis give new perspectives, explanations and understanding 
of South African society predictive efforts also have 
their place, since it is imperative in a world of 
exponentially increasing change to at least try to think 
about the unthinkable. However, much serious, rigorous 
academic research remains to be done on concrete political 
events and problems in South Africa, and indeed elsewhere, 
for as Moore concludes . 
"Whether the ancient Western dream of a free and 
rational society will always remain a chimera, 
no~one can know for sure. But if the men of the 
future are ever to break the chains of the present, 
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they will have to understand the .forces that 
forged them" (Moore, 1966, p.508). 
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